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Abstract
Over the course of the fifth to ninth centuries, the Roman Empire gave way in
western Europe to several kingdoms initially founded by so-called ‘barbarian’ tribes.
This thesis is a thematic assessment of the evolutionary trends that shaped this
period. It respects and integrates the highly interconnected nature of these themes
(politics and social structures, for instance). It is driven by a desire for synthesis, and
in particular a desire to reconcile the economic arguments of Chris Wickham and
Walter Goffart with the more political histories of Peter Heather and Guy Halsall.
The institutions that define the early medieval era—localized, more feudal societies,
power systems, and economies—will be seen to be the direct outcome of trends
begun under the Empire. In fact, these trends began with the Romans’ method for
accommodating the arrival of the barbarian peoples in the fifth century.
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Glossary & Abbreviations
AA

Auctores antiquissimi

allod

Land held absolutely, i.e., independently of any overlord, and not
subject to tax, rent, or legal constraints. Distinguished from socalled feudal land tenure.

annona

Supplies, principally food (and especially grain), moved within the
Empire to sustain the bureaucracy and most especially the army.

barbarian

Non-Roman, non-Celtic inhabitant of western Europe. Frequently if
inaccurately referred to as Germanic, particularly in older literature.

CE

Constitutiones Extravagantes

CG452

Chronica Gallica 452

foederati

Barbarians deliberately settled by treaty (a foedus) within the Empire, usually with the intent that they provide local military and/or
governmental services.

LC

Liber Constitutionum sive Lex Gundobada

LSK

Lex Salica Karolina

MGH

Monumenta Germaniae Historica

PLS

Pactus Legis Salicae
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Motivation and Research

The subject period of this thesis, spanning roughly the years 400 to 800, was a time
of major turbulence within western Europe. To properly understand the context,
however, requires backing up a little farther in time. Over 50 years (235–84) there
were 20 legitimate emperors and dozens of pretenders; 17 of these emperors were
assassinated, and two more died in war. In the most extreme case, four pretenders
managed to rule a breakaway “Gallic Empire” for 15 years.1 This so-called crisis
of the third century was balanced by a long period of restoration during the fourth
century, during which the Empire was governed by capable emperors from Diocletian to Theodosius I (284–395). It was during the troubled third century that the
Franks, Alemanni, and Goths were all first attested.2 There are also allusions during
1 Peter

Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the
Barbarians (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 66; Guy Halsall, Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West 376–568 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
73–74; Patrick J. Geary, Before France and Germany: The Creation and Transformation
of the Merovingian World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 10–11.
2 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 73–74; Geary, Before France and Germany, 10–11. See
Herwig Wolfram, History of the Goths, revised from the German second edition of 1972,
ed. and trans. Thomas J. Dunlap (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 43–52,
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this period to other peoples—the Saxons, Burgundians, and Vandals—living beyond
those tribes that most closely bordered the Empire.3 All of these peoples later made
their way inside the Empire.
The origin of the Franks is uncertain, but they were almost certainly from the
area east of the Rhine. They first crossed the frontier in the third century on a “raid”
which took them all the way through Gaul to the Pyrenees before they were repulsed;
from that time they were in what Katherine Fischer Drew called “constant contact”
with the Empire.4 The Goths formed in the area north of the Black Sea and gradually
worked westward along the Danube in the late third century; they were initially
defeated by Claudius II Gothicus (268–70) but remained in the Danube corridor.5
For a time thereafter, the Empire was able to prevent any further incursions. But
after the defeat at Adrianople in 378, the Empire could no longer hold out the Goths.
More famously, on 31 December 406, a mass of Alans, Vandals, and Sueves crossed
the frozen Rhine to wander in the interior of the Empire; the Burgundians may have
joined this migration. The majority of these peoples ravaged Gaul for the next three
years before eventually settling in Spain.6
Although the Empire made extensive efforts to accommodate these peoples—
settling them, hiring them, delegating to them, and in various other ways integrating them into the fabric of Roman society—the fourth and fifth centuries were
nonetheless a time of significant change. The barbarians steadily increased in infor a more detailed discussion of the Goths in particular.
3 Patrick J. Geary, The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 81.
4 Katherine Fischer Drew, introduction to Katherine Fischer Drew, ed., The Laws of the
Salian Franks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 3–5; Geary, Myth of
Nations, 80.
5 Thomas S. Burns, A History of the Ostrogoths (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1984), 19–25.
6 Bernard S. Bachrach, “The Alans in Gaul,” Traditio 23 (1967): 477; Geary, Myth of
Nations, 101. Burgundians: Paulus Orosius, Historiarum Adversos Paganos Libri Septem,
in Alexander Callander Murray, ed., From Roman to Merovingian Gaul, Readings in Medieval Civilizations and Cultures 5 (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000), VII.38.
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fluence throughout this time, both as individuals and as national/political groups.
Simultaneously this period saw the apparent weakening of long-standing imperial
institutions, culminating with the deposition of the last formal emperor of the West,
Romulus Augustulus, in 476. Historically this has been viewed, through the lens
of Edward Gibbon’s famous ‘decline and fall’ paradigm, as the dissolution of the
Empire and the end of Roman civilization in the West.
Although superficially the Empire was replaced by barbarian kingdoms in the
early medieval period, these kingdoms retained much of late Roman culture and
institutions. Roman continuity was of course not unending. There comes a point
when—whether we characterize it as arising from barbarian culture, a Roman fusion,
or as something altogether new—we must begin to speak instead of Europe. In one
sense, therefore, Gibbon was right: as the kingdoms began to carry this Roman
heritage in different directions, the monolithic Empire dissolved into a handful of
related but distinct localities. By the time of Charlemagne, it is fair to say that, in
Henri Pirenne’s words, “The Middle Ages had arrived.”7
∗

∗

∗

My fundamental area of interest is the boundary in space, time, and conceptualization between the Roman Empire and the early medieval kingdoms. This places
me squarely in the field first comprehensively surveyed by Gibbon, and subsequently
re-plotted by Pirenne and then Peter Brown. In more recent years Bernard Bachrach,
Cameron, Collins, Patrick Geary, Walter Goffart, Halsall, Chris Wickham, and Ian
Wood—all of whom will be referenced extensively in this thesis—have all made significant contributions. My emphasis in current research is on the institutional transition between late antiquity and the early medieval period, especially in western and
7 Henri

Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, reprint of 1954 edition by George Allen
& Unwin Ltd., London, ed. and trans. Bernard Miall (Minneola, NY: Dover, 2001), 265.
See also the position taken in G. W. Bowersock, Peter Brown, and Oleg Grabar, eds., Late
Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1999),
vii. However, compare the titles of cited works by Guy Halsall, Averil Cameron, and Roger
Collins, who stop at 568, 600, and 1000, respectively.
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southern continental Europe. Of particular interest to me is the idea of institutional
permanence or continuity of various ideas and trends.
My approach, both in this thesis and elsewhere, is driven by a desire for synthesis.
In sentiment I am perhaps closest to the French Annales school and its concept
of total history, at least in terms of the inclusiveness of sources and the interest
in problems and long-term studies. I would like to follow Georges Duby’s lead in
“relegat[ing] the sensational to the sidelines” and “striv[ing] on the contrary to pose
and solve problems and, neglecting surface disturbances, to observe the long and
medium-term evolution of economy, society and civilisation.”8 Fernand Braudel
likewise made the point that “we can no longer believe in the explanation of history
in terms of this or that dominant factor. There is no unilateral history. No one
thing is exclusively dominant: neither the conflict between races . . . nor powerful
economic rhythms . . . nor constant social tensions. . . .” The list goes on.9
At the same time, I disapprove of the rejection of historical narrative. Indeed, I
very much agree with Peter Heather that “it is vitally important not to lose sight
of narrative in the midst of the current emphasis on ideology and perception.”10 All
matter of sentiment aside, reconstructing narrative—and I carefully say reconstructing, because I reject E. H. Carr’s notion that historians may pick and choose their
past to suit their interpretations—is the primary goal of history.11 While Leopold
von Ranke’s desire to describe the past wie es eigentlich gewesen ist (“how it really
was”) may be forever beyond our grasp, that does not mean we should not strive to
do so.

8 Georges

Duby, The Legend of Bouvines: War, Religion, and Culture in the Middle
Ages (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), foreword.
9 Fernand Braudel, On History, trans. from the French 1969 edition by Sarah Matthews
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 10.
10 Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, xiv.
11 Edward Hallett Carr, What is History? (New York: Vintage, 1961), 5–11.
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Framing the Argument

In 1984, Wickham lamented that “Much analysis of the congeries of changes that
is generally known as the ‘end of the ancient world in the west’—or some similar
name—has been harmed by considerable lack of clarity as to what is actually meant
by the phrase.” Wickham goes on to list a series of things commonly considered part
of ‘antiquity’, while noting that their histories are neither the same nor necessarily
related: “Graeco-Roman paganism (and/or state Christianity), secular Latin literature, temples, the emperor, the senate, slavery, [and] togas.” Since Wickham wrote
that nearly thirty years ago, there have been a number of more or less comprehensive
attempts to describe the “congeries of changes” by, among others, Collins, Cameron,
Halsall, and Wickham himself.12
Unfortunately, the discourse has not necessarily come any closer to Wickham’s
goal of clarity. His point was that we have lumped too many extraneous features
of late antiquity together and missed the essential elements (a charge he would presumably also level at the works cited above), and his article was therefore an explicit
attempt to frame the “end of the ancient world” in economic terms, rather than
cultural history or political history per se. In my view, however, he gives economic
history too privileged a position, even if he does treat “the fall of the state” as a
necessary component of an economic explanation.13 This thesis will undertake to
do almost exactly what Wickham was decrying, and deliver a broad, synthesizing
survey of institutional changes in the post-imperial period.
The elements we now see as medieval were largely present (if latent) within the
12 Chris

Wickham, “The Other Transition: From the Ancient World to Feudalism,” Past
and Present 103 (1984): 3. Survey books include: Roger Collins, Early Medieval Europe, 300–1000, 2nd ed., History of Europe (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 1999), originally
published 1991; Averil Cameron, The Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity, AD 395–
600 (London: Routledge, 1993); Halsall, Barbarian Migrations; and Chris Wickham, The
Inheritance of Rome: A History of Europe from 400 to 1000 (New York: Viking, 2009).
13 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 4.
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later Roman Empire—the barbarian invasions and subsequent political realignment
merely provided an opportunity for social and economic structures to realign as well.
To cast this in Braudelian terms: a series of events in the fourth and fifth centuries
enabled existing imperial structures/conjunctures, built within the framework of the
Mediterranean (and particularly Roman) longue durée, to re-assemble in new ways.
Within this context, barbarians and their Roman “collaborators” actually made
much use of imperial institutions, adapting and working within them—and when
necessary, replacing them. These changes affected the political, social, economic, legal, and religious domains. They are characterized by an essential continuity, though
with particular areas of disruption or discontinuous change, and throughout a trend
towards localization of institutions. In particular I will argue that the traditional
narrative of feudalism is still a useful—perhaps the most useful—framework for understanding this transformation.
Stated more directly: The barbarian kingdoms of post-imperial western Europe,
commonly held to be the destroyers or at least supplanters of the Roman Empire,
were in fact built on and out of the late imperial structural framework. The very
institutions that define the early medieval era—more localized power systems and
economies and the beginnings of what may be called feudalism—are all the direct
result of evolutionary trends begun under the Empire.
∗

∗

∗

There are a number of definitional issues raised by framing the thesis this way. By
‘institution’ or ‘structure’ I mean what Braudel called “an organization, a coherent
and fairly fixed series of relationships between realities and social masses.”14 In the
context of this thesis, that includes political structure, class and ethnic divisions,
economic patterns, law, and religion. In future work it could be expanded to include
a number of other topics. In treating the subject this way I reject the traditionally
14 Braudel,

On History, 31. The passage continues, “For us historians, a structure is of
course a construct, an architecture, but over and above that it is a reality which time uses
and abuses over long periods.” I cannot say I disagree with this definition.
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perceived division between political and social history.15
The Roman Empire, of course, was a Mediterranean-wide entity that lasted in
some form (including the earlier monarchy and republic) for at least 1,200 years in
the West, and nearly 2,000 in the East. By ‘the Empire’ or ‘imperial’ I am referring
either to the single integrated entity (fourth century and earlier) or to the western and
eastern halves operating as a single conceptual unit and sharing broad similarities.
When I need to specify the Western or Eastern Empires, I will try to be clear about
which one I mean.
In modern times, ‘Europe’ has many meanings, some of them quite far-ranging.
Geary highlights some of the difficulties surrounding any attempt to grapple with the
definition of ‘Europe’, particularly when linking its history to the barbarian peoples
and the post-imperial kingdoms.16 For the purpose of this thesis, however, I will
identify Europe with its continental portion. Primarily this will mean the regions
bordering the northwestern Mediterranean—roughly the Iberian and Italian peninsulas and what is now France—and on occasion some of their immediate neighbors
(e.g. what is now Switzerland). This narrowing of scope is justified by the historical events described in the previous section. Whereas the northern and western
Mediterranean was subject (along with some of northern Africa) to ‘barbarian’ invasions in the third to fifth centuries, the remainder of the Empire was not. Indeed,
the eastern Mediterranean remained Roman, at least in name, for nearly another
millennium. The Eastern Empire brought western Africa back into its sphere in the
sixth century. In the seventh and eighth centuries it lost all of its southern territories
to the expanding Islamic empire, which Pirenne saw as pivotal, and which certainly
15 Compare,

for example, the characterizations of Braudel’s Annales paradigm in his own
On History, as well as Lynn Hunt, “French History in the Last Twenty Years: The Rise
and Fall of the Annales Paradigm,” Journal of Contemporary History 21 (1986): 209–24,
and Lynn Hunt, “Introduction: History, Culture, and Text,” in The New Cultural History,
ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 3–6.
16 Geary, Myth of Nations, 1–14; as another measure of complexity, the Council of Europe
currently includes forty-seven nations.
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altered its historical trajectory. These disparate regions all have their own unique
and interesting institutional histories (and historiographies), but for the moment I
will set them aside in favor of the larger meta-narrative of western Europe.
For the most part this thesis will exclude Anglo-Saxon England, for the simple reason that its historical trajectory was fundamentally different from those of
the continental kingdoms. Britain, which was always one of the least romanized
provinces of the Empire, was nonetheless still nominally Roman when it was deliberately abandoned by Rome. This withdrawal happened decades prior to the arrival
of the Anglo-Saxons, meaning that there was no extended period of acculturation or
incorporation of the Anglo-Saxons into Roman political/social structures, as there
was on the Continent. As an unsurprising consequence, Anglo-Saxon England ended
up being the least Roman of the territories of the former Empire. I will still refer to the Anglo-Saxons on occasion as providing examples of barbarian culture or
institutions, or as offering counter-examples to trends on the Continent.
Lastly, why the periodization 400 to 800? These dates are not meant to represent
hard endpoints: 400 is a convenient approximation for two changes that collectively
signaled a new phase for imperial history. The Empire was irrevocably divided into
West and East after the death of Theodosius I in 395. Combined with the mass
invasion of 406, the Empire’s governing strategy, and indeed historical trajectory,
was never the same. At the other end of the period, 800 is likewise a convenient
date, corresponding with Charlemagne’s imperial coronation in Rome. Although
this thesis will include some discussion of events under Charlemagne past 800, the
Carolingians represented a significant break with the past, and for the most part any
discussion of the early medieval period will end with the reign of Charlemagne.
Before turning to the structure of this thesis, I also want to touch briefly on
a few matters of terminology, most of which will be discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 2. As I have done already, I will continue to use the terms ‘late antique’ and
‘early medieval’ somewhat interchangeably throughout this thesis. It is my belief
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that there is some separation between the two, with ‘late antique’ referring to the
earlier part of the period in question, and ‘early medieval’ to the later. However,
although I will not use ‘late antique’ to mean 800, or ‘early medieval’ to mean 400,
there is a great deal of overlap in the middle and to avoid any false sense of precision
I will not try to distinguish too carefully between the two. Similarly, I have already
used the term ‘barbarian’ above; I use it merely as a nondescript, non-pejorative
catch-all label for ‘non-Romans’. I will use the terms ‘feudalism’ and ‘feudal society’
somewhat loosely to describe a society characterized by hierarchical relationships of
power, jurisdiction, and land-based economies.17

1.3

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into eight chapters that will address the evolution of late Roman
institutions in light of the historical events identified above. The chapters are largely
arranged thematically, although some of them are highly interconnected—political
and social structures and economics, for instance. The last two chapters on law and
religion are notionally extensions of the chapters on politics and society, respectively,
but contain distinct arguments and so are treated separately.
Chapter 2 addresses the historiography of late antiquity, including both significant
historical debates and current positions. It looks first at the ways historians have
approached the field of late antiquity, focusing in particular on the ‘decline and fall’
paradigm and the development of the ‘late antique’ model itself. It will turn next
to the related question of barbarian identity and the debate over whether we must
see Roman and ‘barbarian’ identities and continuities as a zero-sum game. It will
then change course somewhat to tackle the contentious debate over feudalism; it will
conclude that while the traditional understanding of the label may be inappropriate,
17 I

will follow Wickham in looking for useful labels, rather than necessarily exact ones:
see Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 7.
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‘feudalism’ still holds value as a conceptual framework. Finally, the chapter ends with
an assessment of the ways in which our understanding of late antiquity is improving.
Chapter 3 is the first of the thematic chapters, and will investigate the evolution
of political and governmental structures in late antiquity. It begins with the way
the barbarian peoples were accommodated by the Empire and the ways the groups
shaped each other. Power structures became increasingly decentralized, a trend that
began under the late Empire. This trend allowed the barbarians a political entry
point, a way of adapting themselves into Roman institutions. Over the course of late
antiquity, the barbarians also began to adapt these institutions to themselves; this
chapter will focus in particular on the execution of political power, taxation, and
military organization.
Chapter 4 will pivot from politics to society, addressing the class systems and
organizations of both late Roman and early medieval societies. Although Roman
and early barbarian social structures had some surprising similarities, these (and
their differences) became blurred as the two cultures adapted to each other. Like
government, culture became more local throughout late antiquity, leading to the
regionalization of a formerly common, comparatively monolithic culture and society.
The roles of cities and towns also changed during this period, becoming more purely
administrative centers. The chapter will end on a discussion of the impact of these
changes on the growth of feudalism, or at least feudal-like structures.
Chapter 5 will pivot again to economic structures, beginning with the bases of
the economy, primarily agriculture and industry. The chapter will make a brief
digression to address the so-called ‘Pirenne Thesis’ on the comparative impacts of
the barbarians and Islam upon the Roman economy, and will conclude that while
Pirenne raised many good arguments, ultimately his conclusions are unsatisfactory.
The chapter will then return to economic trends in the late antique/early medieval
period, noting once more the tendency towards localization. This effects of this
localization were felt particularly hard in trade, although ‘international’ commerce
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did survive in the market fairs and new trading routes.
Having gone through some of the more conceptual aspects of institutional change,
Chapter 6 will be a specific case study. The laws of the early medieval kingdoms
were founded on Roman law. The chapter will cover the evolution of that law as
well as the process by which the new legal codes were established and the ways in
which their content reflected or rejected Roman antecedents. Finally, the chapter
will discuss the use of the various early medieval laws as an insight into the culture
of the barbarian peoples that first issued them.
After discussing the avenues by which western Europe eventually became more or
less universally Catholic, Chapter 7 attempts to explore the interconnections between
the subjects of the preceding chapters from the perspective of the Catholic Church.
The Church gained tremendous power and influence throughout late antiquity and
the early middle ages, both political and economic, and had a hand in re-shaping
the law and society of the kingdoms that sprang up after the Empire. This chapter
will investigate the extent to which these new kingdoms became quasi-theocracies,
heavily influenced by and dependent on the institution of the Church.
Finally, Chapter 8 will re-assess the thesis. After a brief recapitulation of the
argument, it will offer up conclusions and identify themes that may be drawn from
this study. It owes much to both Pirenne and Peter Brown, at least with respect
to the first post-imperial period following the barbarian invasions. It will construct
an account of this period that, while complex, is able to synthesize political, social,
and economic history to see elements both of Roman continuity and of the newlyintroduced barbarian culture. This transition between what is thought of as ‘the
Roman Empire’ and ‘early medieval Europe’ is thus best seen as beginning well before
traditional breaking points (e.g., the fall of Romulus Augustulus), and continuing
some core of the Empire, along with a sense of romanitas, long afterward.

12

Chapter 2
The Historiography of Late
Antiquity

2.1

A Brief History of the Field

However they may have been perceived at the time, events along the Rhine–Danube
frontier in the late fourth and early fifth centuries were to prove epochal in the history
of the Roman Empire. In the last quarter of the fourth century, the Empire faced the
near-simultaneous threats of the Alemanni and Franks in the West and the Huns and
Goths in the East. For almost exactly a century after the Goths defeated and killed
the Eastern emperor Valens at Adrianople in 378, the Empire faced conflict both
within and outside its borders. Finally, the last emperor of the West was deposed
by barbarians in 476.
Prior to the turn of the twentieth century, the prevailing view of these events
had been that of Edward Gibbon, whose History of the Decline and Fall of the
Roman Empire (issued in six volumes between 1776 and 1788) neatly summarized
his perspective in its title. To Gibbon, the (morally cataclysmic) end of the Empire
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was due first and foremost to the barbarian invasions.1 Gibbon also blamed the
degeneracy of the Empire; see page 181 of the same work.
More recently, some historians have still seen the history of the period through
the lens of catastrophe, decline, and ruin. Being somewhat dramatic about it, Luis
Garcı́a Moreno saw an “inundación” of ‘Germanic’ peoples into the Iberian peninsula, and substantial disruption of agricultural systems due to the upheaval of the
invasions.2 Two books, published in 2005–2006, both announce their perspectives
in their titles: Peter Heather’s The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of
Rome and the Barbarians and Bryan Ward-Perkins’ even more pessimistic The Fall
of Rome and the End of Civilization. These modern historians have seen the Empire’s
end in a more complex network of causes than did Gibbon. But their interpretation
still pits Rome against the barbarians: Heather, for instance, emphasizes the failed
reconquest of Vandal Africa and the barbarian ‘seizures’ of kingdoms in Gaul and
Spain.3 And he attributes “the destruction of the Roman west” to an “exogenous
shock” caused by “the largely Germanic groups . . . whose invasions fatally holed the
west Roman ship of state.”4
This is not to deny a fundamental sense of division between Rome and Europe in
contemporary historiography. However, while historians have differed on the timing,
severity, and causes of the end of the Roman Empire, the modern view is generally less
1 Edward

Gibbon, Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (New York: Fawcett
Premier, 1962), 177–80: among other statements, “the barriers, which had so long separated the savage and the civilized nations of the earth.”
2 Inundación: Luis A. Garcı́a Moreno, “Las invasiones y la época visigoda: reinos y
condados cristianos,” in Juan José Sayas Abengochea and Luis A. Garcı́a Moreno, eds.,
Romanismo y germanismo: el despertar de los pueblos hispánicos (siglos iv–x), Historia de
España 2 (Calabria: Editorial Labor, 1982), 250; upheaval: 279–80. Garcı́a, admittedly,
was writing twenty to twenty-five years before the other authors cited below.
3 Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, 385–430. On ‘seizure’: the word is used (as ‘seize’
and ‘seized’) on pages 416 and 417. Similar concepts are taking—of power (416), of cities
(417), and of control (418)—and carving up (or out), used on 418 and 421. See also Bryan
Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
4 Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, 431–59; quotations are all from 450.
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catastrophic. Guy Halsall’s work Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West 376–
568 is less provocatively titled—and decidedly less gloomy—than that of Heather
or Ward-Perkins. And although there is still the sense that, in Halsall’s words, “the
barbarian migrations and the fall of Rome are inextricably linked,”5 with the few
exceptions mentioned above, ‘fall’ is no longer seen as an appropriate interpretation.
As Peter Wells puts it, “to judge [this period] in terms of ‘decline,’ or the communities
that instigated the changes as ‘barbaric,’ is to adopt the cultural prejudices of the
late Roman writers.”6
∗

∗

∗

Most notably, Henri Pirenne contended in the early twentieth century that there
was in fact a great deal of continuity following the supposed end of the Empire.
The now famous “Pirenne thesis” was first stated in 1922 and developed over the
next two decades before being fully laid out in his Mohammed and Charlemagne
(1939).7 Pirenne argued that neither the fall of the Western emperor nor the barbarian invasions were the cause of the paradigmatic break between the Roman Empire
and early medieval Europe. His premise was that Rome was fundamentally Mediterranean, that continued Mediterranean ties kept the West essentially Roman for nearly
two centuries after the Empire’s supposed demise, and that it was only when these
ties were severed by Islam in the seventh century that the Empire truly ceased to
exist: “The Germanic invasions destroyed neither the Mediterranean unity of the
ancient world, nor what may be regarded as the truly essential features of the Roman culture.”8 Pirenne emphasized the survival of the legal fiction of the Empire
5 Halsall,

Barbarian Migrations, 10; see also 73–74, and Geary, Before France and Germany, 10–11 for similar if less emphatic sentiment.
6 Peter S. Wells, Barbarians to Angels: The Dark Ages Reconsidered (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2008), 5.
7 For early statements, Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival
of Trade, trans. Frank D. Halsey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 3–5, and
Henri Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, trans. I. E. Clegg (San
Diego: Harvest Books, 1936), 1. For the more detailed argument, see Pirenne, Mohammed
and Charlemagne.
8 Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne; continuity: 75–144; Mediterranean nature:
most notably 17–18, 140. His conclusions are stated on 284.
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and the actual survival of “Romania”, the idea of “Roman-ness” that had motivated
the barbarians in the first place.9 With the exception of trade (Pirenne saw continued trans-Mediterranean voyages, trade, and wars throughout this period10 ), he was
significantly less emphatic on the survival of institutions. (Pirenne’s contention on
Islam will be discussed in Chapter 5.)
Pirenne was not the first to offer an alternative view to Gibbon, as Henry St.
Lawrence Beaufort Moss was already pointing out in the 1930s.11 Nonetheless,
Pirenne’s thesis received significant attention in the decades following his publication, and despite criticism was ultimately successful—together with the work of
Alfons Dopsch and Ferdinand Lot—in changing the terms of the debate. Robert
Lopez, writing in the 1940s, was even more emphatic. Noting that “It is not my
purpose to challenge the core of Pirenne’s conclusions,” Lopez critiqued Pirenne’s
particular analysis of economic changes but continued to support a final political
realignment under the Arabs.12 A few years later, Daniel Dennett made an attempt
to thoroughly refute Pirenne, but this was unsuccessful.13 In the late 1950s, Philip
9 Pirenne,

Mohammed and Charlemagne, 22, 36, 63, 118. Pirenne credits this development to some extent to the centuries-long extended interaction and slow cultural accommodation of the northern barbarians. Regarding the legal survival of the Empire: no
barbarians in the sixth century claimed the throne, and all recognized the Eastern emperor
(32–33). I will return to this idea in Chapter 3, below.
10 See, e.g., Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, 79–96.
11 In fact, Moss noted that “By the end of the nineteenth century what may be called the
‘catastrophic’ view had been definitely abandoned. Since then the complexity of the change
has become steadily more apparent”: Henry St. Lawrence Beaufort Moss, “Economic Consequences of the Barbarian Invasions,” in Alfred F. Havighurst, ed., The Pirenne Thesis:
Analysis, Criticism, and Revision (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1969), 35–38; quotation
is from 35.
12 Robert S. Lopez, “Mohammed and Charlemagne: A Revision,” in Havighurst, The
Pirenne Thesis, 40, 42–55. Lopez goes on to say that “Mahomet et Charlemagne and
Dopsch’s Grundlagen—however much one may disagree on point of details and on range of
implications—have helped historians to realize that their traditional division of ages was
wrong: Germanic invasions did not mark the beginning of a new era; Arab invasions did.”
Both quotations are from 40.
13 See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, Jr., “Pirenne and Muhammad,” in Havighurst, The
Pirenne Thesis, 56–71. A thorough “re-rebuttal” of Dennett is neither possible nor appropriate here; suffice it to say that his criticisms were either anticipated by Lopez earlier in
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Grierson defended Pirenne’s assessment of the collapse of trade in the so-called Dark
Ages.14 By 1960, Bryce Lyon was able to say that “As a result of the studies of
Pirenne, Dopsch and Ferdinand Lot, few historians today can still pretend that the
Germanic invasions of the fourth and fifth centuries were catastrophic for Western
Europe. . . . The majority of historians concede that fragments of ancient civilization outlived these invasions.” Lyon argues that while Pirenne may have overstated
the extent of Merovingian activity, he correctly identified the continuity of transition (Lyon says “decline”) from the later Empire to the medieval period.15 And
in his conception of the Mediterranean longue durée (last revised 1966), Fernand
Braudel saw a multi-partite but nonetheless singular Mediterranean world, and one
that had changed very little between the Roman Empire and the Habsburg empire
of Philip II.16
∗

∗

∗

In the context of this general agreement on at least some sort of continuity,
Brown popularized the idea of a “late antique” period in his World of Late Antiquity
(1971). Brown saw this period as lasting from 200, when he notes the “shifting
and redefinition of the boundaries of the classical world” to 700, the boundary first
identified by Pirenne.17 In understanding this period, “the third century A.D. must
lie at the center of any account of the making of Late Antiquity.” Disclaiming
the 1940s or addressed by Peter Brown in the 1970s.
14 Philip Grierson, “Commerce in the Dark Ages: A Critique of the Evidence,” in Havighurst, The Pirenne Thesis, 91, 92 et seq. Grierson cited evidence of non-traditional
mechanisms for distributing the sorts of coins and high-value items that had been previously relied on as proof of commerce.
15 Bryce Lyon, “The Work of Henri Pirenne after Twenty-five Years,” in Havighurst, The
Pirenne Thesis, 102–108; quotation is from 102.
16 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of
Philip II, reprint of the 1972 translation of the 1966 French 2nd ed., trans. Sı̂an Reynolds
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). In addition to the all-important ecological
continuity, Braudel specifically cites—like Pirenne—the continuity of communication and
trade mechanisms (which in his view were crucial to understanding the history): 281–82.
17 Peter Brown, The World of Late Antiquity: AD 150–750 (New York: W. W. Norton,
1971), 7–19; quotation is from 19.
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the traditional view of a “crisis” of the third century, Brown argues that the real
issue is “what it is like for a great traditional society to pass over [the] watershed”
that evidently existed in the century between Marcus Aurelius and Constantine.18
And as Brown pointed out, Roman society at large was changing; late antiquity
is to be understood, in Brown’s framework, as the beginning of a medieval mode
of thought within the construct of the Empire. Partly this is characterized by a
more direct understanding of government involvement combined with a sharpening
of class distinctions and a privatization of power. Brown also emphasizes the same
Christianizing trend as Gibbon, though he does not ascribe it the same destructive
power.19
Historical study of the period was also bolstered by a surge in archaeological
interest in the late twentieth century.20 In the 1980s, Richard Hodges and David
Whitehouse were finally offering a more equivocal view of Pirenne based on archaeology; their assessment of his continuity thesis is nevertheless that while some of
his details are wrong, his broad conclusions still hold.21 More recently, Peregrine
Horden and Nicholas Purcell have pointed out the enormous impact of archaeology
on Mediterranean history more broadly.22
Today, late antiquity has itself reached the “orthodoxy” of Gibbon’s earlier
“catastrophic” view. To Averil Cameron, for example, the final overthrow of Romulus Augustulus is “one of the most famous non-events in history.” She notes that
the people in late antiquity saw themselves as very much part of the same tradition
18 Peter

Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1978), 1–5; quotations are from 2. Brown is citing Marcus Aurelius and Constantine
as exemplars of first the pagan and later the Christian empire.
19 Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity; medievalism: 15; class: 31–33; government:
47–49; Christianization: 5–11.
20 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 6–7.
21 Richard Hodges and David Whitehouse, Mohammed, Charlemagne and the Origins
of Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); pages 169–76 contain a good
summary of their argument.
22 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean
History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 176–77, 288, etc.
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as their past, and did not perceive a substantive change in their history.23 Greece,
Vandal Africa, and the Levant showed a continuous classical civilization through the
sixth century, and in Italy the Ostrogothic kingdom “maintained many continuities
with the Roman past.”24 Like Gibbon, Cameron sees the final break with classical
civilization in the religious rejection of the secular Roman past, reinforced when the
Church in Italy began aligning itself with the West and Africa against Constantinople, breaking ties with the Empire.25 In all of this, Cameron and Patrick Geary
see the “unofficial” changes of slow, incremental movement—the gradual changes in
population and adaptations of laws and institutions—as ultimately more important
than discrete settlements or conquests.26
∗

∗

∗

Not all historians see a gradual transition as the appropriate characterization.
As Ralph Mathisen notes: “continuity aside, clearly, something happened during the
century following 406 CE.” His model for the time thus “leaves the fifth century as [a]
period of transition.”27 And while generally agreeing with Brown, Halsall continues
to see the key feature of the third century as crisis, containing the seeds of the
Empire’s fall. Previously, the disparate regions of the Empire were bound together
by a shared elite culture, a common desire for romanitas as the upper classes (or
upwardly mobile) sought privilege or citizenship. In the third century, two things
23 Cameron,

The Mediterranean World, 33–34. See also Averil Cameron, “Remaking the
Past,” in Bowersock et al., Late Antiquity, 1–2; on page 1, Cameron observes that in the
380s Ammianus Marcellinus was “as overcome by Rome’s present majesty as by her great
past.”
24 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 41 (including quotation), and Cameron, “Remaking the Past,” 6. The inclusion of both Vandal Africa and Ostrogothic Italy should
imply at least some rejection of any catastrophic barbarianization.
25 Rejection: Cameron, “Remaking the Past,” 11–14; realignment: Cameron, The
Mediterranean World, 122.
26 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 44–47; Patrick J. Geary, “Barbarians and Ethnicity,” in Bowersock et al., Late Antiquity, 110–17.
27 Ralph W. Mathisen, “The Letters of Ruricius of Limoges and the Passage from Roman
to Frankish Gaul,” in Ralph W. Mathisen and Danuta Shanzer, eds., Society and Culture
in Late Antique Gaul: Revisiting the Sources (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001), 101.
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changed: regions became more self-sufficient, reducing the need for integration, and
Caracalla issued blanket citizenship to the Empire, eliminating any motivation to
“Romanize.”28 The Empire began to dissolve into localized economies and villacentered landlord–tenant relationships that presage the beginning of what might be
called feudalism. In the fourth century, the Empire was further restructured into
ever-smaller administrative units, which must have made it easier for the barbarians
to insert themselves into the Roman system.29 Halsall also finds it noteworthy that
barbarian movements were closely aligned with changes in the imperial situation
throughout this period. The Franks, Alemanni, and Goths were all first attested
during the instability of the third century, and it was only ten years after Diocletian’s
restructuring that the barbarians, long lurking on the outskirts of the Empire, made
their first permanent appearance at the turn of the fifth century.
Halsall notwithstanding, the majority view is that Pirenne was, in fact, on to
something, the result of which is Brown’s conceptualization of late antiquity. In fact,
approaching the period from the other (barbarian) direction, Walter Pohl suggests
that we should really be asking why the Roman Empire lasted as long as it did.
He proposes that the answer is to be found in conceiving the Empire’s “successor”
kingdoms instead as continuations, actual or metaphorical, of the Empire: “the barbarian kingdoms were themselves a Roman achievement.” Geary likewise suggests
that “The Germanic world was perhaps the greatest and most enduring creation of
Roman political and military genius.”30 This line of reasoning both projects Roman continuity much further forward in time and nicely encapsulates the previously
problematic period.
28 Halsall,

Barbarian Migrations, 66–72. Geary, Before France and Germany, 28–29, also
emphasizes the integrating effects of culture.
29 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 68–70, 74–76. See also Geary, Before France and Germany, 11.
30 Walter Pohl, “The Barbarian Successor States,” in Leslie Webster and Michelle Brown,
eds., The Transformation of the Roman World AD 400–900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 33. Geary, Before France and Germany, vi (this is actually Geary’s
opening line).
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Barbarian Identity

The subject of barbarian identity (together with the related but distinct question
of ethnicity) touches on this thesis in two ways. The first is largely a matter of
terminology. The second is the way the study of barbarian identity has become
politically bound up with established narratives of continuity and change in the
aftermath of the Empire; the continuity of barbarian identity has been set against
the continuity of Roman identity. More subtly, these issues are connected: the
nature of the language, and the precise applicability of certain labels—specifically
both ‘Roman’ and ‘barbarian’—in themselves reveal some of the complexities of
interpreting this period.
With regard to terminology, the nature of this thesis demands that I refer both to
the Romans and to non-Roman peoples. When it is possible to be specific in referring
to a group such as the Franks I will do so (although even that can be problematic).
Frequently, however, I will need to be more general, and there I run into a historiographic problem. Different sources refer to the non-Roman peoples as ‘barbarian,’
‘Germanic,’ or even ‘German.’ This is to some extent a matter of convention, but
misuse of the terms can be quite misleading at best and factually incorrect at worst.
In terms of potential ethnicities, the word ‘barbarian’ is extraordinarily far-reaching,
in that it originally applied to (almost) all non-Romans.31 Even within the confined area of Western Europe, however, there are many theories as to the identity of
these peoples. Roger Collins notes that we will very likely never know how they saw
themselves—how consciously Burgundian (or Frankish, or Gothic, etc.) they were.
The complexity of the problem has caused many contemporary historians (Collins
31 See,

e.g., Geary, “Barbarians and Ethnicity,” 107, or Ralph W. Mathisen, “Barbarian
Bishops and the Churches ‘in barbaricis gentibus’ during Late Antiquity,” Speculum 72
(1997): 665: “It also should be noted that the word ‘barbarian’ will be used here as
a convenient, nonpejorative term to refer to all the non-Latin- and non-Greek-speaking
exterae gentes who dwelt around, or eventually settled within, the Roman Empire during
late antiquity.” The term did not apply to the Greeks or Persians, whom the Romans
considered cultural equals.
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included) to effectively throw up their hands and muddle forward.32
What is clear is that these peoples were not German in any modern sense of the
word. The original Germani were an insignificant Rhineland tribe, and attempts to
link these ancient people with the modern Germans are a purely modern, ahistorical
endeavor. Some of the barbarians cannot even properly be called Germanic: the
Alans, for example, were Indo-Iranian.33
Roman identity, or at least that of the Roman state, might seem clear enough. It
is important to remember, however, that particularly during the time period leading
up to and surrounding the formal end of the Empire, that ‘Roman’ had not been
an ethnic label for several centuries. Rather, as Geary puts it, “the sense of populus
Romanus was a constitutional one, internally generated and based on a common
cultural and intellectual tradition, a legal system, and a willingness to be part of
a common economic and political tradition.”34 In fact, in thus defining ‘Roman’,
Geary implicitly offers what may be the best definition of ‘barbarian’: one who does
not subscribe to this constitutional identity. Further complicating matters, the idea
of being ‘Roman’ was itself not a “primary self-identifier for the millions of people
[in] the Roman Empire.”35 Geary notes that “the central state had never demanded
exclusive adherence to Roman values: Whenever possible, local tradition was assimilated into or equated with that of Rome. However, one did not need to forget one’s
pre-Roman family position in earlier tribal or cultural traditions.” Indeed, such over32 Collins,

Early Medieval Europe, 101.
Walter Pohl, “Ethnicity, Theory, and Tradition: A Response,” in Andrew
Gillett, ed., On Barbarian Identity: Critical Approaches to Ethnicity in the Early Middle
Ages (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2002), 226–27. Modern revisionism: Andrew Gillett,
“Introduction: Ethnicity, History, and Methodology,” in Gillett, On Barbarian Identity,
5–6. Alans: Bachrach, “Alans in Gaul,” 477. Note that most European languages do not
have this ambiguity, using ‘alemanes’ or the equivalent (or in German ‘deutsch’) for modern
Germans, and ‘germanos’ or the equivalent for the ancient barbarians: see Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 11. While clearer, this is really just sidestepping the question of actual
identity, and of course alemanes itself derives from the barbarian ethnonym ‘Alemanni’.
34 Geary, Myth of Nations, 63.
35 Geary, Myth of Nations, 64.
33 Germani :
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lap between nominally ‘Roman’ and ‘barbarian’ structures will form a major part of
my argument in Chapter 3. Religious integration, intermarriage, economic ties and
(at least the promise of) social mobility were all additional mechanisms for blurring
the lines between multiple identities36 —and ones that I will come back to throughout
the following discussion.
Likewise, Ralph Mathisen has called the very use of labels like ‘Roman’ or ‘barbarian’ problematic. (He does not, however, appear to have any problems with the
labels themselves, merely with their use, including the division into ‘Roman Gaul’
and ‘Frankish Gaul’.)37 Misuse, or at least confusing use, is widespread. Even
Cameron—who was generally careful to note the change in scholarship surrounding
traditional theories—casually uses phrases like “either [the eastern government] could
follow a pro-German [in this case actually Gothic] policy and continue to attempt to
conciliate such leaders, or it must attempt to root them out altogether”38 (thus in
one sentence neatly demonstrating both the problems of barbarian identity and one
possible framework for Roman interaction with barbarians). Even Walter Goffart,
Andrew Gillett, et al., who raise the most serious objections to common perceptions
of barbarian identity (on which more below), do not have any better terminology.
Lacking any terms or concepts more suitable than ‘Roman’ or ‘barbarian’, therefore, I—like Mathisen, Cameron, Geary, Goffart, and practically everyone else—will
continue to use them. It is beyond the scope of the current project to fully explore
the actual identity of these peoples. For the purposes of this thesis I am primarily interested in their role as non-Romans and in distinguishing one group from
another, although I will also draw some conclusions about common barbarian culture. Consequently, I will use the generic term ‘barbarian’—without any pejorative
connotations—as both the noun and adjective for these peoples; cited passages may
follow different conventions.
36 Geary,

Myth of Nations, 66–70; quotation is from 67.
“Letters of Ruricius,” 101.
38 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 17.
37 Mathisen,
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As discussed in some detail above, the question of continuity is a subtext to virtually all the history being done today. The emphasis on the continuity of Roman
culture and institutions is now shared by many modern historians—notably including Goffart (to whom I will return)—who claim themselves to be the inheritors of
Pirenne.39 There is another school of thought focused on the continuity of barbarian
culture. Primarily continental scholars continuing the work of Reinhard Wenskus
and Herwig Wolfram, their nationalities and focus of research have led them to be
caricatured as the ‘Germanists’; I will use the more neutral term ‘Vienna School’ after the leading university associated with the theory. The debate between these two
poles has typically been seen as a ‘zero-sum game’—that is, we can have long-term
continuity of either Roman culture or barbarian culture, but not both. However, I
believe a more comprehensive view of the historiography will demonstrate that these
two threads of continuity are not really at odds.
There are two fundamental theories, or frameworks, of barbarian identity that
have shaped the historiography of late antiquity throughout the twentieth and into
the twenty-first centuries.40 Both originated, or were at least popularized, by scholars
from the University of Vienna in the early to middle twentieth century.41 The more
significant of these theories is the so-called Traditionskern (“tradition core”) model
of ethnogenesis. This theory holds that a kernel of tradition, passed down among
leading figures or families, formed the cohesion point for all other members of the
group, be they family members, political or military followers, etc. Over time it
may even have led people “of quite heterogeneous backgrounds” to believe they
39 See

Gillett, “Ethnicity, History, and Methodology,” 17–18.
addition of course to the initially controversial notion of late antiquity itself, as
discussed above.
41 Wolfram, History of the Goths, 11. Hereafter I will call this the “Vienna School,”
although others, particularly their detractors, sometimes refer to this perspective as the
“Germanist tradition”: see, e.g., Gillett, “Ethnicity, History, and Methodology,” 6. The
Vienna School grew out of nineteenth- and twentieth-century German-nationalist attempts
to promote the notion of long-term barbarian (originally ‘Germanic’) continuity.
40 In
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shared a common origin, quite literally serving as the genesis of a new ethnos.42
More significantly from the original ‘Germanist’ perspective, it provided a plausible
mechanism by which the groups of historical literature and myth could have retained
continuity of identity.
The second framework is that of ‘culture history’, and it is commonly connected
with, or at least seen as supporting, Traditionskern. Culture history fundamentally
consists of the twin assumptions that archaeologically identifiable continuities in artifacts map to historically attested peoples, and that by following traces in the material
record it is possible to reconstruct the movements of these peoples. It was originally
the goal of many culture historians to identify an Urheimat, or original homeland,
for the various peoples they studied. The concept is still useful today given the desire to supplement the (frequently sparse) historical record of the late antique/early
medieval period with archaeological evidence. Like Traditionskern, culture history
began in the studies of German (and also, in this case, Slavic) history.43
The notion of Traditionskern properly began with Wenskus in his Stammesbildung und Verfassung, published in 1961, although it owes the core of its own ideas to
nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship, particularly in Germany.44 Wenskus’s
lordship theory, which helped form the basis of his theory of ethnogenesis, reached
back all the way to the work of Hector Munro Chadwick in England just at the turn of
the twentieth century, and it certainly owed something to Nazi historian Otto Höfler’s
work in the 1930s. In fact, the idea of “Germanic” continuity—politically, culturally,
42 Pohl,

“Ethnicity, Theory, and Tradition,” 221. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 14–17,
has the best summary. See Gillett, “Ethnicity, History, and Methodology,” for a similar
chronology but more critical opinion.
43 Gillett, “Ethnicity, History, and Methodology,” 4, offers a good summary; Halsall,
Barbarian Migrations, 14, has similar information.
44 Walter Pohl, “Conceptions of Ethnicity in Early Medieval Studies,” in Lester K. Little
and Barbara H. Rosenwein, eds., Debating the Middle Ages: Issues and Readings (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1998), 15; Pohl, “Ethnicity, Theory, and Tradition,” 221–24; Gillett, “Ethnicity, History, and Methodology,” 3; Alexander Callander Murray, “Reinhard Wenskus on
‘Ethnogenesis’, Ethnicity, and the Origin of the Franks,” in Gillett, On Barbarian Identity,
49–54.
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and eventually racially—dominated mid-twentieth-century German historical thinking in forms ranging from the relatively benign origins of the Monumenta Germaniae
Historica to the more political (and racist) work of Höfler. Wenskus, ironically, actually formulated Traditionskern to avoid a reliance on racial ties.45 In the decades
after Wenskus, Wolfram and Pohl attempted to make the theory both clearer and
more nuanced, and Geary has done much to defend the idea of barbarian identity as
a constructed phenomenon.46 As a result, the Vienna School, and particularly the
Traditionskern model, continued to gain in prominence throughout the latter part
of the twentieth century. This coincided with the emergence of late antiquity as a
viable sub-discipline in the 1960s and 1970s. Historical study of the period was also
bolstered by a surge in archaeological interest around the same time.47
∗

∗

∗

After having attained what Gillett called “historical orthodoxy,”48 Traditionskern
has recently come under attack by Goffart and several of his students from the
University of Toronto (including Gillett and Alexander Callander Murray). The
gist of the complaint—the kernel, as it were—seems to be two-fold: First, that
Traditionskern is prima facie preposterous because memory is insufficiently lengthy
or precise to support the traditions assumed by the Germanists. Second, that there
is something distasteful about the apparent elitism—and potentially racial elitism—
of Traditionskern as an element of ethnicity. A brief summary of the criticisms
follows.49
45 Pohl,

“Ethnicity, Theory, and Tradition,” 224; Murray, “Reinhard Wenskus,” 51.
History of the Goths, 5–6, has a particularly good summary; see also pages
11–13. Pohl, “Conceptions of Ethnicity,” 17, acknowledges that reality was not always as
straightforward as theory might seem; Pohl, “Ethnicity, Theory, and Tradition,” 222–26,
cautions in particular about drawing overly general or long-term conclusions. See also
Patrick J. Geary, “Ethnic Identity as a Situational Construct in the Early Middle Ages,”
in Edward Peters, ed., Folk Life in the Middle Ages, Medieval Perspectives 3 (Richmond,
KY: Southeastern Medieval Association, 1988), 1–17, and Geary, Myth of Nations.
47 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 6–7.
48 Gillett, “Ethnicity, History, and Methodology,” 3.
49 For ease of reference, I will call this group the Toronto School, after Goffart’s place
46 Wolfram,
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The Toronto School’s principal objection seems to be to an overly simplistic combination of Traditionskern and culture history that implies straightforward continuity
from prehistoric times to the present. The Toronto School argues that Traditionskern
relies on (and implies) an element of continuity that human memory is insufficiently
lengthy or precise to support. In particular, Goffart et al. disclaim the idea of an
Urheimat derived from tribal legends, even if backed by some “culture historical”
evidence.50 The standard for proof in this attack is peculiar. After recounting a
series of “tenuous and disconnected” events in Gothic history, each of which he understands to imply a “break in cohesion,” Goffart concludes that “No smooth line of
historical narrative can connect the Goths in southern Russia to the heterogeneous
peoples led by Alaric. . . . However Gothic in name, their following was no lineal
prolongation of the nation that Athanaric had ruled in the 370s.”51
In a similar vein, Murray (probably rightly) dismisses the Frankish origin myths
promulgated by Gregory of Tours and Fredegar—but from this basis he goes on to
disparage not only the existence of any tradition of Frankish history but by impliof employment. Probably the best treatment of their argument is still Gillett’s 2002 book
On Barbarian Identity: Critical Approaches to Ethnicity in the Early Middle Ages, which
includes many of the sources cited here. The book was based upon a symposium at the
2000 International Congress on Medieval Studies, itself originally organized as a reaction
against Traditionskern theory. In particular, see Walter A. Goffart, “Does the Distant
Past Impinge on the Invasion Age Germans?” in Gillett, On Barbarian Identity, 22–24,
especially on the inadequacy of memory; Pohl, “Ethnicity, Theory, and Tradition,” 222.
50 Goffart, “The Distant Past,” 22. To support his argument Goffart provides only an
unsourced anecdote of a university student reputed never to have heard of World War I,
and the bald assertion that memory “rarely carries back more than three generations”; he
further notes that “Three medieval generations incorporated little more than fifty years
of memory”: Goffart, “The Distant Past,” 22 (emphasis original). To counter Goffart’s
anecdote with one of my own: My family has a history of continuous military service dating
back to 1922, and we remember service stories dating to the early 1930s—roughly 80 years
over four generations. These stories, and military service, have become part of what it
means to be a ‘McDaniel’, and it is virtually certain they will be passed down to future
generations. Even the fact that they are no longer precisely remembered and are slowly
being mythologized I think supports Traditionskern rather more than it does Goffart’s
position.
51 Walter A. Goffart, Barbarians and Romans, A.D. 418–584: The Techniques of Accommodation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 6–7, emphasis mine.
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cation any coherent Frankish history at all.52 In my view this is throwing the baby
out with the bathwater, rejecting two fundamentally reasonable theories because of a
perception that an extreme interpretation is illogical. Just to take Murray’s example:
That Gregory or Fredegar might have invented historical traditions for the Franks,
for example, may mean that earlier traditions were not remembered by the time of
their writing—but it does not have to mean that there were no traditions, or that
the Franks did not in fact constitute a persistent coherent group with a recognizable
past, movement history, even something like an Urheimat.
Additionally, despite Wenskus’s construction of an ethnic theory that explicitly
did not depend on race, the Toronto School still attempts to paint its opponents with
this brush.53 As one example, Murray offers up the supposedly damning fact that
“[Wenskus’s] model itself does not preclude a racial interpretation.”54 Since it is hard
to see how any model of ethnic identity could in fact preclude a racial interpretation,
it is not clear what Murray hoped to accomplish beyond an ad hominem attack.
Similarly, the necessarily nation-building aspects of any ethnogenesis theory are, in
the case of Traditionskern, blamed for current European (and particularly German)
nationalism.55
Based on such logic, Goffart and his fellow “anti-Viennans” attack the implications of Traditionskern. However, the Toronto School has done little beyond asserting
that the Vienna School has not sufficiently proved its argument. This is debatable
in itself, but in any event absence of proof is not proof of absence, and certainly is
not license for the sort of rejectionist claims being made by Goffart and Murray. Nor
52 Murray,

“Reinhard Wenskus,” 64–65. In particular the line “So much for the ideological
cultivation and propagation of genealogy by the Merovingian Traditionskern” (65) conveys
something of Murray’s attitude.
53 As satirized by Pohl, “In the language of [Murray’s] myth, Otto Höfler went out to
Germany where he met a monster, Heinrich Himmler, and then he begat Reinhard Wenskus, who begot Herwig Wolfram, who begot Walter Pohl”: Pohl, “Ethnicity, Theory, and
Tradition,” 223.
54 Murray, “Reinhard Wenskus,” 51.
55 Geary, Myth of Nations, 10; Pohl, “Ethnicity, Theory, and Tradition,” 222–26.
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has the Toronto School put forward any substantive alternatives on the subject of
barbarian continuity.
∗

∗

∗

Although from a scholarly perspective the Toronto School is justified in questioning orthodoxy, fundamentally, Goffart et al. are missing the point. The nihilism in
their position cannot be wholly accurate. There was a clear belief evident in the ancient sources that barbarian group identifiers meant something, although the sources
are not always clear what; sometimes the same individual is even labeled differently
at different times.56 These groups must have been defined by some common core of
identity that was shared between members. As Pohl summarizes the current view:
“Most scholars agree today that these names [Langobardi, Burgundiones, Gothi, etc.]
do not simply identify coherent wandering peoples. . . . The question is what else this
continuity of names means.”57
Similarly, it is admittedly erroneous to work forward from a people’s legendary
homeland as a basis for understanding their (culture) history. But it is logically
fallacious to equate this mistake with tracing a people through the sources as far
back as possible and labeling that an Urheimat. Indeed, it is tempting to consider
the earliest stages of Rome, including the almost certainly apocryphal descent from
the mythical Trojan Aeneas or the equally legendary wolf-raised twins Romulus and
Remus, as a sort of cultural Urheimat of the Roman civilization. This in no way
lessons the reality of a coherent Roman history; why must we question the movement
of barbarians from some more or less original location in more or less coherent groups?
Similarly, why should Alaric’s movements, consisting of the long-distance transport
of sufficiently many people that they “could both absorb and disgorge impressive
numbers of people and still be perceived as fundamentally the same unit”58 —which
56 Michael

Kulikowski, “Nation versus Army: A Necessary Contrast?” in Gillett, On
Barbarian Identity, 83–84.
57 Pohl, “Ethnicity, Theory, and Tradition,” 222–26.
58 Kulikowski, “Nation versus Army,” 81.
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no one seems to question as historical fact—not serve as a model for the movements,
either migratory or invasive, of other coherent groups of barbarians?
The debate over continuity of tradition is not truly zero-sum; it is possible to
see elements of Roman continuity (in economics, for example) and of the newlyintroduced barbarian culture (in law). Indeed, to pick up on the point made by Geary
about the blending of Roman and barbarian identities, Jonathan Barlow makes a
persuasive argument for the multicultural nature of barbarians in service to the later
Empire, retaining (at least to some extent) their barbarian identities and connections
even when immersed in Roman structures.59 Murray likewise gives the example of
the fifth-century historian Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus, “whose three names, to
paraphrase Gibbon, show him to be a Roman citizen, a Christian, and a barbarian.”60
At this point the study of coherent group history, whatever we may hope to learn
from it, needs to be completely divorced from the idea of ethnogenesis as the basis of
modern Europe. In this sense, I think Geary is spot on: “the history of the barbarian
world must be seen, not in the context of ‘German history’ in any modern sense but
rather in terms of the history of late antiquity.”61 Despite the reservations of the
Toronto School, and even if a persistent Germanism has been set against the idea of
Roman continuity, we do not need to resolve that debate to analyze the impact of
the barbarians. We need to accept the fact that the barbarians can be talked about
in a meaningful way even if we do not know their “real” identity. Indeed Geary,
Chris Wickham, and to an extent Halsall are already moving in that direction.62

59 Jonathan

Barlow, “Kinship, Identity and Fourth-Century Franks,” Historia: Zeitschrift
für alte Geschichte 45 (1996): 223–29.
60 Murray, “Reinhard Wenskus,” 64.
61 Geary, Before France and Germany, 43. He makes this point even more forcefully in
his 2002 book, The Myth of Nations, most explicitly on pages 9–13.
62 See cited references for all three authors, particularly their most recent publications.
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Feudalism as a Framework for Transition

Since the latter part of the twentieth century, and particularly since the critiques
of E. A. R. Brown and Susan Reynolds, “feudalism” has been a highly contentious
concept. Nevertheless, its widespread acceptance by earlier historians means that
the term appears not infrequently in the literature relevant to this thesis. As such,
it is important to come to grips with the debate over the meaning (if any) of the
term and the resulting significance for interpretations of the post-imperial transition.
The following discussion is focused on the early medieval period, and makes no
attempts to draw conclusions on the subject of so-called “classic feudalism” during
the High Middle Ages. I will look only at whether there is an identifiable change in
socio-economic structures during the transition period that—for the sole purpose of
facilitating further discussion in this thesis—might profitably be called feudalism.
Although they formed a major part of many definitions of the practice, and
though I will mention them briefly in passing, I am not concerned here with the
formal trappings or ceremonies surrounding notions of feudalism. I am concerned
instead with understanding the sorts of social relationships that influenced both the
alignment of power and the nature of economic production and transfer. As such, I
will consider both “classic” feudalism as well as a more modern Marxist (economic)
interpretation.
∗

∗

∗

The traditional understanding of feudalism—to the extent that there is one, which
is one of the complaints leveled by Brown—is probably best exemplified by the
similar yet distinct approaches of Marc Bloch and F. L. Ganshof. According to
Bloch, feudalism is characterized by “A subject peasantry; widespread use of the
service tenement (i.e. the fief) instead of a salary, which was out of the question;
the supremacy of a class of specialized warriors; ties of obedience and protection
which bind man to man and, within the warrior class, assume the distinctive form
called vassalage; fragmentation of authority—leading inevitably to disorder; and, in
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the midst of all this, the survival of other forms of association, family and State, of
which the latter, during the second feudal age, was to acquire renewed strength.”63
Bloch noted that relationships based on service (patronage or homage) date to at
least within the fourth-century empire. He also noted that the similarity between
the homage customs of the Franks, Anglo-Saxons, and Scandinavians “attests [a]
Germanic origin.”64 The natural conclusion is a marrying of “Germanic” form and
Romano-barbarian understanding of the relationship. And, like those who came after
(notably Ganshof), Bloch saw a natural connection between the need for support
identified in the patronage relationship and the disposition of “service tenements” or
fiefs.
Ganshof, writing somewhat later, offered a definition that was both more limited
and more specific: Feudalism consists of “a body of institutions creating and regulating the obligations of obedience and service—mainly military service—on the part
of a free man (the vassal) towards another free man (the lord), and the obligations
of protection and maintenance on the part of the lord with regard to his vassal. The
obligation of maintenance had usually as one of its effects the grant by the lord to
his vassal of a unit of real property known as a fief” (from feodum)65 Ganshof similarly identified the bond of protection between freemen with the established concept
of patrocinium (patronage), and argued that it was initiated by a ritual contractual ceremony called a commendation. This process may have been connected with
the swearing of fealty in manus (i.e. by placing of the inferior’s hands within the
hands of the superior), but Ganshof is not willing to commit to this latter identification. Finally, as one possible source of maintenance under patrocinium, Ganshof
saw a connection with the granting of land (beneficia) under particular, usually favorable terms. Together this represented what he called the “union of vassalage and
63 Marc

Bloch, Feudal Society, 2nd ed., trans. L. A. Manyon (London: Routledge, 1965),
vol 2, 167.
64 Bloch, Feudal Society, vol 1, 149–51; quotation is from 151.
65 F. L. Ganshof, Feudalism, trans. Philip Grierson (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1996), xvi.
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benefice” that formed the backbone of feudalism.66 Ganshof saw the origins of this
system in the system of personal retainers (vassi, gasindi, antrustiones) prevalent
in the Merovingian kingdoms of the fifth and sixth centuries (and in fact it was the
vassi that gave vassalage its name).67
Georges Duby offered a more nuanced interpretation, that “Vassalage and the
fief, customary practices born in private usage, organized the relations that unequal
division of wealth and power had already determined; they created no additional
ones.”68 While Brown is citing Duby to claim the “superficial importance” of feudalism, I would argue that if there is a meaningful sense in which we can talk about the
organization of relations through feudal structures, then we have something we might
as well call feudalism. Note that Brown also cites Duby to the effect that “As the
count’s power declined and as that of the castellans increased, bonds of dependence
among the higher classes became more important, and grants of land were used to
solidify the ties until by 1075 land outweighed loyalty as their determinant.”69 These
statements, as with much of the rest of the discussion in this section, concern the later
Middle Ages rather than the immediately post-imperial period. Nevertheless, they
seem to indicate fairly strongly a reasonably consistent understanding of feudalism
(as much as Duby might protest the contrary).70
Despite the fact that Brown describes them as “diverg[ing] at many points,”71
the descriptions offered by Bloch, Ganshof, and even Duby strike me as sufficiently
66 Ganshof,

Feudalism; commendation: 5–8; patrocinium and beneficia: 9–12; union with
vassalage: 16. On the subject of commendation as a ritual (or at least a process) Ganshof
also notes that the verb se commendare already in classical times had the meaning of
placing oneself under another’s authority.
67 Ganshof, Feudalism, 3–5.
68 Duby, Feudalism, cited in Elizabeth A. R. Brown, “The Tyranny of a Construct:
Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe,” The American Historical Review 79, no. 4
(1974), 1082.
69 Brown, “Tyranny of a Construct,” 1082.
70 See Brown, “Tyranny of a Construct,” 1084, where she claims Duby told her there was
“Toute la différence du monde” between his theory and that of Ganshof.
71 Brown, “Tyranny of a Construct,” 1071n30.
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consistent to form the basis of a working understanding. Ganshof may be more narrowly defined than Bloch, but in fact nothing of what he says is truly contradictory.
Both of the descriptions encompass reciprocal relationships between persons free to
engage in them; both encompass the use of land as a gift, payment, or means of sustenance (which we may call a fief); and both encompass the idea of service in return
for support or maintenance (which we may call vassalage). Both Bloch and Ganshof
cite evidence for some of their specific claims that is admittedly a little thinner than
they imply it to be—it is not at all clear, for example, that the formula cited by
Ganshof for the details of commendation was actually a universally representative
document.72 Nevertheless, while they may be drawing overly broad conclusions from
specific examples (or attributing unjustifiably specific forms to the idea of feudalism),
the overall scheme of their arguments may continue to prove useful.
∗

∗

∗

The first significant attack on feudalism as a concept was levied by E. A. R.
Brown in her 1974 article “The Tyranny of a Construct.” Suggesting that there
was already general “unease” around the term ‘feudalism’ “for years” by the time
of her writing, Brown’s initial approach is that ‘feudalism’ as a term is confusing,
probably over- and mis-applied, and prone to oversimplification.73 While certainly a
valid criticism, this does not necessarily mean that the term is wrong, or that it is
not useful to continue employing it.
According to Brown, “the concepts of feudalism and the feudal system” dominated medieval studies only since the middle of the nineteenth century. She decries
the efforts by many in the twentieth century—she specifically calls out Ganshof and
Bloch among others—to retain feudalism as a useful abstraction or concept even
as evidence has mounted for a more sophisticated understanding of medieval social
72 See

Ganshof, Feudalism, 6–7.
“Tyranny of a Construct,” 1063–66; quotations are from 1063. On “unease,”
Brown cites, among others, Frederic William Maitland. Maitland objected to the vagaries
of the terms ‘feudalism’ and ‘feudal system’ but nevertheless used both (synonymously);
Brown takes him to task for a “tolerance for unresolved contradictions.” (1066)
73 Brown,
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structures.74 In fact, Brown wanted to eradicate any reference to feudalism as an
‘ism’ per se (she also decries ‘manorialism’, ‘scholasticism’, and ‘humanism’). Her
argument that different times and regions must be considered as varying instances
of the development and organization of society is perfectly valid (though the implicit
conclusion that broader generalizations are therefore either wrong or to be avoided is
unwarranted). Her statements suggest that a modern definition of a term describing
a perceived organization necessarily means that the organization did not actually exist. She instead would require using the words that medieval people themselves used,
and states that “attention must be paid to the shifting meanings of key words.”75
Reynolds is even more harsh. She opens her substantial 1994 book by stating
that her objective “is most emphatically not to prove that feudo-vassalic relations
or institutions were less important than is generally thought, nor to trace their rise
or say when and where they appeared, nor to judge which part of Europe was most
truly feudal. These seem to me meaningless subjects.”76
‘Vassalage’ as a concept Reynolds dispenses with fairly swiftly. Noting that vassalage is by definition a personal relationship, Reynolds argues that medieval societies
demonstrated extensive blending of what we now call ‘public’ and ‘private’; in particular she disagrees with the contrast between a ‘personal’ bond of obligation and
the ‘territorial’ relation embodied in fiefs. Moreover, Reynolds disagrees with the
tendency to see medieval relationships (particularly between ‘lords’ and ‘vassals’) as
close or personal (contra Bloch and Ganshof), and levels particular incredulity at
the supposed practices of commendation and swearing fealty in manus. Reynolds
ultimately concludes that “Vassalage itself is a term that no longer matches either
the evidence we have available or the conceptual tools we need to use in analysing
it. . . . [V]assalage is too vacuous a concept to be useful.”77
74 Brown,

“Tyranny of a Construct,” 1065, 1067–70, 1078; quotation is from 1065.
“Tyranny of a Construct,” 1086–88, quotation from 1087.
76 Susan Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), 14, emphasis added.
77 Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals, 25–47; quotations both from 47.
75 Brown,
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With respect to fiefs, Reynolds argues that seeing feudalism in service relationships based on land grants is imposing a modern distinction (rent versus tax, property versus government) where none existed. She traces this ‘confusion’ to much
later academic study of property law, arguing that the customary law of the time
was far looser that our conceptions of it.78 Reynolds is particularly insistent on the
connection between military service and fiefs/feudalism, and notes that grants to
soldiers by Conrad II in the early eleventh century marked the true beginnings of
the “feudo-vassalic relations” that Reynolds believes are incorrectly read backward
in time.79 This is strange, as military service is by far the most likely type of service,
as she notes herself.80
Her account of relations to state powers is similarly confusing. Reynolds argues
on the one hand that until the twelfth century the expectation of property ownership by free men was in full (“allodial”) rights, thus implying that no “feudal”
relations existed with a higher lord. On the other hand, she notes that “Wherever
any semblance of government was maintained, the holder of what was thought of as
full property had obligations to the ruler,” which rings very much of feudalism, as
does her further statement that “People with full property had some rights over their
unfree or less free tenants that we might consider governmental rather than property rights.” She claims that “the standard form of property . . . certainly did not
correspond to Weber’s ideal type of the fief as a ‘service tenement’ that is granted in
return for services.” However, in a world where personal and public distinctions are
blurred—as she herself points out—how is the obligation of service to a “government”
ruler different from obligation to a feudal lord?81
Reynolds’ argument boils down to believing that we are trapped by the language
and constructs of earlier historians; she blames these constructs on overly literal
78 Reynolds,

Fiefs
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80 Reynolds, Fiefs
81 Reynolds, Fiefs
79 Reynolds,
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53–59.
44.
39, 62–63. See also the discussion on Wickham below.
53–74; quotations are from 59, 60, and 73, respectively.
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reading of the later medieval Libri Feudorum (which she calls an academic attempt
to impose an inappropriate concept of property law on the Middle Ages). In her
words, “We cannot understand medieval society and its property relations if we see
it through seventeenth- or eighteenth-century spectacles. Yet every time we think of
fiefs and vassals we do just that.”82
∗

∗

∗

In 2006, Fredric Cheyette wrote a lengthy review of Reynolds’ book; though
motivated by her work, his comments apply almost equally to Brown. Noting that
Reynolds was the first to “grind systematically through the sources on which that
conventional (non-Marxist) construction of ‘feudalism’ has been based,” Cheyette
argues that she must be taken seriously. “If she is successful, certain assumptions
will no longer hold easy sway, and post-Reynolds accounts of European society in
the half millennium from Charlemagne to 1300 will differ in significant ways from
the pre-Reynolds accounts that she criticizes.”83 There, however, the praise stops,
hinging on that supposition: “If she is successful.” In the first place, Cheyette takes
Reynolds to task for what he calls “a radical nominalism” in asserting that we cannot
draw any larger inferences about the meanings of words beyond their particular use
in particular documents (which is really just an extension of Brown’s point two
decades earlier). In demolishing this argument, Cheyette calls this approach the
“road to paralyzing skepticism.”84
On a related front, Brown’s objections to the comparison of the terms ‘war’ and
‘agriculture’ with ‘feudalism’ as similarly necessary abstractions ring hollow. In particular, she states that “there is an evident difference between, on the one hand,
those collective descriptive abstractions arrived at by isolating common features of
different phenomena similar enough to permit the use and assure the acceptance
82 Reynolds,

Fiefs and Vassals, 3; see, among many others, page 5 for the Libri Feudorum.
L. Cheyette, review of Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Evidence Reinterpreted,
by Susan Reynolds, Speculum 71 (1996): 999.
84 Cheyette, review of Fiefs and Vassals, 1000–1002, quotations from 1000 and 1001
respectively.
83 Fredric
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of single words to denote them, and, on the other hand, those abstract analytic
constructs formulated and defined as a shorthand means of designating the characteristics that the observers consider essential to various time periods, modes of
organization, movements, and doctrines. To a degree to which the first type is not,
the second sort of general term is inevitably and often intentionally affected by the
theories and assumptions of the formulators and users.”85 Brown offers no support
for this “evident” claim. Even assuming her distinction to be meaningful and appropriate, she offers no firm criteria for sorting abstractions into one category versus the
other. And finally, even assuming that ‘feudalism’ is an abstraction of the second
type, she has given no reason for denying it meaning as a concept.86
Additionally, responding purely historically, Cheyette directly rebuts three of
the central tenets of Reynolds’ critique. She claims that an ex post facto concept
of feudalism derives from misinterpreting texts like the Libri Feudorum. Cheyette,
however, notes that to the extent that something like the Libri Feudorum was used
as the basis for case law, it cannot have embodied a property too radically different
from the customary interpretation, as “there were no revolts, no demands for concessions or charters of privilege in response to [what would have been] a wholesale
introduction of new legal rules.” Moreover, although Reynolds attacks the critical
Ganshof-ian “union of vassalage and benefice”, as Cheyette points out, “eleventhand twelfth-century documents that explicitly tie fidelity to property are not all that
hard to find.”87 Cheyette also critiques Reynolds’ distinction between “attribute[s] of
government” and “right[s] of property”; if she claims that “it is only the anachronis85 Brown,

“Tyranny of a Construct,” 1080.
implication, Brown is putting ‘war’ into the first category. Yet our understanding of
the term is clearly “affected by the theories and assumptions of the formulators and users,”
as the early twenty-first century consternation over the rise of ‘cyber warfare’ illustrates.
Occurring in a new domain in which the doctrine and modes of organization of traditional
warfare do not apply, the idea of ‘cyber war’ has fundamentally altered our perceptions
of what ‘war’ itself means. It has not, however, done away with all meaning whatsoever;
‘war’ is still a useful concept. Similarly, ‘feudalism’ may still be meaningful regardless of
its origins.
87 Cheyette, review of Fiefs and Vassals, 1003.
86 By
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tic application of ‘feudalism’ that has led us to confuse the two,” what reason do we
have for anachronistically applying our understanding of government and property?88
Separately—and in fact writing halfway in time between Brown and Reynolds—
Wickham demonstrates a totally different approach to feudalism. His 1984 article
“The Other Transition: From the Ancient World to Feudalism” is explicitly an attempt to frame the “end of the ancient world” in economic terms, and then frame
those terms “into the Marxist problematic of transition.”89 Wickham’s particular
emphasis is the transition between slave labor and tenant rents as the primary basis
of the economy; as far as he is concerned, “feudalism . . . has nothing to do with
military obligations, vassalage or the fief.”90 Since much of Brown’s and Reynolds’
critiques are levied at assumptions about form, Wickham’s approach deserves a separate look.
Without going too much into the details of Wickham’s article, which will be addressed more fully in Chapter 4, his argument runs essentially as follows: Economies
may be driven by “modes of production”, and at any one point in time tend to be
dominated by one mode over any others. In particular, the medieval period (including the early medieval period) is characterized by a mode that may be called
“feudalism” that is based upon the exchange of land for service or rent. For Wickham, “feudal relations are represented simply by tenants paying rent to (or doing
labour service for) a monopolistic landowner class.”91 (Rents in cash may seem antithetical to the more traditional definitions of Bloch or Ganshof, but for reasons that
will be discussed later, there is a valid case for considering them a ‘service’.)
This characterization is sufficiently strong that we can identify a definite transition between imperial society (characterized by slavery and taxation, as noted above)
and an early medieval “feudal” society. In specifically avoiding any discussion of this
88 Cheyette,

review of Fiefs and Vassals, 1004–05; quotation from 1005.
“The Other Transition,” 4.
90 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 6.
91 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 6.
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“Marxist” view of feudalism,92 Reynolds is limiting herself to a never-realistic view
of feudalism as only fiefs in return for only military service.
∗

∗

∗

The purpose of this section was to investigate whether there is an identifiable
change in socio-economic structures between the Empire and the Middle Ages that
can be called feudalism, and I believe that there is. I am not concerned with commendation, swearing in manus, or any of the other formal trappings; I am interested
in the social institutions that people made and used for themselves—on which see
also Cheyette’s suggestion to ask “what people are doing rather than what is the
nature of legal institutions and social classes.”93 That said, I think that the debate
over feudalism as a concept has become bogged down in precisely these sorts of trappings and ceremonies or, in the case of Reynolds, become a matter of not seeing the
forest for the trees. One of the causes (and consequences) has been the unfortunate
identification between fief and vassalage ever since Ganshof’s memorable phrase.
Nevertheless, fief and vassal are not unhelpful concepts. To best employ them
we will probably need to match the intent of Brown’s suggestion and base our understanding on the best historical evidence available. And, following Wickham (over
his express objections), that may mean identifying his service and/or rent tenants
as fief-holding vassals. In fact, although Wickham is not explicit, his arguments are
generally consistent with Bloch’s “feudal society.”
Indeed, Wickham and Cheyette have made it clear that there was something
like feudalism, even if it does not have all the formal structure of the classic understanding represented (and debated about) by Bloch, Ganshof, and Duby. Wickham
specifically argues that feudalism obtained very early in the medieval period. Although precise definitions may vary, and even though ‘feudalism’ as a label may
be a modern framework for interpreting the medieval period, Brown and Reynolds
92 Reynolds,
93 Cheyette,

Fiefs and Vassals, 15.
review of Fiefs and Vassals, 1001–02; quotation from 1002.
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are overreaching in their attempts to do away with feudalism as a construct. The
claim that ‘feudalism’ as a label is a recent construct, even if true, does not imply
that the label does not have a meaningful referent. Similarly, Brown’s suggestions
to pay attention to the meaning of words, and preferably to use the words that medieval people themselves used, both have merit. But even taken together they do
not discredit the explanatory power of a modern construct.

2.4

Towards a More Sophisticated Understanding

One other historiographic trend that bears some discussion is the increasingly sophisticated understanding of and discussion about the nature of the transition from
Roman Empire to European kingdoms. This change is reflected in the ways historians talk about the barbarians and the effect they had on the later Empire. It is
also reflected in, and shaped by, the application of new technologies and techniques
to the study of the time period.
On the most simplistic level, the very language of the discussion has changed.
Criticizing the barbarians for not matching Roman cultural or technological achievements (or simply for not being Christian) is no longer commonly accepted practice.
Neither is calling the barbarians, or any other peoples, “primitive” or ‘backward”—as
did virtually all earlier historians, and even some more contemporary ones.94
At a deeper level, the past century has seen Gibbon’s straightforward account
of collapse rejected by increasingly many historians. The argument has been set
against Pirenne’s not-much-more-complicated account of continuity in the face of
change. Current views now see a more nuanced, multi-threaded history—a trend
that culminated, or at least peaked, with Peter Brown’s construct of late antiquity
(which itself has seen evolving interpretations).
94 See

passim.

among others Braudel, The Mediterranean, and Wickham, “The Other Transition,”
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On the subject of identity, the simplistic notions of culture and ethnicity that
characterized the historical approach of the nineteenth century have given way to
sustained debate about the nature and impact of these labels (see Wolfram, Pohl,
Goffart, etc.). Geary et al. have argued increasingly in favor of ethnicity and identity as constructed markers rather than inborn attributes, and have described the
concepts as fluid, rather than fixed.
Finally, in terms of social and economic structures, the long-cherished (or at least
much-used) term ‘feudalism’ has seen substantial debate and revision in the last
several decades. Duby already was setting himself against the more classical understanding of Bloch and Ganshof, though his definition was not after all so different.
Brown and Reynolds, of course, declared the entire concept inapplicable—though
that argument has not turned out to be nearly as persuasive as either might have
hoped. In fact, Wickham has attempted (successfully in my view) to extend the
traditionally social view of feudalism to more purely economic grounds.
∗

∗

∗

The other way in which interpretations of the late antique/early medieval period
have become more sophisticated is by bringing new technologies and techniques to
bear on historical problems. The following discussion is not an argument for or
against any particular technology or innovation, but rather an attempt to highlight
the ways in which our understanding of the past (and of history itself) continues to
evolve based on new material.
Concerns over culture history notwithstanding, archaeology has a great deal to
offer, especially for a period in which the written sources are comparatively sparse.
Archaeology itself is not a new field—though its techniques have likewise become
more sophisticated—and has been contributing significantly to our knowledge of
history for well over a hundred years.95 Yet Hodges and Whitehouse were arguing
95 In

a limited sense, it has been contributing for far longer than that: Bede, for example,
discusses (albeit incorrectly) the ruins of Hadrian’s Wall in an attempt to structure the
post-Roman period of history in Britain.
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in the 1980s that the application of archaeology to late antiquity was still in its
infancy. And recent archaeological work, frequently backed by rigorous statistical
analysis, has offered new kinds of data on which to formulate historical arguments.
Mark Handley’s essay “Beyond Hagiography” contains a good discussion on the use of
inscriptions on datable artifacts to trace shifts in local religious beliefs, for example,96
and Michael McCormick points to the use of ice cores to document atmospheric
pollution traceable to metalworking.97 Now, most major histories of the period
draw heavily if indirectly on archaeological evidence—the works of Geary, Heather,
Halsall, and Wickham are all good examples.
Likewise, the seemingly unrelated fields of genetics and paleoclimatatology each
bring their own contributions. By offering credible scientific evidence for migration
and assimilation of different gene pools, genetic studies of the sort conducted in
England regarding Anglo-Saxon history can shed some light on the sorts of tribal
movements that have caused controversy between the Vienna and Toronto schools.98
Paleoclimatology—the study of changes in climate on long time scales—was already
being discussed qualitatively by Braudel in the middle twentieth century. Now historians like Horden and Purcell, Cheyette, and Tamara Lewit are tackling the issue
in greater detail to explain some of the driving forces behind economic and/or social
change; more details are provided in Chapter 5.
The historiographic trends discussed above have all overturned, or at least revised,
earlier, more simplistic (or naı̈ve) arguments in favor of more complex interpretations.
These will not in themselves be the end of the debate. Likewise, there are presum96 Mark

A. Handley, “Beyond Hagiography: Epigraphic Commemoration and the Cult
of Saints in Late Antique Trier,” in Mathisen and Shanzer, Society and Culture in Late
Antique Gaul.
97 Michael McCormick, Origins of the European Economy: Communications and Commerce AD 300–900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 53.
98 See, e.g., Cristian Capelli et al., “A Y Chromosome Census of the British Isles,” Current Biology 13 (2003): 979–84, as well as Mark G. Thomas, Michael P. H. Stumpf, and
Heinrich Härke, “Evidence for an Apartheid-Like Social Structure in Early Anglo-Saxon
England,” Proceedings of the Royal Society B273 (2006): 2651–57.
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ably many other ways in which our knowledge and understanding of history can be
increased through the adoption and application of new methods and materials.
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Chapter 3
Political Structures: Devolution
and Evolution

3.1

The Empire’s Barbarians/The Barbarians’
Empire

A. H. M. Jones, in his The Later Roman Empire, 284–602: A Social, Economic,
and Administrative Survey (first published in 1964), laid out a vision of the Empire
that shaped the study of late antiquity for decades. Jones saw an Empire that
was autocratic, absolute, and pervasive. Guy Halsall credits this view in part to
the then-current context of fascism and communism, and notes that Jones’s model
evolved over time to become more nuanced. Nonetheless, the authority and range of
the imperial bureaucracy was indisputably immense, though not without its limits
(notably corruption and the sheer difficulty of managing so vast a territory without
modern communications or transportation).1
1 A.

H. M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284–602: A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey, reprint of the 1964 edition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1986); “late antiquity” of course was a concept that arose after the publication of Jones’s
book. Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 68, 74–76; see also Heather, Fall of the Roman Em-
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In some respects, the Empire was as much an ideological and cultural phenomenon
as it was a military and administrative reality.2 Even into the fifth century, the local
powers and ruling class shared with the emperor a sophisticated elite culture that
derived from the Classical period, helping to hold the ideological Empire together
despite its apparent shortcomings as a bureaucracy. This elite culture spanned the
Empire, papering over (at least at society’s upper levels) the differences in the social
structures and living conditions of the various regions of Europe. Initially these
regions were bound together by a common desire for romanitas as the upper classes
(or upwardly mobile) sought privilege or citizenship.3 This binding culture was
partially undone in the third century as, on the one hand, the individual regions
became more prosperous and self-sustaining, weakening integrating economic ties,
and on the other, the incentive to “Romanize” was reduced after Caracalla issued
blanket citizenship in 212—everyone already was Roman.4
At least as important in the loss of imperial cohesion, however, was the crisis of
the third century, which saw a dramatic decrease in central authority from which
the Empire never fully recovered. The third century was balanced to some extent
by the restorative fourth century. This period saw a huge expansion in the imperial bureaucracy, including the separation of military from civil service, that turned
birth/wealth distinctions into a “service aristocracy” in which “the importance of
rank, status, and precedence . . . cannot be overestimated.”5 Among the most significant changes instituted by Diocletian was the administrative re-organization of
the Empire into smaller provinces consisting of more locally autonomous civitates
(cities), which were the fundamental administrative unit.6
pire, 23–30, on the evolution of the structure of the Empire, and 103–10 on limitations.
2 See, for example, Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, 69–70.
3 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 66–71; Geary, Before France and Germany, 28–29;
Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, 15–22, 116–18.
4 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 71–72.
5 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 74–78; quotation is from 76–77.
6 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 74–76; Geary, Before France and Germany, 11; Christopher Kelly, “Empire Building,” in Bowersock et al., Late Antiquity, 176–77. Provinces were
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Throughout the last decades of the fourth century, and the first decades of the
fifth, the barbarians inflicted harassing attacks that weakened—though they did
not yet permanently damage—imperial stability.7 As it became apparent that the
barbarians were not going to go away, the Empire attempted to find ways to make
them useful. Thus began the imperial policy of settling barbarians as foederati :
they were settled by treaty, or foedus, in a particular region, usually to provide
some stability as a sort of contracted army. (Though etymologically it is only a
coincidence that this word looks like feodum, or fief, in a very real sense this was
the beginning of what might be called feudalism: the barbarian kings were granted
territory to support themselves and their people, over which they exercised at least
some governmental authority, and in return for which they provided military security
and tax revenues.)8 Officially established as buffer zones, over time—and often quite
rapidly—these foederati begin to turn into more or less autonomous sub-kingdoms.
The Franks settled gradually as individuals and small groups west of the Rhine in
what is now the southern Netherlands and northern Belgium.9 In 358, Julian formally
recognized the right of the Franks to live where they did, making the Franks the first
barbarians to be “settled” within the Empire; the majority of Franks at this time
continued to live east of the Rhine.10 In 382, after an extended period of conflict
with the Empire, the Goths were settled by treaty on the Danube and in the Balkans.
Exposing the dangers that arose when imperial actions did not live up to imperial
promises, however, an army under Radagaisus, dissatisfied with the treatment they
grouped into dioceses, which were themselves grouped into praetorian prefectures.
7 Wells, Barbarians to Angels, 20–27; Geary, Myth of Nations, 99–103.
8 See Wolfram, History of the Goths, 174. Walter Goffart has made the fairly persuasive
argument that what was being assigned was not land per se but the tax revenues of the
land, but in fact for the purposes of this discussion it hardly matters; also see Section 4.1.
9 As noted above in Section 2.2, the use of group names to identify the same peoples
across several centuries is somewhat controversial. Further complicating matters is the
fact that all of these peoples are first documented as multi-ethnic agglomerates. To use
particular labels at this point is therefore somewhat misleading, but nonetheless useful.
10 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 3–5.
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were receiving from the Empire, invaded Italy in 405. Under Alaric, the Goths sacked
Rome itself in 410 but left Italy in 412, somewhat placated. Shortly thereafter the
Visigothic king Athaulf married the daughter of Theodosius I, Galla Placidia, and the
Visigoths were settled in Aquitaine by Honorius to counter the threat of the Alans
and Vandals. Around this time the Goths begin to be divided into the Visigoths,
who would be focused more to the West, and the Ostrogoths, focused and aligned
more with Constantinople.11
Later, in the fifth century, the Alans were some of the few barbarian peoples to
have been deliberately settled twice within the Empire. Originally established in the
first decade of the fifth century in northeastern Gaul, where placenames still indicate
their settlements, in 440 they were relocated by Flavius Aëtius to the Valentinois
in heavily Romanized southeastern Gaul.12 Like the Alans, the Burgundians were
settled twice in a short span of time. The Emperor Honorius first granted the Burgundians federate status in 413, apparently as part of a truce following the uprising
of the usurper Jovinus, and settled them in the Rhineland where they occupied the
area around Worms.13 In 443 the general Aëtius re-established the Burgundians—
whom he had defeated in the meantime after a rebellion in 436—in Sapaudia (Savoy)
in southeastern Gaul, probably distributed along the Rhône, and certainly in the regions of Vienne and Lyons.14

11 Geary,

Before France and Germany, 69–73; Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 38;
date of settlement from P. D. King, Law and Society in the Visigothic Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 1.
12 Bachrach, “Alans in Gaul,”: initial settlement 477, later settlement 481; see also
Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 38.
13 Prosper of Aquitaine, Epitoma chronicon, in Murray, ed., From Roman to Merovingian
Gaul, annal for 386; Katherine Fischer Drew, introduction to Katherine Fischer Drew, ed.,
The Burgundian Code: Book of Constitutions or Law of Gundobad, Additional Enactments
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), 1.
14 Prosper of Aquitaine, Epitoma chronicon, annal for 408; Chronica Gallica 452, in
Murray, ed., From Roman to Merovingian Gaul, 118, 128; Gregory of Tours, The History
of the Franks, trans. Lewis Thorpe (London: Penguin, 1974), chapter II.9; Ian N. Wood,
The Merovingian Kingdoms (Harlow, UK: Longman, 1994), 8.
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As stated earlier, not all barbarian peoples were settled in this way. The Alemanni, for example, were never established as foederati and were soundly crushed
by the Franks in the sixth century in the first real barbarian expansion beyond the
borders of the Empire.15 On the other hand, some tribes occupied land by conquest,
rather than treaty—as was the case with the Sueves in northwestern Iberia and the
Vandals, first in Iberia and later in north Africa. In fact, as noted above, the Visigoths were settled in Aquitania and Iberia precisely to counter the Sueves, Alans, and
Vandals.
∗

∗

∗

The Visigoths proved to be an extremely effective buffer against the Vandals. In
fact, they were so effective that (in a prime example of unintended consequences)
they pushed the Vandals out of Iberia into Roman north Africa. Under their king
Gaiseric, the Vandals subdued the province between the late 420s and early 440s.
The emperor Theodosius II failed to retake the province in 441, and in 442 the
Vandal kingdom became the first independent barbarian kingdom to be recognized
as such, although Vandal Africa remained relatively integrated economically with
the Empire.16
Elsewhere the barbarians were gaining in power and independence. On the Continent, Aëtius led the Romans and the settled barbarians against Attila’s Huns at
the Battle of Châlons in 451. Although a Roman victory, it did not prevent the Huns
from entering Italy, and “as the western government became progressively weaker,
it became less and less possible to sustain any coherent policy in relation to barbarian settlement.” After the battle and the subsequent disintegration of the Western
Empire, Gaul was dependent on Syagrius’s Roman field army headquartered at Soissons; the Franks expanded in this context, and in 486 Clovis defeated Syagrius,
15 Geary,

Before France and Germany, 73–75, 84–86. Note that the Alemanni are sometimes called Sueves—they should not be confused with the Sueves that invaded in the
Empire in 406 and ended up occupying Galicia.
16 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 228–29; Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 37, 40.
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ending Roman rule in Gaul.17
After their recognition in Africa, the Vandals began to expand northward into the
Mediterranean islands, and even sacked Rome in 468.18 At roughly the same time,
Euric “seized royal power,” effectively creating a break-away state in Aquitaine in
466 and promptly began expanding the Visigothic territorial base. In 475 he was
recognized by the Eastern Empire as controlling the land between the Loire and
the straits of Gibraltar.19 The first phase of barbarian ascendancy in the West
finally culminated in 476 with the deposition of Romulus Augustulus by Odoacer.
Unlike his predecessors, Odoacer did not bother to set up a puppet emperor, but
applied directly to Constantinople to use the title patricius; he eventually settled for
rex. Halsall points out that at this point both Gundobad and Odoacer had decided
barbarian kingship was more worthwhile than imperial office.20
Further afield, in the wake of Continental unrest and Constantine’s rebellion in
Britain, that island was abandoned c.410. Thereafter Saxon raids grew in intensity,
leading to a decline in the Roman towns, economy, and imperial integration even
faster than was happening on the Continent.21 On the subject Bede says merely
that “At the same time [as Rome was sacked, i.e. 410] Roman rule came to an end in
Britain.”22 After holding out for a generation or two, some time around 450 (Bede
says in the reign of Marcian, 449–56), the Romano-British hired the Saxons to help
defeat the Picts to the north. Following this initial invitation, successive waves of
Continental peoples (predominantly Angles, Saxons, and Jutes) began an invasion
of the island.23
17 Quotation

is from Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 38; see also Drew, introduction
to Laws of the Salian Franks, 5.
18 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 37.
19 King, Law and Society, 1.
20 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 33–34; Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 279–81.
21 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 36–38.
22 Bede, Ecclesiastical History of the English People, ed. D. H. Farmer, (London: Penguin, 1990), chapter I.11.
23 Bede, Ecclesiastical History, chapters I.14–15; Gildas, “The Ruin of Britain,” in
Michael Winterbottom, ed., Gildas: The Ruin of Britain and Other Works (London:
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The Ostrogoths under Theodoric invaded Italy in 489; after a short war with
the Vandals and various other barbarians under Odoacer, the Ostrogoths established
what was to be, for a short time, the most Roman of the barbarian kingdoms.24
Theodoric’s policies were generally well-received and he was compared in his own
time (by Romans!) to Trajan and Valentinian I, considered model emperors.25 This
model was not to last. The Ostrogothic kingdom likewise ended in the mid-sixth
century, defeated in relatively short order by the Eastern Empire in a war that
lasted 536–54.26
In Gaul the Franks were beginning a long push towards hegemony. As noted
above, Clovis conquered the Alemanni living in the middle Rhine and Alsace in
506.27 A year later the Franks, fighting with the Burgundians, defeated the Visigoths,
pushing them back into Spain just as they had pushed the Alans and Vandals nearly
a century earlier. (Once in Spain, however, the Visigoths thrived.28 ) After a series of
bad decisions that antagonized both the Franks and the Ostrogoths, the Burgundians
under Sigismund were in turn conquered by the Franks in 534 and absorbed into that
growing kingdom.29 After Clovis the Frankish kingdom was divided into four regions,
each with a different demographic makeup.30
Phillimore, 1978), chapters 21–25; James Campbell, “The Lost Centuries: 400–600,” in
James Campbell, ed., The Anglo-Saxons (London: Phaidon, 1982), 23–34; Peter Hunter
Blair, An Introduction to Anglo-Saxon England, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3–7.
24 Wolfram, History of the Goths, 278–90; most Roman: see Burns, History of the Ostrogoths, 68.
25 Wolfram, History of the Goths, 306–07.
26 Wolfram, History of the Goths, 342–62; Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 41,
108–09.
27 William M. Daly, “Clovis: How Barbaric? How Pagan?” Speculum 69 (1994): 620n3,
following Cassiodorus; Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 6.
28 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 288–89, 296–300; Cameron, The Mediterranean World,
42; Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 6; Gregory of Tours, History of the
Franks, chapter II.37 does not mention the Burgundians.
29 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 302–03; Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian
Franks, 7; Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks, chapter III.4–6.
30 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 9. The regions were northeastern Austrasia, with a majority Frankish population; northwestern Neustria, majority
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By the beginning of the sixth century, following the official demise of the Western
Empire, the barbarians—initially settled as foederati to maintain at least some semblance of imperial control over western Europe—had established a series of more or
less permanent independent kingdoms. Nonetheless, the barbarian leaders, at least,
were still wrapped into the Roman political structure through the holding of Eastern
offices.
∗

∗

∗

Section 2.1 raised the crucial question of why the Roman Empire lasted as long
as it did, even to the point of outlasting—actually in the east, conceptually in the
west—its own successors. As suggested there, the answer lies in viewing the barbarian
kingdoms as the natural political extension of the Empire, “the greatest and most
enduring creation of Roman political and military genius,” as Patrick Geary put it.31
In the first place, individual barbarians had long been integrated into the Empire,
rising through the imperial ranks to wield often considerable influence. Perhaps befitting the barbarians’ initial role as contracted armies, the position of magister militum
(roughly, ‘general’; see Section 3.3 for a more detailed discussion of the significance
of this title) became the principal route for success.32 Already in the fourth century
individual Franks were rising to high position via the army: Richomer became not
just magister militum but consul, and his nephew Arbogast was likewise magister
militum.33 Alaric was finally named magister militum per Illyricum, and Geary suggests that it was his search for further imperial recognition that drove his attacks
on Italy.34 Ironically, the Goths in Italy had been defeated by Stilicho—himself
a Vandal commanding a Roman army. In addition to Stilicho, other notable fifthGallo-Roman/minority Frankish; southwestern Aquitaine, majority Gallo-Roman/minority
Visigothic; and southeastern Burgundy, majority Gallo-Roman/minority Burgundian.
31 Geary, Before France and Germany, vi; see also Pohl, “Barbarian Successor States,”
33.
32 Geary, Before France and Germany, 13, cites “a continuous increase of the influence
of these individuals [barbarian commanders] and their armies.”
33 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 4.
34 Geary, Before France and Germany, 70.
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century magistri militum included Ricimer (Suevian-Gothic), Sigisvult (Gothic), and
Gundobad (Burgundian). All of these either sparred with or appointed western emperors; of Ricimer, J. B. Bury notes that he “was the first German who had become
a virtual king of Italy; he is the link between Stilicho and Odovacar.”35 Even the
Scirian Odoacer, who finally ended western imperial succession, had previously been
magister militum.
This integration of individuals tended to instill some notion of continuity, particularly given the survival of broader state institutions (see Section 3.3). The continued recognition of Roman authority may be explained by an intriguing argument
made by Evangelos Chrysos, that the imperium, “the constitutional and legitimising power of the Roman state,” was not tied to any particular practical reality of
the Empire. Imperium could not be divided—Chrysos states that it was believed
to be indivisible—and so it endured as a concept not only after the division of the
Empire but even after the nominal end of the Western Empire.36 Additionally, the
period after the end of the Empire in the West actually corresponds to something
of a resurgence in the Eastern Empire, which may have suggested to the barbarians
that although the terms of game had changed somewhat, Rome in a broader sense
was not yet gone. Certainly in the sixth century there was a great deal of looking
back (or simply east) in hopes of claiming or borrowing some of the legitimacy and
heritage of Rome. Inter alia, Justinian’s codification of law was “a grand imperial
gesture” at the start of his reign that he thematically followed with the attempted
reconquest of Africa and Italy.37 Belisarius’ African campaign of 533–34 was successful, destroying the Vandal kingdom after a little less than a century of independence.
As previously mentioned, the Ostrogothic kingdom was destroyed at about the same
35 J.

B. Bury, History of the Later Roman Empire (London: Macmillan, 1889), 241;
Jones, Later Roman Empire, 177.
36 Evangelos Chrysos, “The Empire in East and West,” in Webster and Brown, Transformation of the Roman World, 9.
37 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 123. Justinian’s reign began in 527; his code was
compiled 529–34.
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time, and the Byzantines also had some success against the Visigoths, ruling a strip
of territory on the southeastern coast under a magister militum from 552–624.38
Before relations were soured by these reconquests, however, there was an extended
period of time following Odoacer’s deposition of Romulus Augustulus during which
various barbarian leaders saw themselves at least as exercising the authority of the
legitimate Roman emperor, if not actually as Romans per se.39 There were at least
four letters exchanged between the Burgundian king Sigismund and the Eastern
Emperor Anastasius. These letters indicate not only that there were formal embassies
from the king, but that he considered himself (at least when writing to Anastasius)
to be “under the jurisdiction of Roman [in this case Byzantine] power.” Sigismund
also held the titles of patricius and magister utriusque militiae from the emperor, as
had his father Gundobad before him.40 Theodoric’s letters do not imply quite the
same level of submission, probably due to his greater relative power, but nonetheless
recognize Anastasius as the emperor,41 and he persistently tried to be recognized
in his own right.42 After Theodoric and Anastasius had a falling out in 508, the
emperor conferred a consulship on Theodoric’s rival Clovis, an appointment that
was apparently rewarded by a Frankish attack on Italy that same year; granted that
this may have been a case of the Eastern emperors incentivizing the barbarian kings
rather than commanding them directly, but it points to a continued linkage between
the two.43
38 Cameron,

The Mediterranean World, 40–42, 104–09, 121.
“Empire in East and West,” 10–15.
40 Avitus of Vienne, Letters and Selected Prose, ed. and trans. Danuta Shanzer and Ian
Wood, Translated Texts for Historians 2 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002),
Epistles 93 and 94; see also accompanying commentary by Danuta Shanzer and Ian Wood,
141–53.
41 See for example Cassiodorus Senator, Variae, ed. Theodor Mommsen, MGH AA12
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1894), I.1.
42 A. H. M. Jones, “The Constitutional Position of Odoacer and Theoderic,” The Journal of Roman Studies 52 (1962), 127–28—although Jones’s article is attempting to make
the broader claim that Theodoric ruled as king of the Goths and Romans, unfettered by
imperial recognition or constraints.
43 Ian N. Wood, “Gregory of Tours and Clovis,” Revue belge de philologie et d’histoire
39 Chrysos,
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As will be seen in Chapter 5, the barbarian kingdoms maintained trade connections and other economic ties with the Eastern Empire in addition to their surviving
political ties. They even maintained, at some level, a ‘Roman’ identity into the sixth,
seventh, and possibly eighth centuries (see Chapter 4 and Chapter 6).

3.2

The Decentralization of Power

Against this backdrop, the Roman world, in which the Empire had been the single
centralized focus of society, witnessed the continued and increasing decentralization
of power. Indeed, perhaps the best argument for a ‘collapse’ following the end of the
Empire is the weakening and eventual disappearance of a centralized state. Yet even
here ‘collapse’ is inappropriate, and ‘decline’ may even be too strong a label. At the
most, Peter Wells argues, we should see it as “a steady, even inevitable unraveling
of the military, political, and economic institutions that Rome had created over its
seven centuries of growth. But it was much more complex than that, and few people
at the time would have noticed or felt that their world was declining.”44
In considering the power of the Empire, Halsall points out that “No modern
state has ever been able effectively to hold [the] diverse areas [of Europe] together
even with advanced communications and military technology.” To the extent that
the Empire was able to do, the question is therefore how the Empire had become
centralized in the first place (though Peter Heather notes that the Empire was not
always able to hold these areas effectively).45 Halsall argues that the early Empire
solved the problem by incentivizing local powers to participate in the Roman system
through common culture and earned rewards (e.g. imperial office). At the same time,
63 (1985), 268–69.
44 Wells, Barbarians to Angels, 18.
45 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 68. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, 100–103, gives
a good example of the Empire’s failure to police its own administration. See also Kelly,
“Empire Building,” 176.
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ironically, this Roman system strengthened the power of the local élites. So long as
the central state survived, this relationship was sustainable. In the third and fourth
centuries, however, cultural changes within the Empire, including the free extension
of citizenship to all inhabitants, reduced the incentive for local élites to engage in a
unified endeavor.46
For the time being, at any rate, the Empire was able to maintain a centralized,
autocratic style of government. However, while changes in the fourth and fifth centuries undid the aristocratic disengagement, they did so in a way that set the stage
for more independent local élites. In the first place, the Empire was never really
able to repair the ideological damage caused by political instability from the third
century onwards.47 Additionally, the administrative re-organization of the Empire
into smaller, more locally autonomous provinces solidified the rise of a local power
élite.48 As Halsall put it, not entirely facetiously, “in the late Roman Empire aristocrats ceased to ask what they could do for their Empire and instead increasingly
asked what the Empire could do for them.”49
∗

∗

∗

To step away from this narrative briefly, there was a short period after the end of
the Empire when central state exercise of power remained strong (at least relatively
speaking). And in some areas such as lawmaking the state retained certain powers
to itself. Barbarian acculturation within the context of the Empire meant that “[by]
the fifth century, under Roman influence, the Germans had come to regard the state
as having certain powers, on the one hand, and certain duties and responsibilities,
on the other.” This was accompanied by a corresponding decline in barbarian social
structures. The “most important” increases in state power were in the areas of
46 Halsall,

Barbarian Migrations, 69–72.
Barbarian Migrations, 73.
48 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 74–76; Geary, Before France and Germany, 11; Kelly,
“Empire Building,” 176–77.
49 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 77–79; quotation from 79. See also Cameron, The
Mediterranean World, 81–94.
47 Halsall,
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security and justice.50
In the most obvious case, the existence of more or less autocratic kings represented
a continuation of ideology, if not precisely of form. Although more decentralized than
the arrangement under the Empire—there were more barbarian kings than there ever
had been emperors—the underlying principle of monarchy (maximally oligarchy, in
the case of divided kingship) still pertained. Additionally, all of the barbarian legal
traditions either imply or specifically refer to the retention of lawmaking councils
surrounding the king. Whether these derive from older barbarian traditions or from
the period of Roman acculturation is not entirely clear (Chris Wickham would argue
for barbarian origins).51 For the most part this manifested itself in the continuation
of Roman state institutions, albeit sometimes with a barbarian twist: see further
details below.
In terms of state activities per se, during its short span, the Ostrogothic kingdom
“maintained many continuities with the Roman past,” including survival of the senatorial class (and the senate itself) and the consular office.52 The continued relevance
of these groups can be seen in several sixth-century letters from Theodoric addressed
to the Roman senate.53 The Ostrogoths are a particularly strong example—Thomas
Burns claims that “unlike any other barbarian group [they] entered the living heart
of the Western Empire”54 —but they were hardly unique.

50 Katherine

Fischer Drew, introduction to Katherine Fischer Drew, ed., The Lombard
Laws (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1973), 6–7; quotation is from 6.
51 Drew, introduction to The Lombard Laws, 7–11; see also Harold J. Berman, “The
Background of the Western Legal Tradition in the Folklaw of the Peoples of Europe,” The
University of Chicago Law Review 45 (1978): 573. See Tacitus, Germania, in Tacitus: The
Agricola and the Germania, ed. H. Mattingly, 2nd ed. with revised translation by S. A.
Handford (London: Penguin, 1970), chapters 11–12, 13, for possible origins in older tribal
traditions, as well as Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 100–01.
52 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 41.
53 Cassiodorus, Variae, I.4, I.13, I.30, etc.
54 Burns, History of the Ostrogoths, 68. It is worth mentioning that both Gundomar and
Gundobad spent time in Rome and Ravenna as imperial officials—so after the Ostrogoths,
the Burgundians probably had the most direct influence from the late Empire.
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As mentioned, all of the barbarian laws reference some senate-like body, and
Wickham notes that “[the] Vandal administration seems to have been close to identical to the Roman provincial administration of Africa.”55 Over time, however, these
senates or councils may have declined in influence and power. Noting that “on Italy
the effects of the Gothic wars were destructive in the extreme,” Averil Cameron argues that the imperial senate finally collapsed as an institution following the loss of
senators’ fortunes and subsequent flight to the east.56
∗

∗

∗

In the hundred years between 400 and 500, “the West was divided into half a
dozen major sections . . . and a host of smaller autonomous units in Britain and more
marginal areas elsewhere. The larger western polities were all ruled in a Roman tradition, but they were more militarized, their fiscal structures were weaker, they had
fewer economic interrelationships, and their internal economies were often simpler.
A major change had taken place, without anyone particularly intending it.”57
The beginnings of the decentralization of the state and its associated powers
began well before the traditional end of the Empire. By the start of the fifth century,
events had conspired to make the Empire nearly impossible to govern outright; as
Cameron put it, “the frequently repeated and often contradictory pronouncements
of emperors do not signify authoritarian intrusions on the lives of individuals so
much as vain attempts to regulate a situation which was in practice beyond their
control.”58 In fact, we can see the first step in decentralization—true devolution, or
the voluntary assigning of power downward—in the establishment of the barbarian
foederati.59
55 Wickham,

The Inheritance of Rome, 77.
The Mediterranean World, 122.
57 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 79; the half dozen sections were “Vandal Africa,
Visigothic Spain and south-west Gaul, Burgundian south-east Gaul, Frankish northern
Gaul, Ostrogothic Italy (including the Alpine region).”
58 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 86.
59 See, inter alia, Wolfram, History of the Goths, 170–74.
56 Cameron,
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Furthermore, what Halsall called a change in the “core-periphery relations” in
the fifth and sixth centuries led to the “loss of a monopoly over political legitimacy.”
Once people lost their investment in a common political ideology, there was nothing
to stop the powerful local élites from choosing different allegiances.60 The process is
perhaps best exemplified by Wickham’s description of the Vandals: Although they
“could be seen as in effect a rogue army that seized power in a Roman province
and ran it in a Roman way . . . the Vandals ruled Africa as a military landowning
aristocracy [and] became a political élite, replacing and expropriating the largely
absentee senatorial aristocracy.” As such breakaway kingdoms began to undermine
the perceptions of a unified state (and as the foederati became more powerful themselves), the incentive to remain part of the larger Empire declined, in a sort of vicious
feedback cycle.61
The late Empire had become a patronage network of vertical relationships; up to
at least during the fourth century the emperors were able to control this framework.62
However, as the Empire waned, the aristocracy63 grew in strength and importance.
“[The] growth of an immensely rich and powerful class of senatorial landowners in the
west [began] during the fourth century. . . . The combination of a weak government
and wealthy and powerful landowners was crucial in determining the shape of the
western economy.”64 The result was a “shift from a complex urban, monetised,
Romanised society . . . to an unremittingly local and rural society.”65
Already by the fourth century, “most ‘senators’ had never seen Rome. Instead,
60 Halsall,

Barbarian Migrations, 513–17, quotations from 513 and 515 respectively.
The Inheritance of Rome, 78.
62 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 93; Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 111.
63 There is some debate about the appropriate use of the words ‘aristocrat’, ‘noble’, and
‘élite’ to describe the upper tier (or tiers) of late antique and early medieval society: see
Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West, 450–900 (London: Routledge,
2003), 21. Without becoming too technical, and at the risk of introducing some slight
inaccuracies around the edges, I will use the three terms interchangeably.
64 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 84; see also Brown, The World of Late Antiquity,
34, and Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 497.
65 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 498.
61 Wickham,
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they were the leaders of their own society.” Local magnates became important
intermediaries in law, military recruitment, and taxation, increasingly taking over
all of the trappings of official governance.66 Indeed, Susan Reynolds argues that
this sort of blending of what we now distinguish as ‘public’ and ‘private’ power is
one of the defining characteristics of medieval societies.67 The élite transformed,
moving from a status defined purely by wealth to one in which official service and
position (i.e. local power) had become critically interwoven components.68 As the
aristocracy grew in power, they also strengthened their local ties. The later fourth
and fifth centuries exemplified the maxim that all politics is local politics, and the
Empire became an increasingly irrelevant superstructure.69 Separately, these nobles
had already begun to acquire personal military power under the late Empire (beyond
just their role in recruitment for the army).
Combined with their roles in law and taxation, F. L. Ganshof saw a merger with
imported barbarian traditions and the beginnings of a feudal aristocracy.70 This
created a tension with the state—first the Empire, later the barbarian kingdoms—as
the aristocracy, always eager to hold on to their gains, were now more able to do
so. As Wickham notes, “direct state involvement in and control of status was by
now lost even to the strongest government.”71 On the other hand, Wickham notes
that “in the last two millennia the period 500–800 was probably when aristocratic
power in the West was least totalizing, and local autonomies were greatest,”72 so the
newfound power of the nobility should not be overemphasized. Just as the central
Empire had lost power to them, so they lost some measure of power or control over
those beneath them.
66 Brown,

The World of Late Antiquity, 36–40. See also Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 10, 14, 23–24, 28–29.
67 Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals, 25–47.
68 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 104; Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 77–78.
69 Brown, The World of Late Antiquity, 126–31.
70 Ganshof, Feudalism, 4.
71 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 24.
72 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 216.
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In cities, Roger Collins suggests that, at least in Spain, local powers—including,
or especially, bishops—were more relevant to the inhabitants than were kings, and
that there was a general trend toward self-administration at all levels of government.
Wickham agrees with Collins on this point, seeing the continued devolution of wealth
and authority to lower levels in different regions.73 Less land wealth for aristocracy
meant more land wealth for the peasantry and thus more autonomy. The result was
political fragmentation, seen especially in Francia and the Rhineland. With some
exceptions (e.g. Neustria) Frankish peasant society was autonomous at the level of
villages—villages defined by their relationship with a lord used to be taken as the
norm, but this is now seen as “highly unusual.”74 Wickham sees the influence of
“medium owners” rather than a dominant militarized aristocracy. In addition to the
remnants of major cities, he sees villages with some powerful external owners but
also a significant presence of peasant landowners, or even ones where small, mostly
autonomous owners predominated. In Wickham’s view, such villages were common
through the sixth and seventh centuries, perhaps becoming less so by the ninth and
tenth.75
Compounding the problem, at least from the standpoint of a central state, was
the increasing tendency towards heritability of power and position. The barbarian
kingdoms, for the most part, practiced hereditary kingships, although elections were
not uncommon (particularly if the heir was considered unsuitable).76 The wealth
of the landholding aristocracy was inheritable under both Roman and barbarian
law, and increasingly their positions were too. Certainly by the ninth century, and
probably earlier, fiefs had acquired an expectation of heritability (at least among their
recipients); it is not clear at what point this expectation developed.77 In practice, this
73 Roger

Collins, “Mérida and Toledo: 550–585,” in Edward James, ed., Visigothic Spain:
New Approaches (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 196–99; Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome,
204–05.
74 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 205–06.
75 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 206–11.
76 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 489–90.
77 Ganshof, Feudalism, 46–49; Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals, 49, 54, 63.
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was not so different from the state of affairs under the later Empire, which had made
virtually all professions hereditary. In addition to the emperors themselves (who
were of course also sometimes elected), even military positions could be inherited—
notably in the case of the late general Syagrius.78 As noted above, however, this
would tend to frustrate the intentions of the nominal overlord.

3.3

Adaptation of Roman Institutions

As suggested in the previous section, for the most part the barbarian kingdoms
integrated with or sat atop the remnants of Roman society. In ruling these kingdoms,
the barbarians made use of the tools of governance that survived. Although Wickham
argued for major, if unintentional, change, Paul Fouracre argues that “What gave
early-medieval Europe its particular character was interplay between the local and
the universal in [the] process of coping with changing conditions, for although a
kaleidoscope of local identities emerged along with the formation of new political and
social groups, nearly all groups clung to norms and beliefs derived from the same
massive human organisation: the Roman Empire.”79 At its height, that Empire
had been the single centralized focus of society; as mentioned earlier, perhaps the
best argument for a ‘decline’ following the end of the Empire is the corresponding
weakening of the centralized state. By the late antique/early medieval period, the
exercise of power was largely confined to issuing and administering law; organizing
and fielding a military; and collecting taxes to pay for the two.80 This section will
cover the ways in which the various barbarian kingdoms adopted and adapted Roman
78 Helen

J. Nicholson, Medieval Warfare: Theory and Practice of War in Europe, 300–
1500 (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 41; Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 271;
Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, 28. It was Clovis’s defeat of Syagrius that initially
vaulted him to preeminence in Gaul.
79 Paul Fouracre, “Cultural Conformity and Social Conservatism in Early Medieval Europe,” History Workshop 33 (1992): 152.
80 See, e.g., Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, 107, and Halsall, Barbarian Migrations,
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state institutions to suit their evolving needs.
∗

∗

∗

One of the most important and lasting of the tools available to the barbarians
was law. The following description of the legal system after the end of the Empire
is intended only to touch briefly on some highlights of the evolution of that system
in line with the current discussion on political institutions. The barbarian laws and
the corresponding post-imperial legal systems are covered more fully in Chapter 6.
Most if not all of the barbarian kingdoms issued laws, beginning in the mid-fifth
century and running more or less continuously until the time of Charlemagne. One
of the unique features of early barbarian law was its ‘personal’ nature (i.e., Visigoths,
for example, were supposed to be judged according to Visigothic law regardless of
where they happened to be). Consequently, the early kingdoms issued separate laws
for barbarians and Romans, undoing one of the trends of Roman judicial theory
throughout the later Empire. Over time, these diverse personal laws were gradually
replaced by integrated territorial legal codes more line with later Roman law—both
in form and in content.
In many ways like the early Roman law, the barbarian laws also exhibited a great
deal of shared culture. All of the barbarian codes were issued by a king, sometimes
with the help of a council. All assumed some state judicial function and described,
to varying degrees, courts and court procedures. Their method for handling violence
was a payment in lieu of feud, although the value of a person might vary (for several
reasons). They typically placed a high value on marriage and family, and (mostly)
had a detailed concept of inheritance. In their treatment of foreigners (Romans) they
perhaps differed the most, the integrated societies of the Visigoths and Burgundians
contrasting with the more hostile attitudes of the Franks or Lombards. Finally, all the
laws showed an increasing impact of Roman heritage—and specifically Christianity—
as they evolved and professionalized.
∗

∗

∗
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The later Roman military employed a system of more or less professional legions, as often as not ethnic barbarians, under the command of generals (magistri
militum: “masters of the soldiers”), who were sometimes given specific geographic
commands (per Gallias, for instance). Infantry and cavalry were usually commanded
separately; when the commands were combined, or when a more senior position was
required, a magister utriusque militiae (literally “master of both armies”) might be
created.81 This army was paid for out of a hierarchical, centralized system of state
tax revenues.82
Collins notes that throughout the fourth and fifth centuries there is declining
mention of Roman armies; some are known to have been moved internally within
the Empire for political reasons (allowing, for example, the Vandals to seize Africa):
“What emerges from the records of Roman military activity . . . is the diminishing
capacity of the imperial government in the West . . . to provide direct administrative
control over and military defence of its provinces.”83 Consequently, there was an
increasing reliance on non-Romans to fill the ranks, which helped to drive taxation
ever higher (on which more below).84 This difficulty is all the more remarkable given
that, according to Halsall, we are talking about individual field armies of at most
tens of thousands of troops (Cameron cites a total figure of 400,000 men under arms
in the late Empire).85
While noting that in fact most armed conflict probably took place on a small scale,
Halsall does contend that the post-imperial period still saw real, large-scale warfare
requiring sizable armies and the means to maintain them.86 The structure and
organization of these early medieval militaries was firmly rooted in the late Roman
81 Jones,

Later Roman Empire, passim.
“The Other Transition,” 20–21, including note 21 on page 20; see also
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83 Collins, Early Medieval Europe, 80–82; quotation is from 81–82.
84 Collins, Early Medieval Europe, 81–87; Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 146–50;
Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 83–84, 96–97.
85 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 144–45; Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 96.
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model: “we can trace transformations in the nature of the army, its methods of
recruitment and payment, and its relationships with the state, but these nevertheless
remained recognisable descendants of the late Roman system.”87 Specifically, the
titles—and possibly the roles—of the magistri militum survived at least through the
sixth century
One of the features that did distinguish early medieval from late imperial military organization, at least in degree, was the role of class. This common association
between martial prowess and élite warrior class is usually traced to “ancient Germanic traditions”, and to some extent this is supported by the increasingly important
military role of the aristocracy in the fifth and sixth centuries, and corresponding
identification of that class with military service.88 However, Halsall notes that there
is a “continuous thread of development in ideas which associated good rulership with
military victory, from the late Roman Empire into the successor states in ‘barbarian’
western Europe and the East Roman or Byzantine Empire,” and many of the thirdand fourth-century emperors originally rose via the army89 This identification represents a potential conflation of identities: Halsall, noting that there are no records
or significant mentions of the Roman army after the end of the Empire, points out
that the barbarians who had constituted that army (or, more properly, those armies)
were now the very peoples ruling more or less independent kingdoms.90
After the Empire, Halsall claims that it was “most plausible that the dukes and
counts of a kingdom were responsible for maintaining and supplying the troops within
their areas of jurisdiction.” As the accommodations made by the Empire to pay for
the hired barbarian armies, as well as the military positions themselves, became
87 Quotation

from Halsall, Warfare and Society, 45; see also Bernard S. Bachrach, Early
Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2001), 51–2.
88 Halsall, Warfare and Society, 25, 31; quotation from 25.
89 Halsall, Warfare and Society, 25, citing Michael McCormick’s Eternal Victory: Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity, Byzantium and the Early Medieval West.
90 Halsall, Warfare and Society, 32; see also Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 20–21.
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more permanent and hereditary, “by the later sixth century the social group from
which the army was raised had become a class of landholders.”91 The resulting crucial distinction between the Empire and the post-imperial period was the immediate
change in military funding from centralized cash payments (paid by taxation) to
decentralized landowning (paid by rents); as Wickham puts it, “the Germanic settlement subtracted funding and responsibility for the army from the state in favour of
men who ended up as private landowners.”92 Wickham is here specifically rejecting
Goffart’s Barbarians and Romans, A.D. 418–584 on the subject of taxation (as do
S. J. B. Barnish and Halsall); also note that this does not per se reflect any barbarian
cultural attitude, but the conditions by which the tribes were settled as foederati.93
In fact, Thomas Anderson argues that the original purpose of the infamous Salic Law
(which nominally prohibited women from inheriting land) was to ensure that the land
intended to support military service by the foederati remained with those who could
continue to provide that service. There was a similar Burgundian restriction on the
alienation of land that had been Roman.94
Over time, an expectation developed that all free men would provide either military service in proportion to their wealth or pay a concomitant fine (or “army tax”);
although this evolution is clearest in Frankish Gaul, similar transitions occurred in
Visigothic Spain and Ostrogothic (later Lombard) Italy.95 Bernard Bachrach describes the Carolingian system in very much the same way, noting that it was based
on the later Roman and earlier medieval models (he specifically cites an edict from
639)—although we should be careful about reading any Carolingian organization too
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94 Thomas Anderson, “Roman Military Colonies in Gaul, Salian Ethnogenesis and the
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directly into the past.96 This discussion is deeply connected with the one on feudalism in Section 4.1; for now suffice it to say that changes in social structure, land
ownership, and methods of taxation all seem to have been connected, and probably
related to the method for raising an army.
∗

∗

∗

This section will focus on the ‘governmental’ functions of taxation and fiscal
administration.97 The relationship between these functions and the broader economy,
as well as discussion of economic trends and consequences, will be covered more fully
in Chapter 5.
Although the financial administrative structure of the late Empire is not fully
understood, it appears that there was only a limited bureaucracy for managing the
economy, what Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller call a “rudimentary apparatus of
officialdom.” In general, the Romans followed the administrative practice of previous
rulers in their conquered territories. They had no regular monetary policy, and their
default action when faced with a monetary problem was to debase their coinage.98
There was a main treasury that received imperial taxes (although there was a separate military treasury) and was administered by the emperor’s staff; there was some
probably inevitable blurring between the empire’s and the emperor’s finances. As
best as can be determined, the finances of the provinces were controlled by junior
magistrates, but sometimes they were under the direct control of the emperor. Roman fiscal policy seems to have allowed diverse tax methods—tribute was paid as a
lump sum by Spain, but as an in-kind tithe by Sicily—but Wickham argues that the
most significant portion of late Roman revenue was the annona, or land tax.99
96 Bachrach,

Early Carolingian Warfare, 55–60.
acknowledging the issues raised by Reynolds and Fredric Cheyette over the
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Cities’ tax obligations were largely fulfilled by the so-called liturgical system,
whereby wealthy locals (typically also the city officials or curiales) ran the government and paid for services—which seems a little like the later notion of noblesse
oblige, and may offer the best starting point for understanding the evolution of local
finances. One outcome of this arrangement was weak local taxation, which in fact
could not be raised without imperial permission. Garnsey and Saller call the cities’
tax revenues “adequate for the limited goals of the central government,” but Wickham stresses the other side of the coin, that the increasingly centralized state needed
all of this surplus to sustain itself, particularly given the rising costs of maintaining
the army. Eventually, therefore, the Empire took an increased interest in the activities of local officials, particularly concerning finance. Local autonomy declined, with
jurisdiction being pulled back to the emperor.100
After the end of the Empire, the various barbarian kingdoms adapted the Roman tax system differently, but it seems probable that all made at least some use of
it. Wickham argues that “[the] controlling oligarchy in each of the successor-states
sought to maintain the financial mechanisms of the empire as far as they could.”
Wickham goes on to note that all of the kingdoms for which we have data (which
notably excludes Britain) levied taxes, but that “[s]uch taxation was successful according to the measure of the internal strength of the kingdoms concerned.”101 There
seems to have been a two-tiered tax system that dated from Roman times. The lower
tier paid in-kind to the upper tier; the upper tier paid in cash to the government. At
least initially, kings earned income from their own estates as well as from taxes; the
royal financial administration managed both.102 There is some evidence of continued
taxation, censuses, records of purchases, etc. from so-called polyptychs. These originated in the fourth century as simple registers and were used (maybe sporadically)
100 Garnsey
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through the ninth century; already by the fifth or sixth century they had evolved
into a system of tax administration. Polyptychs were also used for other financial
records, and would go on to become the medieval seigneurial list. In fact, the major
distinction between the Roman system and seigneurie (the system of organization
of medieval European land holdings) is the latter’s stipulation of particular labor
from particular peasants (which also shows a specifically agrarian economy).103 As
mentioned in the previous section, the transition of the military from paid professionals to levies supported by land dramatically decreased the tax burden on the
state. While noting that royal taxes were still opposed by local leaders in the sixth
and seventh centuries—when have they not been?—Wickham points out that tax
burdens had fallen to something like ten percent of land value from a high of as
much as half under the Empire.104
Burns calls the administration of the Ostrogothic kingdom “remarkably Roman
[in] manner.” The old imperial taxation continued under the Ostrogoths (mostly evidenced by Ostrogoths trying to get out of it!) and lasted at least as late as the wars
with Byzantium in 533–34.105 In Iberia, however, Collins claims that “we cannot
be precise about taxation either in theory or in practice,” either for the Visigothic
court or for individual towns.106 The Franks seemed to have had the most difficulty
in administering their kingdom. The Merovingian tax system was “unquestionably
descended” from the late Roman system, though it lost most of its hierarchical structure.107 However, corruption in raising revenue from aristocratic functionaries led to
the decline of the Merovingian kingdom, which possessed no centralized tax, fiscal
system, or salaried bureaucracy.108 Goffart believes the Merovingians “wast[ed] their
fiscal inheritance” from a tax and administration standpoint. Henri Pirenne likewise
103 Walter
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saw Charlemagne’s fiscal legislation not as creating any real economic policy but as
an attempt to enforce Christian morality (forbidding usury, requiring fair dealing,
etc.).109 According to Goffart, the Carolingians finally abandoned the per-person
tax maintained by the Merovingians from Roman times, with the king’s resources
coming instead from revenue from personal estates, tribute, and war spoils.
As mentioned, tax payments originally mixed cash with service or in-kind payment. Goffart argues that over time this system evolved to reflect all in-kind payments, at least at the lower levels of society, or all cash, particularly as payments to
the government.110 However, Wickham puts forward another point that he argues
is more relevant: Throughout this period, as officials gained wealth (in land), they
also gained tax obligations and the incentive not to pay them, which drove another
change to the fiscal system. Wickham argues that the élites powerful enough to
get away with it simply opted not to pay taxes, and that in turn they were able
to act as tax-shelters for people of lesser power (including peasants): these people
ceded their lands to the élites and then rented them back in a form of patronage
(Wickham uses the term patrocinium). Wickham notes that this implied that they
must have seen paying rent as preferable to paying taxes, particularly under the tax
burdens of the late Empire. (On the social effects of this transition to rents, see
Section 4.1.) All of this was facilitated by the political re-alignment towards more
local, weaker barbarian kingdoms rather than the centralized and (notionally) more
powerful Empire.111
∗

∗

∗

In the period covered by this thesis, from 400–800, the barbarians evolved from
imperial nuisance to threat to ally and, eventually, to successor. After many of
the barbarian tribes were settled by the Empire as provincial foederati, they took up
more and more power as the Empire lost the ability to centralize control. Eventually,
109 Pirenne,

Medieval Cities, 39.
“Roman Taxation to Mediaeval Seigneurie (II),” 386–7.
111 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 9–18.
110 Goffart,
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many of the barbarian settlements became fully-fledged kingdoms in their own right,
although most if not all of them maintained connections to Byzantium for centuries
after the end of the Empire in the West.
This period is best characterized by the devolution of power, first from the Empire to its foederati, and subsequently the recognition that the emerging barbarian
kingdoms had de facto taken over the role of the provincial governments. The decentralization of power went further, with the changing role of aristocracy in the
late imperial bureaucracy transitioning relatively naturally into a wealthy landholding, aristocratic class with increasingly governmental powers. This class was held
in tension with the barbarian kings’ desire to hold onto power, nor was it free from
the continued decentralizing trend, as the peasantry likewise saw their autonomy
increase. There is a logical connection to the evolution of social structures that will
be discussed in the next chapter.
Despite increasing localization, the barbarian kingdoms made extensive use of
Roman state or governmental structures. The barbarian laws, when they began to
be issued, grafted a veneer of barbarian tradition onto a Roman legal framework.
Barbarian adaptation of Roman military structures initially looked a great deal like
the status quo. The biggest apparent change during the centuries after the end of
the centralized Empire was the fact that units began to be drawn as levies or service
requirements from assigned land areas. However, even this might almost be called the
miniaturization or logical extension of the foederati system by which the barbarians
had first been settled in the Empire. The early medieval tax systems were likewise
derived from their Roman precursors, though with varying success. In most cases,
a reduced tax burden (primarily driven by the change in military organization) was
offset by increased corruption and a weakened tax collection infrastructure, all of
which was complicated by the transition to a rent-based economy.
To quote Fouracre: “The basic shape and configuration of Europe in the early
middle ages was determined by a political geography inherited from the later Roman
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Empire, and, in ways which now easily suggest modern analogies, Europe’s political
structures were made out of what could be salvaged from that Empire’s disintegrating
command economy.”112

112 Fouracre,

“Cultural Conformity,” 152.
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Chapter 4
Social Structures: Localization and
Feudalization

4.1

Class Structure and Social Organization

The societies of the late antique and early medieval worlds were built around an
overlapping set of classes and hierarchies. Ralph Mathisen and Alan Watson (among
many others) describe Roman society in broad terms in the following way: Roman
law recognized citizens and non-citizens, and further divided citizens into formal
classes. Slavery was rampant, but not a permanent condition; citizenship itself was
not a fixed condition. Outsiders (including barbarians) could become citizens, and
there were ways in which one could lose citizenship and some of its incumbent privileges.1
The actual social classes went through a variety of changes over the centuries, but
in late antiquity society was broadly divided into the “distinguished” (honestiores)
1 Ralph

W. Mathisen, “Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani : Concepts of Citizenship
and the Legal Identity of Barbarians in the Later Roman Empire,” The American Historical
Review 111 (2006): 1015, 1019–20; Alan Watson, Roman Law and Comparative Law
(Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 39–43.
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and the “humble” (humiliores)—those Averil Cameron calls “the poor and the helpless.”2 There were at various times different gradations in these classes—at the
upper end, viri illustres versus viri clarissimi, at the lower the distinctions between
the free poor, the unfree, and slaves—but the details are not particularly important
here. For the purposes of this discussion they were distinctions without a difference.
Peter Brown suggests that one consequence of this class structure is that military
and political changes described in Chapter 3—the “period of military defeat and of
undeniable insecurity among the governing classes of the Roman Empire”—“may
not have had repercussions in Roman society at large.”3
Brown notes that already “[by] 200, the empire was ruled by an aristocracy of
amazingly uniform culture, taste, and language.”4 The position of the élite actually
improved despite the events of the fourth and fifth centuries—the senatorial class
was a major beneficiary of the social re-arrangements of late antiquity, not the least
of which was the patronage system first begun under Constantine.5 The élite culture
(addressed in fuller detail below) became an element of continuity between the late
antique and early medieval cultures. Both were highly unequal societies, in which
the élite class lived off the labor of others. Yet this class had (and maintained) very
particular ways of viewing itself. Centered around “ideas of justice and custom”
and ties of reciprocity, members also shared a common intellectual culture, which
overlapped with and grew into ties to (and through) the Church.6
Current historiography sees a three-fold division of early medieval society. This is
not the division into “men of prayer . . . farmers . . . and men of war” popularized by

2 Cameron,

The Mediterranean World, 93; see also Mathisen, “Peregrini, Barbari, and
Cives Romani,” 1015.
3 Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity, 4. One assumes the same would hold for
barbarian lower classes.
4 Brown, The World of Late Antiquity, 14.
5 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 89.
6 Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals, 35–39, with quotation from 37; see also Cameron, The
Mediterranean World, 131–41.
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Georges Duby.7 Rather, it is more properly a distinction between what we might call
upper, middle, and lower classes. Chris Wickham notes the contrast between suppositions in, e.g., the Pactus Legis Salicae of a peasant society with a few aristocrats
and the “society of large landowners” revealed in contemporary histories (Gregory,
etc.) as well as in charters, wills, etc. Wickham proposes a “tripartite” model with
relatively few absentee owners of large amounts of land, their unfree tenants, and
a middle class of small landowners.8 In this discussion the “middle” and “lower”
classes will be treated together. These were the people who, in Susan Reynolds’
words, either “push[ed] ploughs” or were at least “closely concerned with getting
their own livings . . . supervis[ing] their own plough-pushers more directly.” Many
of them “owed rents and services of various kinds to [the élites] . . . [but] many were
free enough to make agreements, however unequal the bargain, about the services
they would owe for their land.”9
These divisions, though enshrined both in Roman and later in barbarian law, became more changeable in the fourth and fifth centuries—continuing a trend that had
begun much earlier.10 As Brown noted, “The phenomena that distinguished the society of the Later Empire—a sharpening of the division between the classes . . . and the
accumulation of wealth and status into ever fewer hands—were the most predictable
developments in the social history of the Roman world. They were well under way
by A.D. 200.”11 However, Guy Halsall and Patrick Geary point out changes in the
structure of the Empire in the fourth century—including enormous expansion in the
7 Georges

Duby, The Three Orders, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Barnes &
Noble, 2009), xviii; he is citing Gerard of Cambrai.
8 Chris Wickham, “Problems of Comparing Rural Societies in Early Medieval Western
Europe,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th ser., 2 (1992): 233–34.
9 Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals, 38–43; all quotations from 39.
10 See, inter alia, The Visigothic Code (Forum Judicum), trans. S. P. Scott (Boston:
Boston Book Company, 1910), chapters VI.5, VI.4.1, and VI.5.9, or Pactus Legis Salicae,
in Drew, Laws of the Salian Franks, chapters XV.1, XLI.1, XLI.5, and XXIV; also see
Chapter 6.
11 Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity; quotation is from 31, similar content can be
found throughout 31–33.
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imperial bureaucracy and the separation of military from civil service—that meant
the Empire was moving towards a “service aristocracy” in which “the importance of
rank, status, and precedence . . . cannot be overestimated.”12
In particular, this reduced the importance of one’s birth status or inherited
wealth.13 The seemingly paradoxical result, Cameron notes, is that “there was in
practice a high degree of social mobility,” at least early in this period.14 This mobility, together with the surprising structural similarities between the Roman/barbarian
societies, allowed the barbarians to be integrated into the late antique social system.
∗

∗

∗

The process of integrating the ‘barbarians’ into society began well before the
end of the Empire. I am not going to get into the by-now lengthy debate over the
technicalities of precisely how the barbarians were settled within the Empire, nor will
I address the particular fiscal or legal mechanisms employed to ensure they received
sufficient support to provide the required military service.15 I will take it as given
that the barbarians were settled somehow: I am more concerned here with how they
were integrated into society, not with late antique property law.
In fact, Walter Pohl proposes that the key to the Empire’s long-term success may
well have been its ability to integrate such disparate peoples and groups “more or less
firmly into its social and cultural texture.” Following Herwig Wolfram, he suggests
that nascent networks of patronage and power, the importance of which in the later
12 Halsall,

Barbarian Migrations, 76–77.
Barbarian Migrations, 74–78.
14 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 91.
15 Were I to do so, this thesis could easily double in length without achieving any more
clarity on the subject. For the most recent, sometimes bitter, salvos in that war, see
Walter Goffart, “The Technique of Barbarian Settlement in the Fifth Century: A Personal,
Streamlined Account with Ten Additional Comments,” Journal of Late Antiquity 3 (2010):
65–98, and Guy Halsall, “The Technique of Barbarian Settlement in the Fifth Century: A
Reply to Walter Goffart,” Journal of Late Antiquity 3 (2010): 99–112; other significant
works on the subject include Goffart, Barbarians and Romans, Wickham, “The Other
Transition,” and Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, among the works I cite elsewhere in this
thesis.
13 Halsall,
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Empire was not always recognized, may have cleared the way for the barbarian kings
that arose after 400.16
As noted above, the transition to a more “service aristocracy” increased social
mobility, opening the door for barbarians to integrate themselves successfully into the
Empire.17 In fact, barbarians became not only citizens but valuable members of the
Empire: the late-fourth-century Vandal Stilicho (who served as magister militum
and consul, and was made a patrician) is specifically referred to as a citizen, and
the Goths and other peoples are called “no longer . . . barbarians but Romans” or
“worthy of citizenship.”18
Additionally, when the barbarians brought their culture into the Empire, it was
also explicitly class-based: Wolfram calls the “social and economic conditions among
the Goths [as] unequal as those of their Roman ‘hosts.’ ”19 I would argue that one
potentially unintuitive effect of this similarity was to facilitate the barbarians’ assimilation: rather than enforcing a strict Roman–barbarian dichotomy, the Romans
could accept certain barbarians while excluding others (and vice versa). That this
happened at some level is shown by a Pannonian funerary inscription: Francus ego
cives miles romanus in armis (“I am a Frankish citizen [and] a Roman soldier in
arms”).20 This tendency would only be enhanced by Pohl’s observation that “We
have scarcely any proof that the lower strata of society felt part of any large-scale
ethnic group.”21

16 Pohl,

“Barbarian Successor States,” 34–37.
Barbarian Migrations, 74–78.
18 Mathisen, “Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani,” 1023, 1025–26. It is not clear how
Stilicho or other barbarians acquired Roman citizenship; some presumably did so in 212
with Caracalla’s edict, and other groups settled later may have been treated similarly.
However they got it, Mathisen makes it clear that barbarians throughout the Empire must
have had status equal (or very nearly so) to Roman citizenship.
19 Wolfram, History of the Goths, 239.
20 Geary, Before France and Germany, 79; Geary translates the missing conjunction as
“but”, though I think the multi-layered identity expressed justifies “and”.
21 Pohl, “Conceptions of Ethnicity,” 17.
17 Halsall,
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Even at the upper level, despite some initial resistance, barbarians participated in
the late antique élite culture. In the mid-to-late fifth century, Gallo-Roman senators
like Sidonius Apollinaris were still poking fun at the barbarians for being relatively
uncultured.22 Nonetheless, by the late fifth/early sixth century, Sidonius’s cultural
successor Avitus of Vienne carried on a lively correspondence—including fairly deep
theological discussions—with the same Burgundians Sidonius had mocked.23
As discussed in Section 3.3, Halsall and Geary highlight that among the most
significant changes instituted by Diocletian was the administrative re-organization
of the Empire into smaller divisions. When we combine this with what Brown calls “a
tacit collusion with the upper classes” and the previously noted connection between
status, power, and government positions, the result is a framework that allowed
the barbarians (as groups of people headed by kings) to be inserted more or less
seamlessly into the Roman system.24 The result was probably the most important
social change introduced by the arrival of the barbarians: the dual nature of the
barbarian leadership. Katherine Fischer Drew, Wolfram, and Halsall note that in
their own right they were kings of barbarian nations, but at the same time—and
symbiotically—they took the place of the Roman provincial governors, and frequently
fell under the Eastern emperors as local magistrates.25

22 See,

for example, Sidonius Apollinaris, Poems and Letters, trans. W. B. Anderson
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936), Carmina 12: “placed as I am among
long-haired hordes, having to endure German speech, praising oft with wry face the song
of the gluttonous Burgundian who spreads rancid butter on his hair.”
23 See the sixteen letters between Avitus and Gundobad or Sigismund in Danuta Shanzer
and Ian Wood, eds., Avitus of Vienne: Letters and Selected Prose, Translated Texts for
Historians 2 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2002), as well as his additional letter
to Clovis.
24 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 74–78; see also Geary, Before France and Germany,
11. Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity, 47–49. Of course sometimes the barbarians
decided they wanted more, and then we see Alaric and his Visigoths rampaging through
the Empire!
25 Drew, introduction to The Lombard Laws, 11–12. Clovis (Frankish), Theodoric (Ostrogothic), Gundobad (Burgundian) and others all had Eastern patrician titles. Wolfram,
History of the Goths, 211–17; see also Chrysos, “Empire in East and West,” 10–15.
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Although no barbarians ever made it to the imperial throne,26 many certainly
became significant aristocratic powers in their own right, via either the army or
imperial office. At some point, however, this balance broke down: Halsall notes that
even before the deposition of the last emperor, both Gundobad and Odoacer had
decided barbarian kingship was more worthwhile than imperial office.27
Halsall also notes that by the end of the Empire, the barbarians had become so
entwined in its structure that “any idea of power and prestige that we can perceive
from barbaricum had by this time come to be entirely based upon the Roman Empire.”28 This view was already recognized by the time of Henri Pirenne: see Pirenne,
Mohammed and Charlemagne, 58–59. As Pohl noted, “None of [the] kings could
have kept his position without the revenues from the Roman tax system, whether
he took them by force or by treaty, whether he was charged with guarding part of it
(again, usually by treaty), or was paid off directly.”29
In more general terms, the degree of barbarian Romanization and conception of
their place on a Roman/barbarian spectrum is a matter of some dispute. Thomas
Burns claims that “the Ostrogoths, unlike any other barbarian group, entered the
living heart of the Western Empire” and saw themselves fundamentally as Romans.30
About the Visigoths, even Luis Garcı́a Moreno notes that their enforcement of the
Roman status quo in the fifth century showed a continuity with the Empire that
Edward Gibbon would not have admitted.31 The grave goods of Clovis’s father
26 Probably.

Zeno (eastern emperor 474–475/476–491) has been considered a ‘barbarian’,
being ethnically Isaurian. See Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 96, where he suggests
that Basiliscus (eastern emperor 475–476) may have been a Scirian.
27 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 279–81. See also 502, where Halsall suggests that this
may have been generational, with later barbarians more ready to deal with the Eastern
Empire as peers.
28 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 57
29 Pohl, “Conceptions of Ethnicity,” 18. He also noted that “Technically, Goths, Vandals,
Franks, even Huns were not enemies of the Roman Empire—they were its (initially external)
members and federates, and their attacks were more of an upheaval than an invasion by
foreigners.”
30 Burns, History of the Ostrogoths, 68.
31 Garcı́a Moreno, “Las invasiones y la época visigoda,” 264.
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Childeric imply he considered himself ruling as a Roman, but “literary and legal
evidence” implies Clovis’s Frankish kingship was basically military leadership.32 The
issue of the barbarians’ religion is controversial, but José Orlandis Rovira, Drew,
William Daly, and Danuta Shanzer all argue that while it was not in itself a barrier
to integration, conversion to Catholicism did smooth the process.33
Geary argues that the social and cultural changes (including legal acculturation)
that in the seventh and eighth centuries blurred or even erased whatever divisions
remained between Romans and barbarians.34 It should come as no surprise that the
increasing establishment of barbarians in the upper tiers of society (both de jure and
de facto) would have blurred or erased those lines.35
∗

∗

∗

Romans and barbarians alike, this social structure was surprisingly long lived.
Paul Fouracre emphasizes the essential continuity of the class system throughout the
late antique and early medieval period: “A hierarchy of society in which even within
the nobility those at the top were vastly more wealthy than those at the bottom of
the scale, was something else which medieval Europe inherited from antiquity and
which, as we shall see, continued to be preserved in legal, religious and political
cultures.”36 And those at the top were highly motivated to stay there: Geary calls
them motivated primarily by their desire to preserve their shared culture. (And it
32 Drew,

introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 7; on grave goods see also Daly,
“Clovis,” 625, and Guy Halsall, “Childeric’s Grave, Clovis’ Succession, and the Origins of
the Merovingian Kingdom,” in Mathisen and Shanzer, Society and Culture in Late Antique
Gaul.
33 José Orlandis Rovira, La iglesia en la España visigótica y medieval (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1976), 97–98; Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian
Franks, 7; Daly, “Clovis,”, especially 623, 639–41; and Danuta Shanzer, “Dating the Baptism of Clovis: The Bishop of Vienne vs the Bishop of Tours,” Early Medieval Europe 7
(1998). See also Chapter 7.
34 Geary, Myth of Nations, 120–41.
35 De jure: PLS , chapter XV.1 among many others; de facto: see Walter Goffart, “From
Roman Taxation to Mediaeval Seigneurie: Three Notes (Part I),” Speculum 47 (1972): 169,
or LC , preamble, for examples of otherwise ‘Roman’ aristocrats with barbarian names.
36 Fouracre, “Cultural Conformity,” 154.
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may have worked: Geary points to a mid-fifth-century saint’s life that relates the
tale of a Gallo-Roman aristocrat who believed, political realities notwithstanding,
that the Roman Empire was still intact.)37
As Drew pointed out, the barbarians were for a long time under the control
of the Empire, and they retained much of the prevailing Roman culture and civil
administration in their own kingdoms after the Empire’s dissolution. The Gallo–
Roman aristocracy (and bureaucracy) generally played significant roles in the new
kingdoms, as did the Church, especially for the Franks and the later Visigothic
kings.38
Indeed, as hinted at in Chapter 3, the Ostrogothic kingdom was unique among
its peers in that it controlled the imperial cities of Rome and Ravenna. Theodoric
attempted to solidify his own authority by borrowing the “conceptual hierarchy of
Christian Rome with its titular elevations and ranks delineated in dress and court
ceremonial.”39 He adopted Roman names (Flavius), titles and positions (Consul),
etc., and fought to be recognized by Constantinople. Under Theodoric the Ostrogoths
continued the senatorial tradition, both in social class and function, as well as offices
like magister militum, magister officiorum, quaestor, the consuls, praetorian prefect,
etc.40 Ironically, it would not be until the Byzantine attempts to reconquer Italia
that the Roman senate would finally be dissolved.41 In fact, given that he used the
title rex, not imperator, seems not to have issued any law code per se, and otherwise
maintained the imperial structure as he had found it, Theodoric appears to have
seen himself as merely stepping into the Roman Empire rather than replacing it
37 Geary,

Before France and Germany, 29.
introduction to The Lombard Laws, 11–12; Drew, introduction to The Burgundian Code, 4; see also Garcı́a Moreno, “Las invasiones y la época visigoda,” 321–23.
39 Burns, History of the Ostrogoths, 71.
40 Burns, History of the Ostrogoths, 71, 70, and 84–7 respectively.
41 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 41. See also Burns, History of the Ostrogoths.
Not that this meant the senators always had an easy time of it: Symmachus and Boethius
were executed by Theodoric for no apparent reason beyond a possibly excessive ‘Romanism’
(see Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 42).
38 Drew,
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with something new and barbarian.42
Further afield, and contradicting the general notion of declining central power
and corresponding localization, Fouracre notes that there were massive “political
units” (i.e., kingdoms) during the seventh century, even larger than some of the
corresponding modern-day states. He attributes this to élite cooperation enabled by
shared culture. He further notes that this is most probably a derivation from the
Roman culture, as the areas that had never had Roman influence (Ireland, Saxony)
never developed such broad-based cooperation.43
Fouracre, Wickham, Cameron, and Halsall all attribute the existence of a more
or less Europe-wide élite culture to the inheritance of Roman culture. “The class
of magnates who had built up their own powers at the expense of public authority actually blocked the latter’s complete disintegration, for they found in it the
means of legitimising their own social preeminence and a provider of mediation in
their relationships with each other.”44 The bonds between these élites—Roman
and increasingly barbarian—were reinforced by gifts and other economic (or pseudoeconomic) “dealings for mutual benefit” from the time of Sulpicius Severus (c.363–
c.425) through at least the Merovingian period.45 “[A]lthough increasingly following
the military idiom, the sixth-century aristocracy retained many features of the late
Roman social élite.”46 “Overall, in fact, the major change in political culture was
not Germanization but militarization.”47
42 See

also the central argument in Jonathan J. Arnold, “Theoderic, the Goths, and the
Restoration of the Roman Empire” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2008).
43 Fouracre, “Cultural Conformity,” 154–55, 158. He does, however, call these units
“confederate in nature” (155) and notes that they were “simultaneously both weak and
large” (158). Saxony, of course, was later integrated into the Frankish hegemony.
44 Fouracre, “Cultural Conformity,” 152–53. He is also referencing Wickham, “The Other
Transition.”
45 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 89.
46 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 496.
47 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 200. See also Geary, Before France and Germany,
15, where he suggests this may have been an effect of settling the Roman legions in place
for centuries at time.
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The Localization of Society

Although Rome is often seen through the lens of the eastern Spain–southern Gaul–
Italy arc, in fact the Empire was divided into “numberless regions and lesser localities” with their own economies and ways of life.48 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas
Purcell make a similar point in The Corrupting Sea: While noting the fundamental
similarities that can be seen across Mediterranean culture and history, they also note
that “From whatever theoretical vantage point [geography, anthropology, political
science, economics] we view the region it apparently remains ineluctably divided.”49
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Roman Empire had for centuries been able to
impose a unifying order on these disparate regions. Yet as mentioned in Section 3.2,
political events solidified the power of the élite class in their locales. Over time, these
élites began to identify increasingly with their regions, rather than with the Empire
per se. Halsall identifies this trend as beginning as far back as the second century,
seeing increasing complexity in the way such local magistrates negotiated with the
emperors (or simply refused to comply: corruption was a pervasive problem).50 In
fact, this sort of localization, particularly in terms of ethnic identification, may finally
have undone the Empire: Odoacer and Theodoric were both barbarians who had
led troops on behalf of the Roman state; but whereas Odoacer was elevated to the
kingship by his army, he is never called ‘king of the Scirians’—yet ‘king of the Goths’
was an integral part of Theodoric’s identity.51
The result, as characterized by Sebastian Schmidt-Hofner, was that “From ca.400
CE onward . . . this unified world began to disintegrate, even if at regionally varying
rates: Smaller political bodies took the place of the central Roman state; the Mediterranean system of exchange shrank into regional economic areas of very different levels
48 Halsall,

Barbarian Migrations, 68–70; quotation is from 68.
and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, 16–21.
50 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 63–66.
51 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 98.
49 Horden
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of prosperity and often with weaker cross-regional ties; regionalisms appeared in the
material culture. . . . The result was a strongly diversified Mediterranean world.”52
∗

∗

∗

Élite culture may have survived, but it was increasingly turning west (away from
the culture of the Eastern Empire) and becoming more local. Geary describes this
“growing sense of regionalism within the Empire” as a natural outcome of the political
transformations discussed in Chapter 3.53
Geary believes that the local cultures in the West, “always primarily Celtic and
Germanic,” began to reassert themselves as the unifying ties of the Empire faded.54
Cameron likewise suggests that “What might perhaps be observed in late antiquity
is a heightened sense of and readiness to proclaim local traditions, with a consequent
increase in their visibility. The disturbance at the centre of power in the third century
has often been seen in terms of such a rise to prominence of local cultures.”55
Indeed, while on the one hand we may say that “A common political culture may
have survived,” on the other, “in each former Roman region or province its points
of reference were becoming more localized, and its lineaments would soon start to
diverge.” While Augustine’s religious works drew on inspiration from (and were
aimed at) the whole Empire, later writers were more constrained. For all he ridiculed
the Burgundians, Sidonius Apollinaris was a provincial Gaul himself, as were all his
colleagues. Wickham makes the argument that by the sixth century, the letters
that survive from the various Gallo-Roman bishops are addressed almost entirely to
recipients within the same kingdom. The Chronicle of Hydatius deals almost entirely
with northern Spain (for which it is nonetheless an invaluable source).56
52 Sebastian

Schmidt-Hofner, “Regionalization and the Integration of the Mediterranean
World in Late Antiquity,” Journal of Late Antiquity 4 (2011): 162.
53 Geary, Before France and Germany, 30.
54 Geary, Before France and Germany, 14.
55 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 185. She is here in the middle of a discussion on
the Eastern Empire, but the observation applies equally to the West.
56 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 91.
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Horden and Purcell, in the midst of a rather muddled section on urban history,
note that “Only under the Romans, after all, did larger settlements around the
sea even begin to approximate to uniformity of architecture and status, let alone
to socio-economic function. . . . Thereafter, for the historian of urban form, all is
divergence.”57 Schmidt-Hofner cites cultural variations ranging from Horden and
Purcell’s urban layout “to tableware as well as in the formation of new identities.”58
Peter Wells notes a change not only in the increasing ‘barbarization’ of style (of
jewelry, for example), but also in the transition from the mass production of goods in
Roman times to the rise of local styles created by artisans in each region.59 Certainly
we start to see regionalization of the various barbarian laws.
Thus Schmidt-Hofner concludes that “regionalization remains an important characteristic of many processes in the economic, social, cultural, and ecclesiastical history of Late Antiquity,” and that “The economic transformations of the Mediterranean thus are only one part of a larger picture that encompasses regionally different developments of many sociocultural factors, from social stratification to the
evolution of aristocratic power to the role and function of cities.”60
∗

∗

∗

Roman fiscal administration had been centered on the city. Cities were the basis of
Roman government, as autonomous urban centers of Romanization. As noted, cities
levied local taxes and services from villages in their surrounding territories. Emperors
could raise (or lower) a settlement’s status, allowing them to form a council and
govern themselves; this was sometimes forbidden in order to increase the emperor’s
control of revenues (as in Egypt). There were varying levels of self-governance:
coloniae all in theory mirrored Rome, municipia had their own varied constitutions;
57 Horden

and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, 90–105; quotation is from 101.
“Regionalization and Integration,” 162.
59 Wells, Barbarians to Angels, 5–11, 142–52. ‘Barbarization’ does not imply inferior
style or quality, merely a different artistic tradition.
60 Schmidt-Hofner, “Regionalization and Integration,” 166–70; quotations from 170 and
166 respectively.
58 Schmidt-Hofner,

Chapter 4. Social Structures: Localization and Feudalization

85

some civitates foederatae, liberae, or liberae et immunes were exempt from external
interference or taxation.61
Medieval cities were generally smaller than they had been under the Empire.
At the extreme end, Augustan Rome probably housed over one million residents, a
number not passed in the west until London in the eighteenth century.62 The decline
of western cities and migration to the east was already happening by the early fourth
century.63 Pirenne sees a further decline after the loss of surplus from Mediterranean
trade in the seventh century.64 However, this does not mean that we should see the
decline of the Empire as a barbarian substitution of agriculture for urban commerce.
Towns did survive as administrative and economic centers in Italy, Spain and Gaul,
and the Church based its dioceses on the old civitates.65 S. J. B. Barnish likewise
identifies at least partial survival of the old cities in various functions (primarily local
administration).66
One of the reasons for this change is that, whereas in the East many cities were
old and had previously enjoyed autonomy, in the West cities were largely founded
or greatly expanded by Rome.67 As such, many existed (or existed in their current
form) only because of the Empire. With no equivalent of a Rome or Constantinople
in early medieval Europe, particularly in Iberia, there was thus no reason for towns to
be as large as they had been. Cities retained only a social function as the residence
of significant persons (counts, bishops, etc.); cities with a fixed bishop were more
prosperous.68
Wickham makes a similar, if simpler, argument: cities may have declined simply
61 Garnsey

and Saller, The Roman Empire, 26–31.
and Saller, The Roman Empire, 83.
63 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 5.
64 Pirenne, Economic and Social History, 39–40.
65 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 13–15.
66 S. J. B. Barnish, “The Transformation of Classical Cities and the Pirenne Debate,”
Journal of Roman Archaeology 2 (1989): 394–96.
67 Garnsey and Saller, The Roman Empire, 28.
68 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 59–63.
62 Garnsey

Chapter 4. Social Structures: Localization and Feudalization

86

because they were no longer important from a tax standpoint. “The city under the
empire was a real force of attraction because of its tax-raising role, and the late
Roman urban focus of the aristocracy and of aristocratic values resulted therefrom.
When taxation ended, cities acted as foci only for ideological reasons. Bishops,
conscious inheritors of the Roman tradition, lived in them everywhere; this at least
resulted in a certain persistence of administrative activity. Aristocrats too could
choose to continue to live in cities and centre their political rivalry on an urban stage;
if they did, cities retained their political-administrative and commercial importance
(or much of it), often right through to the commercial upturn of the tenth and
eleventh centuries.”69
The nature of settlements also changed. In addition to the remnants of major
cities, Wickham sees villages with some powerful external owners but also a significant presence of peasant landowners, or even ones where small, mostly autonomous
owners predominated. In Wickham’s view, such villages were common through the
sixth and seventh centuries, perhaps becoming less so by the ninth and tenth.70
Clearly such reduced settlements were serving less as administrative centers than
the surviving cities. Some, like Dorestad, became major trading centers (see Section 5.4), although there was presumably local commerce being conducted in all of
them. More likely, such settlements were the outgrowth of the late imperial villas
and represented the fundamental units of the local economy, be it agriculture or
production.
Recent scholarship has argued against the once-traditional idea that Roman élite
villas disappeared in late antiquity and the early medieval period. Tamara Lewit et
al. note that the changing nature of villa construction and use does not imply the
disappearance of the villas per se. Paul Van Ossel and Pierre Ouzoulias argue that the
classical Roman villa has been too exclusively the focus of archaeological study, and
that looking also at more architecturally simple structures (e.g. wooden buildings) at
69 Wickham,
70 Wickham,

“The Other Transition,” 27.
The Inheritance of Rome, 206–11.
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the same sites shows continued or even increased construction during late antiquity,
including fortifications and in limited cases an increasing ‘monumentalization’ of the
villa.71 Similarly, “in every region, including Britain, Gaul, the Iberian Peninsula,
and Italy,” Lewit sees extensive modification of these villas to become local or regional
economic, even manufacturing centers.72 In particular, one of the outcomes of this
social structure was the villa-centered landlord-tenant relationship which starts to
look like the very beginning of what might be called feudalism.73
The argument that these villas served as the “nucleation points” for a relatively
more concentrated population in the early medieval period thus makes a good deal
of sense. To offer an alternate, or at least a more cautionary, view, Van Ossel and
Ouzoulias maintain that while this argument for the concentration of active life
around the old villas (to form villages) is perhaps the most plausible one, it is not
yet fully confirmed by archaeological evidence.74
On the other hand, previous conventional wisdom had also been to see a drastic decline in rural habitation and a corresponding increase in nucleated settlements
around these large villas. Fredric Cheyette would push the evidence further, arguing against any assumptions of continuity (at least in peasant village life) between
late antiquity and the Middle Ages. “[W]here there was a striking discontinuity of
physical forms there could have been neither continuity of habitation, nor continuity
of agriculture, nor, therefore, continuity of social forms or institutions.”75 This is
an argument with which I cannot agree. Citing more recent archaeological evidence,
71 Paul

Van Ossel and Pierre Ouzoulias, “Rural Settlement Economy in Northern Gaul
in the Late Empire,” Journal of Roman Archaeology 8 (2000): 140–45.
72 Tamara Lewit, “‘Vanishing Villas’: What Happened to Élite Rural Habitation in the
West in the 5th–6th C?” Journal of Roman Archaeology 16 (2003): 260–61; Tamara Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism: Farming in the Fifth to Sixth Centuries AD,” Early
Medieval Europe 17 (2009): 82–84; see also Section 5.3.
73 Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 68–70.
74 Van Ossel and Ouzoulias, “Rural Settlement Economy,” 139.
75 Fredric L. Cheyette, “The Origins of European Villages and the First European Expansion,” The Journal of Economic History 37 (1977): 182–206, passim, quotation from
184.
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Van Ossel and Ouzoulias claim that “it is no longer possible to maintain the view of
an almost total abandonment of rural settlements in this period.”76 In fact, in terms
of social organization, Wickham makes the interesting argument that communities
where there were no significant large landowners seem to have reverted in the absence
of central taxation to a more communal/egalitarian social structure.77

4.3

Feudalization

The possibility of the sorts of social structures that we can call feudalism was latent
within the late Roman Empire. The combination of various economic and social
incentives drove a move away from centralized cash economies (as discussed in Section 3.3 and Chapter 5) towards increasing land ownership. Simultaneously, society
was becoming increasingly local, as discussed above. Finally, the system of patronage
evolved into personal lordship. The aggregate effects of these trends—and sometimes
their explicit combination—may not quite be the models advocated by Marc Bloch
or F. L. Ganshof but are much more like them than E. A. R. Brown or Reynolds
would admit.
Wickham argues that the transition to the dominance of feudalism was emphatically not a result of the barbarian conquest per se; the largely romanized barbarians
could have formed states exploiting tax structures and maintained a more Romanlike appearance. Rather, he says, the systems of land ownership that would enable
feudalism were already present under the Empire; the re-configuration of the political
system merely opened up an opportunity for the decentralized feudal mode to win
out over the more centralized ancient mode of slave labor.78
76 Van

Ossel and Ouzoulias, “Rural Settlement Economy,” 134–40; quotation from 137.
“The Other Transition,” 26.
78 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 25–26. Wickham is specifically using the economic
(or ‘Marxist’) sense, as in the “feudal mode of production”: see the following pages for
a discussion. To the extent that any description of feudalism will hang in large part on
the underlying economics, I will be somewhat loose with my terminology and simply use
77 Wickham,
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Patronage (patrocinium) had likewise long existed in the Empire. In fact, several
times in the later Empire various authorities tried to make patronage illegal. They
recognized that patronage between “men with local authority, secular or religious”
and the comparatively less powerful was “an evasion of the responsibilities of [the
poorer] subjects, and an illicit appropriation of [imperial] authority by those who
took it on.” Cameron, however, notes that in such circumstances “the poor and
the helpless looked where they could for protection.”79 Throughout this period the
institution grew stronger.80
∗

∗

∗

Wickham draws a distinction between ‘mode of production’ and ‘social organization’, acknowledging that different modes of production can coexist in a society
(the indisputable example being capitalism and slavery in the American South), and
that the social organization will reflect the dominant mode, especially once it has become aligned with the state’s activities. Medieval Europe is therefore characterized
as a feudal society, whereas the late Roman Empire had some feudal (or pseudofeudal) production: “Our terminal point in the late Roman tradition is not, then,
simply the feudal mode of production, but a society dominated by the feudal mode
of production, the ‘feudal social formation’.”81
Wickham characterizes the Roman economy as driven by centralized taxes based
on the monetization of slave labor; specifically, he cites the consolidation of public
wealth in cash money (as opposed to land): the Roman economy “gradually developed into a wholesale taxation network, with the old city/country relationship as its
inner structure.”82 Over time, Bloch and Wickham see the slavery that fueled the
‘feudalism’ as a catch-all.
79 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 93.
80 In fact, even Reynolds, who generally argues against the idea of personal lordship,
offers arguments that seem to support this conclusion: see Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals,
36–37, 42–43.
81 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 7–8, quotation from 8, emphasis original. See
Cameron, The Mediterranean World, especially 87–88, for a contrasting view; I remain
more convinced by Wickham.
82 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 5–6. Quotation is from 6.
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whole economy giving way to feudalism. The mechanism by which this happened
is not entirely clear, but it seems to have been an indirect process by which slaves
began to be used as tenant farmers that eventually led to the rise of serfdom as
an institution.83 ‘Serfdom’ is another problematic concept; for this discussion I will
understand it to mean that the former slaves were now tied to land valued in terms
of physical production or service, rather than being tied to an occupation valued in
cash generation. At this lower level of society, the focus would naturally be local
agriculture (or some other productive activity), which fits nicely with Pirenne’s notion of the origin of feudalism: the loss of cash due to the collapse of a mercantile
economy meant power, including military power, had to come from the land as a
sort of payment in kind.84
At the upper level of society, the transition to a more feudal structure happened
largely in the fifth century, when having land became more important than having
office. The élite class increasingly identified with their land holdings, which replaced
the wealth and status previously provided by state service. As Wickham put it,
“The shift can be simply expressed in material terms: a fourth-century official, unless
exceptionally and personally rich, did in fact gain more from his office in terms of
wealth and status than he did from landowning. From the sixth century, however,
this was only true in so far as offices brought land; in the long run these two became
the same.”85
Ganshof saw feudalism as arising naturally out of a combination of the trends

83 Wickham,

“The Other Transition,” 4–5; Goffart, “Roman Taxation to Mediaeval
Seigneurie (I),” 183–184. See also Marc Bloch, “Comment et pourquoi finit l’esclavage antique (I),” Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations 2 (1947): 30–44 (especially 33–34),
and Marc Bloch, “Comment et pourquoi finit l’esclavage antique (II),” Annales. Economies,
Sociétés, Civilisations 2 (1947): 161–70, which Wickham still calls the “standard interpretation of the economic changes of late Rome.”
84 Pirenne, Economic and Social History, 7–9.
85 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 24. See also Cameron, The Mediterranean World,
84; Brown, The World of Late Antiquity, 34; and Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 497–98.
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described above.86 Thus as wealth went back to being land-based, the aristocracy
acquired an incentive to amass land, both from above (as grants) and below.87 All
of this aligns well with the argument raised in Section 3.3 that the lower class (or
classes) voluntarily traded their tax-paying freeholder status to become rent-paying
tenants, at precisely the same time as their new landlords were gaining in land-based
wealth and power, including an increasing degree of control or lordship over their
tenants.
As a result, late antique patronage practices stemming ultimately from Roman
tradition became something like personal lordship in a natural evolution. There is
a school which sees such personal lordship as a purely ‘German’ cultural institution.
This does not seem credible, but the fact that there were historical precedents on both
sides presumably only helped solidify personal lordship as a viable social construct.88
Even Reynolds, in arguing against the idea of vassalage, noted that medieval culture
became one that “embodied a belief in hierarchy, obedience, and loyalty on the
one hand and a belief in custom, immanent justice, mutuality of obligations, and
collective judgement on the other,” and that “[p]eople owed obedience and loyalty to
their immediate superiors or lords.”89 Although the institution of personal lordship
had not yet developed the full powers of local jurisdiction, it seems already to have
been headed in that direction. Wickham notes, however, that even in the absence
of formal jurisdiction, “such landowners [would] always, while the system is stable,
have the non-economic coercive powers necessary to enforce their control, whether
informally or through their control of public or private justice.”90
These changes caused tension within the upper tier of society, as noted in Sec86 Ganshof,

Feudalism, 4.
“The Other Transition,” 15–16.
88 Ganshof, Feudalism, 3–5. See Katherine Fischer Drew, “Another Look at the Origins
of the Middle Ages: A Reassessment of the Role of the Germanic Kingdoms,” Speculum
62 (1987): 803–12, for the Germanist position.
89 Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals, 34–35; jurisdiction: 61.
90 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 6; see also Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals, 61.
87 Wickham,
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tion 3.2. Walter Goffart argues that (at least in Italy), “Far from there having been
antagonism between large landowners and the later Roman state, the two went hand
in hand.” However, his argument is based on an identification of public and private
that I think goes beyond anything even Reynolds would support.91 Certainly by the
sixth century, there was more or less open competition between kings and aristocracy for land and resources. Kings like the Frankish Chilperic I actively “tried to
undermine the independence of their aristocracies and make them more dependent
on royal patronage.”92
∗

∗

∗

As Wickham says, we can really only talk about ‘feudalism’ or a ‘feudal society’
when we have a society dominated by the feudal mode: that is, one in which the
primary source of wealth was service or rent payment based on working the land
(to which I would add a hierarchical set of obligations and jurisdictions). None of
the above argues that this was the only way in which society was organized (nor
does it need to), only that it was the dominant mode of organization. Based on the
preceding arguments, I think it is fair to say that Wickham’s criterion had been met
by the fifth, or possibly sixth, century.
The ownership of land was ceded upwards to the more powerful; the use or
exploitation of that land was literally farmed downwards to the new tenants. These
tenants paid in cash rents or service—see Goffart’s arguments on the seigneurial
lists, which indicate both, possibly supporting a trend towards a greater proportion
of services owed.93 The resulting effect on society was a consolidation into three
groups: those who owed rents or services, those who were owed rents or services,
and probably some in the middle who both owed and were owed.94 Wickham argues
that under this system, by the sixth and seventh centuries even taxation had become
91 See

Goffart, “Roman Taxation to Mediaeval Seigneurie (II),” 384.
Warfare and Society, 22–23, quotation from 22.
93 Goffart, “Roman Taxation to Mediaeval Seigneurie (I),” and Goffart, “Roman Taxation
to Mediaeval Seigneurie (II),” 386–388 in particular.
94 Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals, 39.
92 Halsall,
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more or less feudal: “the Merovingians were already speaking the language of feudal
social relations. The land tax became simply one part of the resources of the fisc,
like an estate or a toll; the Merovingians gave them away indifferently.”95
Fouracre thus concludes: “In the countryside the pattern of land ownership inherited from the Romans remained relatively unchanged for centuries. Though it was
increasingly landowners other than the state who tapped surplus production, there
remained spread across Europe a complex of large estates interspersed with small
communities more or less independent of producers.”96 This pattern combined with
other trends driving the increased fracturing or regionalization of society at all levels.
In particular, the increasingly local interests and power base of the aristocracy, combined with the localization of governmental functions and the replacement of taxes
and cash payments with rents and payments in kind or in service, began a trend
towards the sorts of social relationships that we can call feudalization. One of the
consequences of this change—the return to a more local, land-based economy—will
be discussed in the following chapter.

95 Wickham,
96 Fouracre,

“The Other Transition,” 21.
“Cultural Conformity,” 153.
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Chapter 5
Economic Structures: Was Pirenne
Right?

5.1

The Bases of the Economy

Understanding the economies of Rome and medieval Europe is a complex problem
that has long defied a complete analysis: we know unfortunately little detail about
the economies of either the Roman or the medieval world.1 Of the early medieval
peasant societies, Chris Wickham notes that they “were too far from the aristocratic
and ecclesiastical interests of the great bulk of our written sources.”2 However,
Tamara Lewit sees the evolution of the basis of the economy as a rebound from
“the pressures of the Roman imperial market, army and taxation” to a more natural
condition favoring local production and consumption of necessary (or desired) goods
without artificially enforced specialization.3
It was not until the middle twentieth century that Moses Finley and A. H. M.
1 Romans:

Garnsey and Saller, The Roman Empire, 43, which incredibly claims that no
official records survive; medieval economy: Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 78.
2 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 204.
3 Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 82.
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Jones could put together the first comprehensive model of the Roman economy.
Finley and Jones saw agriculture as the primary basis of the economy, with most
production and trade being regional (with a few exceptions, including shipments to
major cities such as Rome and Alexandria). They assumed that long-distance trade
was largely restricted to luxuries, and that in the absence of trade, local agriculture
would have been largely self-sufficient. There was a lack of farming specialization,
and no mass market for goods.4 More recently Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller have
modeled the Roman economy against other pre-industrial economies, and similarly
conclude that it was “underdeveloped”—that is, the majority of the population lived
at or near the subsistence level; there was little investment; and manufacturing was
mostly local.5 This is to some extent backed up by archaeological evidence.6
This common model of course had to adapt to regional geographical differences:
the mountainous Mediterranean, fertile northwest, and desert southeast. Furthermore, the presence of the Empire itself altered the economy, particularly in agriculture; there was some restructuring of agriculture due to transport costs, and some
regional specializations in cash crops.7 Without widespread trade, local agriculture
would have been as self-sufficient as possible, as Finley and Jones assumed.
∗

∗

∗

In contrast to the Empire, the most striking feature of the early Middle Ages was
a markedly lower population—there was probably a post-Roman population drop
not made up again until the tenth century, and archaeological evidence supports
lower settlement density—leading to increased local autonomy, and permitting only
4 Kevin

Greene, The Archaeology of the Roman Economy (London: B. T. Batsford,
1986), 14. See also Garnsey and Saller, The Roman Empire.
5 Garnsey and Saller, The Roman Empire, 43.
6 See, e.g., Greene, Archaeology of the Roman Economy, 9–10, citing “a combination
of anthropology, ethnography, archaeology and history” (9). See also J. C. Edmondson,
“Mining in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond: Continuity or Disruption?” The Journal
of Roman Studies 79 (1989): 86–87, which cites archaeology as the major source for our
knowledge of mining.
7 Greene, Archaeology of the Roman Economy; geography: 10, restructuring: 43.
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relatively little control of the environment (though Chris Wickham cautions against
the traditional view of tiny unordered settlements “menaced” by wilderness).8 Most
evidence for the medieval economy is archaeological; there are only a few documents
from a few villages, most of which are from the ninth century or later. We do
have access to laws that frequently deal with peasant society, but Wickham cautions
against assuming they described it accurately.9
However, whereas the traditional archaeology of settlements would indicate substantial population decline, agricultural archaeology shows “considerable continuity
of land use during the fifth to sixth centuries, with no dramatic abandonment of
farmland.”10 This is hugely significant, as agriculture was the primary element of
the economy. In fact, says Michael McCormick, “In a pre-modern economy, the
extent of land farmed was the first and primordial economic fact determining food
production and therefore wealth at its most basic level.”11
Cultivated land remained basically unchanged in Europe from the Roman Empire to about 1000. Lewit suggests that these populations must simply have left
little other archaeological impression.12 The impact of this agricultural continuity
is unclear. There have been many studies of medieval agriculture based on some
documentation of the production and consumption of food as well as archaeological evidence for plant and animal remains. The resulting conclusions have varied
wildly, ranging from support for only a subsistence level economy to something like
a 6,000–9,000-calorie-per-day diet.13 McCormick would peg this at the lower end of
8 Wickham,

The Inheritance of Rome, 216–17.
The Inheritance of Rome, archaeology: 204; laws: 213–14.
10 Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 79.
11 McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 31; see also Bowersock et al., Late
Antiquity, 279–82, 387.
12 Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 77–79. Lewit also warns about an over-reliance
on this methodology, however, as interpretations may be skewed by the selective survival
of certain flora and fauna in the archaeological record where others have perished. See also
Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 81.
13 Kathy L. Pearson, “Nutrition and the Early-Medieval Diet,” Speculum 72 (1997): 1–2.
9 Wickham,

Chapter 5. Economic Structures: Was Pirenne Right?

97

the range, particularly in the sixth century, and notes the negative trend in popular
health in this time (which he claims was poor enough that it can be detected in
skeletal remains).14
The most significant economic shift during the late antique/early medieval period occurred in the fifth century, after which Wickham cites a “dramatic economic
simplification.” The broad base of the economy remained the same, although the tax
and administrative superstructure changed significantly.15 McCormick calls it “the
end of the ancient economy.”16 In their compilation Late Antiquity, G. W. Bowersock, Peter Brown, and Oleg Grabar provide a good list of the variety of possible
explanations that have been put forth for this phenomenon. The list includes precapitalist crisis, the generic “non-development”, state competition, the deterioration
of currency, etc., though they do not pick any most likely factor.17
Agreeing with Wickham’s recent work, Lewit sees a decline in specialization,
with a rise instead of “mixed animal husbandry and diversified farming,” increased
“regionalization,” some reforestation, and the resurgence of marshlands. She notes,
however, that throughout the Rhineland and Britain agriculture shows greater continuity from Roman times through the fifth, and in places into the seventh, century.18
Crop types naturally varied based on location; Kathy Pearson calls the diversification
“only logical.” Grain cultivation was extensive, with several varieties being planted
throughout Europe, or nearly so, with the particular mix depending on the area
(more barley would be planted in colder or wetter climates, for example). Legumes
were also widespread, and their ability to replenish the soil is credited with allowing
the continued use of fields from Roman to Anglo-Saxon times in England. Meat was
valued everywhere; particular preferences were (and remain) highly local, but most
commonly included cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, and chickens. There is actually very
14 McCormick,

Origins of the European Economy, 30–41.
The Inheritance of Rome, 95, 102–04; quotation from 95.
16 McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 28–30, quotation from 29.
17 Bowersock et al., Late Antiquity, 386–88.
18 Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 79; for the Rhineland and Britain, see note 6.
15 Wickham,
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little evidence for widespread consumption of game, with most animal remains belonging to domesticated stock.19 There was likewise substantial fruit and vegetable
cultivation, and wine production may have survived from Roman times.20 At the
same time, marginal land cultivated under the Empire transitioned back to more natural uses. This effect, which ranged from Italy to northern Britain, was particularly
pronounced in previously heavily militarized areas, suggesting the strong economic
impact of the Roman army.21
Under the Empire—and indeed in subsequent medieval Europe—technology limited productivity in agriculture, trade, and manufacturing. It was expensive, often
prohibitively so, to haul heavy goods, including grain, overland. River transport
was therefore vital; sea transport was in general possible only between April and
October. Consistent with such an underdeveloped trade system, evidence of commercial institutions shows them to have been “primitive.” Industrial technology was
likewise minimal, with some exceptions (glass-blowing, for example).22 Yet despite
this the massive building projects undertaken during the Empire speak to immense
management capability.
Given these limitations, Rome’s prosperity was due in part to access to natural
resources, including metals; mining included iron (the most necessary), gold, silver,
copper, and tin. There were even some large-scale iron foundries (in Kent and
Austria); most mines, however, were local, including those in Iberia (which was
nonetheless a major source of gold), as well as Gaul, Britain, and throughout the
Balkans.23 Again speaking to Rome’s capacity for management, there is evidence for
centralized control of mining to ensure efficient allocation of skill sets and to create
19 Pearson,

“Nutrition,” 3–7; quotation is from 4.
“Nutrition,” 11–13; wine: 13. Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 229, calls
the viticulture of northern Francia the only agricultural specialization until the Carolingian
period.
21 Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 80–82.
22 Garnsey and Saller, The Roman Empire, 52.
23 Edmondson, “Mining in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond,” 84–85, 88–90.
20 Pearson,
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economies of scale. The clear implication is that the more fragmented barbarian
kingdoms would have seen the reverse of this trend, although in fact the evolution of
mining into more localized operations (some state-owned, some private) was already
underway in the later Empire.24
∗

∗

∗

The administrative and social roles of cities were discussed in Section 3.3 and
Section 4.2, respectively, but they also had an economic role. During the Empire,
Garnsey and Saller advocate for the model of “consumer cities” in which, as the
name implies, cities were primarily consumers, not producers. Cities paid for their
consumption by “a legal claim such as taxes or rents,” not a return value.25
Strictly speaking, this would argue against a significant role for trade and manufacturing in cities. Garnsey and Saller suggest that the argument should not be
taken to extremes, but Brian Tierney points out that cities in the West were never
the economic centers that their eastern counterparts were.26 Perhaps the biggest role
that cities had, East or West, was as recipients, collectors, and distributors of the
annona—the food tax (if you were paying it) or dole (if you were receiving it) that
also, significantly, supported the army.27

5.2

Pirenne, the Barbarians, and Islam

It is impossible to discuss the post-imperial economy without addressing the arguments raised, most prominently by Henri Pirenne, regarding the putative survival of
the Roman world following the barbarian invasions. This whole thesis concerns the
24 Edmondson,

“Mining in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond,” 96–99.
and Saller, The Roman Empire, 48–49.
26 Brian Tierney, Western Europe in the Middle Ages: 300–1475, 6th ed. (Boston:
McGraw-Hill, 1999), 19.
27 See McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, and Wickham, The Inheritance of
Rome, passim.
25 Garnsey
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evolution of Roman institutions during and following the period of barbarian invasions into and eventually supplantation of the Empire. It should not be construed as
anti-Pirenne, or as arguing against substantial continuity between the late Empire
and the early kingdoms: indeed, I reference Pirenne throughout, and I believe that
many of his details are correct. Nonetheless, a solid refutation of some of Pirenne’s
conclusions is in order.
Pirenne famously argued that the effect of these invasions—at least, the economic effect—was negligible. His conclusion was two-fold: “The Germanic invasions
destroyed neither the Mediterranean unity of the ancient world, nor what may be
regarded as the truly essential features of the Roman culture”; and “The cause of
the break with the tradition of antiquity was the rapid and unexpected advance of
Islam.”28 Pirenne emphasizes the survival of the legal fiction of the Empire (no barbarians in the sixth century claimed the imperial throne, all recognized the Eastern
empire) and the actual survival of “Romania” or romanitas, the idea of “Romanness” that motivated the barbarians to act in this way in the first place. These
claims are not as controversial as they once were, and were discussed in Chapter 2
and Chapter 3. Less well accepted is Pirenne’s claim that throughout this period,
trans-Mediterranean voyages, trade, and wars continued just as they had under the
emperors, and that “the truly essential features” of Roman culture survived intact.
Instead Pirenne argued that Mediterranean trade finally collapsed after the rise
of Islam in the seventh century made the southern shore and much of the shipping
unsafe.29 He saw the focus of Francia shifting under Charlemagne away from the
Mediterranean and the Eastern Empire towards northern Europe, becoming “essentially an island.” Marseilles, which had been a significant port, saw its trade begin
to slow during the seventh century due to the closure of the Mediterranean. He cites
28 Pirenne,

Mohammed and Charlemagne, 284.
Medieval Cities, 23–25. See also Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne,
147–52. The Islamic conquests took just eighty years—thirty, not counting Iberia. Pirenne
opposes this swiftness to the long period of barbarian acculturation in the north, and
strongly implies that this speed was crucial to the Muslims’ retention of their own culture.
29 Pirenne,
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a drop-off in travel, merchants, and their wares, particularly the relative absence of
Mediterranean goods in continental Europe, around this time (after 677, for example,
the Frankish chancellery stopped using papyrus).30
Pirenne’s argument—on the barbarians, at least, if not the Muslims—has recently
gotten a roundabout sort of support from Jean Durliat (Les finances publiques de
Dioclétien aux Carolingiens (284–889), 1990). Durliat’s argument is based on an
extension of Walter Goffart’s assessment of taxation (see Section 3.3), and has been
thoroughly dismantled by Wickham. It runs essentially as follows: the barbarians
had no effect on the administrative or fiscal structure of the Empire, which survived
more or less intact in the union of the Church and Frankish Empire up to the year
888. After listing several breaks with the Empire known to have occurred by the
time of Charlemagne, Wickham is forced to ask: “Why ever was all this so, except
as the result of some crisis at the level of a whole social system? . . . [It] is nonsense to
put the Early Middle Ages on the same level as the Roman Empire in any material
sense.”31 The comment could just as easily apply to Pirenne.
∗

∗

∗

More recent scholarship has shown Pirenne’s assessment to be simplistic, and the
general consensus is now that he was wrong about the timing of the closing of the
Mediterranean. The western part of the sea saw shipping decline even before the
Arabs, and a limited trade (in luxuries) survived after their arrival. Wickham argues
from archaeological evidence that Pirenne’s theory is based on a disproportionate
emphasis on East–West trade in luxury items.32 Already under the Roman Empire,
30 Pirenne,

Medieval Cities, 27–30; quotation is from 29. See also Pirenne, Mohammed
and Charlemagne, 152–53. He notes the lack of travel via conventional sea routes (though
finding some still through Adriatic and Byzantine waters) and the disappearance of Syrian
merchants and their eastern goods (e.g. papyrus, spices, silk) along with gold currency;
the drop in trade was so substantial that even inland merchants not directly involved in
Mediterranean trade disappeared from the record: 164–74.
31 Chris Wickham, “The Fall of Rome Will Not Take Place,” in Little and Rosenwein,
Debating the Middle Ages, 45–57; quotation is from 57.
32 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 223–24.
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the maritime trade routes had declined somewhat. Kevin Greene believes that the
“transport systems of the empire worked best in the first two centuries AD.”33 Guido
Berndt and Roland Steinacher argue that while Pirenne overlooked a longer period
of economic decline, he was right in seeing Mediterranean trade continuing until
the Arabs; certainly during the fifth and sixth centuries Vandal North Africa was
involved in trade with other barbarian kingdoms, particularly in Iberia.34 And in a
limited capacity, Richard Hodges and David Whitehouse argue for the continuation
of Mediterranean trade through the end of the sixth century.35
Although there is still debate over Pirenne’s assertion that the Islamic conquest
was fundamentally to blame for the end of the Empire, it has fared better than his
economic assessment of late antiquity.36 It is worth noting that Robert Lopez, in
recasting Pirenne’s economic “disappearances” as the collapse of Roman state monopolies and their reconstitution under different Arab regimes, is actually strengthening Pirenne’s fundamental argument: that the replacement of Romans by Arabs
was decisive.37 There is nonetheless general consensus that there was at least limited
trade even after the Arabs’ arrival, in the period Pirenne saw as decline.38 In fact,
33 Greene,

Archaeology of the Roman Economy; maritime traffic: 43, inland transport:
30–36. See also Pirenne, Economic and Social History, 86. Road maintenance was of
constant and critical importance, which highlights the impact to communications and trade
when later kings failed to maintain the roads: Pirenne estimated that the Roman roads
were completely gone by the ninth century.
34 Guido M. Berndt and Roland Steinacher, “Minting in Vandal North Africa: Coins
of the Vandal Period in the Coin Cabinet of Vienna’s Kunsthistorisches Museum,” Early
Medieval Europe 16 (2008): 255; Iberia: Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 88–89.
35 Hodges and Whitehouse, Mohammed, Charlemagne, 88–91.
36 See Horden and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, 153–72.
37 Lopez, “Mohammed and Charlemagne,” 42–55. He specifically addresses gold currency,
luxury textiles, and papyrus, all commodities mentioned by Pirenne.
38 Horden and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, 153–60; Steven A. Epstein, Genoa and the
Genoese, 958–1528 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 13–14; as
well as Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 85–87. All see continued (albeit reduced)
maritime commerce even during the period Pirenne saw as in decline. David Whitehouse,
“‘Things that Travelled’: The Surprising Case of Raw Glass,” Early Medieval Europe
12 (2003): 301–05, offers as an interesting case a detailed chemical analysis proving that
literally every post-imperial item of glass in the West until the late eighth century—i.e.,
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see inter alia Hodges, Whitehouse, and McCormick for the inverse suggestion, that
the Islamic rise to dominance was a consequence of events in the Roman world.39
Finally, in thoroughly disagreeing with Pirenne, McCormick is as harsh in his
overall assessment of late antiquity as Pirenne was of the eighth century: “The
economy which had sustained the Roman empire collapsed. It did so through a very
long concatenation of gradual deteriorations and sharp blows. Over time . . . the
situation improved, sometimes considerably, at various times between c.250 and 650.
But the short-term upswings were not sufficient to redress the long-term trend.”40
A proper assessment of the impact of Islam on the former Empire is beyond the
intent of this thesis. It is fair to say, however—without necessarily going so far as
McCormick—that well before the Islamic conquest of the southern Mediterranean, a
series of economic events represented a real break from the end of the Empire. The
barbarians played a major part in (and were frequently the cause of) these events,
which had lasting impacts—economic and otherwise—on the remnants of the Roman
world.

5.3

Increasing Localization

The trends described in the previous sections were general but not universal. Nevertheless, in what is becoming a recurring theme, the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries
saw the economy (and after the end of the Empire, economies) become increasingly
local. Put succinctly, “the proportion of short-distance hauls had grown at the expense of long-distance ones.”41 The full explanation is still not well understood, but
the change was probably due in large part to the disappearance of the dominating
well after the Muslim conquest—can be traced back to trade with the Levant.
39 Hodges and Whitehouse, Mohammed, Charlemagne, 175; McCormick, Origins of the
European Economy, 118.
40 McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 115.
41 McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 116.
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command economy of the Empire, which the smaller kingdoms could not replicate.
“[The] central role of the state in collecting and distributing the annona (the
army supplies) remained an important feature of the economy, both in terms of organization and stimulus to production; the cessation of this state function in the fifth
century was a major factor leading to economic fragmentation.”42 Fredric Cheyette
also offers a good discussion on the role of climate change (particularly colder, wetter
weather) in the fifth century in both the decline of agriculture and populations and
the movement and restructuring of population centers and agricultural methods. He
specifically sees a positive feedback loop being kicked off by this sort of change (poorer
weather meant worse yields, supporting fewer people in the cities, which then drove
the markets down even further, disincentivizing maintenance of infrastructure, which
means even worse crop yields, etc.).43 Although stating that “[no] single cause was
decisive in terms of that contraction [of the late antique economy],” McCormick does
highlight the effects of plague and the collapse of the annona command economy.44
Throughout the Mediterranean, the agricultural system persisted, though modified. McCormick emphasizes the removal of the distorting effects of the annona.45
Lewit likewise sees an increasingly regional focus with a corresponding decline in
specialization. Indeed, in her words, “The clearest trend that can at present be
discerned in fifth- to sixth-century western European land use was a decrease in
specialized cereal production and cattle raising directed towards the organized state
market, army and taxes of Rome. In many regions, there appears to have been an
increase in mixed animal husbandry, usually of pigs, sheep, or goats, and greater regional variation in land use, with farming determined by local conditions rather than

42 Cameron,

The Mediterranean World, 84.
L. Cheyette, “The Disappearance of the Ancient Landscape and the Climatic
Anomaly of the Early Middle Ages: A Question to be Pursued,” Early Medieval Europe
16 (2008).
44 McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 116.
45 McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 116–17.
43 Fredric
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imperial demands.”46 Pearson goes further, characterizing the fourth through the
eighth centuries as “sedentary pastoralism” wherein animal husbandry, not farming,
was important.47
In other pursuits, Sueves, Visigoths, and Merovingians mined silver and gold in
Iberia and Gaul. In both regions there was some consolidation for economies of scale,
as under the Romans, but the scale was smaller nonetheless.48 Inter-regional (now
international) trade continued, at least in the Mediterranean. First in Spain, and
later in Africa, the Vandals profited from a continued trade in grain, oil, garum, and
slaves.; their position was made even better when they stopped paying the annona
to the Empire.49
Iberia was something of a special case: while it did see some transition of villas
into local power centers, it did not see the decline of specialization, and in general
retained a more Roman style of agriculture and trade than elsewhere.50 Perhaps as a
consequence Roger Collins is dismissive of the notion of a “free peasantry” championed by Wickham, at least among the Iberian Visigoths.51 However, Wickham argues
forcefully in favor of a broad network of independent land-owning “peasantry” elsewhere in the Mediterranean. In fact, he connects the survival of civil law courts in
Italy and the relatively weak seigneurial lordship to this class’s economic support for
civil society.52
In Gaul even more than the rest of the former Empire the economic basis was
the landed proprietor. The survival of Roman-style charters (and implied theory of
ownership) in Gaul and southern Europe in Carolingian times suggests that there
was at least some continuity in the land economy from Roman times. Agricultural
46 Lewit,

“Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 79–80; quotation is from 80.
“Nutrition,” 2–3. The quoted phrase comes from 2.
48 Edmondson, “Mining in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond,” peak: 91–102.
49 Berndt and Steinacher, “Minting in Vandal North Africa,” 258–59.
50 Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 89–90.
51 Collins, “Mérida and Toledo,” 200.
52 Wickham, “Comparing Rural Societies,” 228–29.
47 Pearson,
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continuity was particularly strong in Gaul and the Rhineland, but commerce was
“negligible” after Charlemagne.53 Pearson argues that the change from sedentary
pastoralism to more intensive forms of agriculture started in the seventh century,
spreading outward from the Rhineland and northern Francia.54 Pirenne saw a decline
of free small landowners in favor of large landowners, though Wickham would prefer
to see both; in fact the most common use of land was under deed of tenure by
non-land-owning peasants.55
In contrast to the Continent, the situation in England was much more complicated. The precise nature of land ownership and use before about 700 is unclear,
although throughout Britain agricultural evidence shows significant continuity from
Roman times through the fifth century, and in places into the seventh.56 Manufacturing declined in Britain both in the late Roman and post-Roman periods. Nonetheless
there was probably some continuity in manufacturing from Roman times up to the
time of the Anglo-Saxons, but the extent is generally hard to assess. Metalworking
likewise continued in the fifth and even sixth centuries, most commonly in the southwest but in fact all over Britain. This was well into the early Anglo-Saxon period,
and metalworking survived at least long enough to influence Anglo-Saxon work in
several ways (e.g. enameling).57 There was however greater disruption of mining
in Britain than on the Continent. Gold mines in Britain are known to have been
operating around 380, but there is no evidence either way after that point.58
∗
53 Pirenne,

∗

∗

Medieval Cities, 42. See also Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 79n6,
on the Rhineland. Charters: Wickham, “Comparing Rural Societies,” 231–32.
54 Pearson, “Nutrition,” 2–3. Pearson is citing an argument based on the evidence of law
codes, which may or may not be reliable on this front.
55 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 43–45; Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 229.
56 Wickham, “Comparing Rural Societies,” 231–32; agricultural continuity: Lewit, “Pigs,
Presses and Pastoralism,” 79n6.
57 Lloyd Laing, “Romano-British Metalworking and the Anglo-Saxons,” in N. J. Higham,
ed., Britons in Anglo-Saxon England (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell, 2007); manufacturing: 42,
metalworking specifically: 43–56.
58 Edmondson, “Mining in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond,” 101; gold mines: 92.
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One of the more significant economic changes in late antiquity and the early
medieval period is the decline of large-scale industry. To the extent that the economy
was largely based on what may be called craft production,59 the true impact of this
decline is hard to gauge. Nevertheless it is a sign that all was not well with the
late antique economy. The following discussion will use the mining and smelting of
metals as a proxy for industry in general—McCormick states that the ceramic and
food-processing industries underwent similar changes.60
The Roman Empire had once had a thriving metal industry. Although it declined
somewhat in the third and fourth centuries, mining in Iberia, Gaul, Britain, and the
Balkans was restructured and survived under the later Empire.61 Mining is known
to have declined in the later Empire and after its disappearance, although mining of
all types persisted longer in the East than the West. This does not mean that the
need for metals diminished substantially under the barbarians: McCormick notes
that “Theodoric’s Italy was famished for metal.”62
The extent to which this was a result of changes in administration, economics,
or capability is unclear. The conventional view is that mining required sophisticated
economics (capital, labor supply, etc.) and of course the major question is whether
the barbarians could organize such efforts without the coordinating influence of the
Empire. McCormick argues that they could not, citing a labor shortage even before
the end of the Empire, and specifically credits the Empire’s “economy of scale.”
However, mines also required other raw materials such as mercury and salt, and the
disruption of trade networks could in itself have impacted mining production. J. C.
Edmondson additionally suggests that at least some of the decline may have been

59 See

McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 607, 654, and Wickham, The
Inheritance of Rome, 219–22.
60 McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 53–61.
61 Edmondson, “Mining in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond,” 85.
62 McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 42–49, quotation from 49; see also
Edmondson, “Mining in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond,” 99.
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due to exhaustion of the mines given the available technology.63
Not all metal production ceased: as noted above, Iberia remained the most active
mining center, producing gold, silver, copper, lead, tin, iron, mercury, cinnabar,
sulfur and zinc. Although production peaked during first and second centuries,
it never stopped.64 However, in all cases, what mining survived—along with any
dependent refining and production—tended to be both smaller and more local.65
Lest this discussion of industry seem too pessimistic, there is one positive (or
at least less negative) development worth noting. The evolution of both agriculture
and mining is consistent with the established archaeological narrative of late imperial
villas undergoing a transformation into regional economic (even low-scale industrial)
centers. Lewit disagrees with the traditional dismissal of such change as marginal or
unimportant, seeing in the transformation of these multi-structure villas the origins
of the small villages common in the Middle Ages.66 Note that this fits well with
Pirenne’s model of a localized land-based economy.67 Lewit contrasts this western
outcome with the increased “market orientation” of agricultural villages in the eastern Mediterranean at this point (which was presumably due to the pressures of the
still-extant Eastern Empire). She notes that eastern goods (oil, wine, and amphorae,
among others) still ended up in the West, indicating the survival of at least some
inter-regional trade.68
∗

∗

∗

One of the possible impacts of the decline of the mining industry, at least, was
63 McCormick,

Origins of the European Economy, 49–53; Edmondson, “Mining in the
Later Roman Empire and Beyond,” 93–95.
64 Edmondson, “Mining in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond,” 88–94. In fact, the
mines at Almaden produced mercury continuously from Roman times until the seventeenth
century.
65 Edmondson, “Mining in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond,” 93–95; McCormick,
Origins of the European Economy, 52.
66 Lewit, “Vanishing Villas,” passim. See also Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,”
82–84.
67 Pirenne, Economic and Social History, 7–9.
68 Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” 85–87.
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the change in the currency of the early medieval period. As Wickham points out, “all
documented early medieval societies had standards of value, and they were almost
all in coins.” The use of coins (and frequently the coins themselves) followed Roman
custom, but the monetary systems became less complex, and particularly devalued,
over time.69 Wickham also believes that early Anglo-Saxon England operated at
least partially on the barter or exchange system, with the island beginning to see a
return to the market economy in the eighth century.70
“Until at least the mid-sixth century the Mediterranean remained connected
through a uniform coinage system that also included the [barbarian] kingdoms in
the west.”71 Even after that time, the biggest initial change was the king under
whose name the coinage was minted—currency became a local item, no longer common across the Empire. The barbarians retained the Roman gold solidus, at least
initially.72 Minting in some form or fashion was essentially constant in Francia and
the south, and was revived no later than the seventh century elsewhere in Europe.73
Berndt and Steinacher note that the Ostrogoths were the only barbarian group to
have a “fully formed monetary system” of gold, silver, and copper. In addition to
the Franks, the Visigoths and Burgundians also minted in gold, but did not have
a full system of coinage. The Vandals minted silver and copper coins, but none in
gold (this may have been because they still recognized the Eastern Empire’s gold
coinage).74
The Ostrogoths outright assumed the old Roman imperial coinage, and reserved
the imperial right to mint money. While Theodoric revalued the exchange between
69 Wickham,

The Inheritance of Rome, 226. The only exception to coinage Wickham cites
is Ireland, which used slave women and cows! On continuity, see also Pirenne, Medieval
Cities, 16.
70 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 218–19.
71 Schmidt-Hofner, “Regionalization and Integration,” 165.
72 Pirenne, Economic and Social History, 3.
73 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 226.
74 Berndt and Steinacher, “Minting in Vandal North Africa,” 257–58; quotation is from
257.
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gold, silver, and copper, “the Goths actually parted from Roman traditions very
gradually.”75 Later Ostrogothic coins all showed symbols of Theodoric, even after
his death.76 Frankish coinage was “purely Roman or, strictly speaking, RomanoByzantine.” Pirenne argues that the Franks’ persistent replication of Byzantine
coinage shows the continued influence of the Empire, or at least continued economic
ties.77 Under the Visigoths, coins continued to be minted and circulated in Spain
from at least two major mints, Mérida and Toledo; those of Mérida were particularly
widely distributed in the sixth and seventh centuries. In fact, based on this coin
distribution, Collins sees an Iberian-wide economy.78 Edmondson also supports a
monetary economy in Portugal.79
By contrast, coins in seventh- and eighth-century England, according to P. H.
Sawyer, “had a social rather than a commercial significance.”80 In the ninth century,
however, mints were being reestablished in England;81 Neil Middleton implies that
the return of minting was related to the rise of trading settlements.82 It is not clear
how these positions can both be reconciled with Bede’s statements that London was
already a major trading center in the early eighth century (see below).
In the eighth century, starting with Pepin and concluding by the time of Charlemagne, even the Franks abandoned gold coinage in favor of silver. Pirenne claims the
solidus referenced in the barbarians’ laws became “only nominal money.” The whole
of Europe had switched to silver pennies by 800, a move that was not reversed until
the advent of gold florins and ducats in the thirteenth century.83 Pirenne ties this
75 Burns,

History of the Ostrogoths, 70.
History of the Ostrogoths, 181–82.
77 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 16–17; quotation is from 16.
78 Collins, “Mérida and Toledo,” 207.
79 Edmondson, “Mining in the Later Roman Empire and Beyond,” 99.
80 P. H. Sawyer, “Kings and Merchants,” in P. H. Sawyer and I. N. Wood, eds., Early
Medieval Kingship (Leeds: University Printing Service, 1977), 139–40.
81 Sawyer, “Kings and Merchants,” 155.
82 Neil Middleton, “Early Medieval Port Customs, Tolls and Controls on Foreign Trade,”
Early Medieval Europe 13 (2005): 314.
83 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 36–37; quotation is from 36. See also Goffart, “Merovingian
76 Burns,
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transition to the loss of Mediterranean trade, reasoning in part that southern Italy,
which did still trade with Constantinople, retained its gold coinage until the region
was conquered by the Franks. Pirenne also sees the increasing decentralization of
minting privileges (usually attached to market rights) as a sign of decline.84
∗

∗

∗

In contrast with Garnsey and Saller’s view of imperial “consumer cities,” cities
in ninth-century Gaul were not centers of commerce or agriculture. They lacked a
“middle class” and any communal organization.85 In the early Middle Ages, cities
really served only as concentrated populations with some administrative and/or defense functions; whatever economic (and specifically manufacturing) role they had
had was lost.86 This statement is not universally accepted; Lewit, for example, makes
a case for “vigorous urban activity” that was “focused on the cathedral, market, and
palace of the bishop or king.”87 Even assuming that cities’ economic role was at best
minor, however, it is unclear exactly how much of a change this represented. Cities
had retained their administrative functions largely unchanged, if not always organized or conducted in the same way (see Section 4.2), and had never been significant
economic powerhouses, at least in the West.88
For a somewhat different view, see the following section for a discussion of the
rise of specific trading centers. These were not always cities per se, but Pirenne, for
one, did not think it a coincidence that Italy and the Netherlands were the first areas
to show the resurgence of both cities and trade. Likewise, S. J. B. Barnish sees some
Taxation,” 19–20; Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 226–27; and Pirenne, Economic
and Social History, 5.
84 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 37–38; on the connection of gold coinage to Mediterranean
trade, see also Pirenne, Economic and Social History, 5.
85 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 56.
86 Hodges and Whitehouse, Mohammed, Charlemagne, 83.
87 Lewit, “Vanishing Villas,” 266–67; quotations from 266 and 267 respectively, emphasis
mine.
88 Barnish, “Transformation of Classical Cities,” 386–96. Also see Tierney’s comment
above on page 99.
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economic role for cities even in the post-imperial period.89
Compare this with the rising economic importance of landed estates. In Francia
and Bavaria, the landowners controlled a comparatively greater fraction of wealth;
in Italy and Spain less so.90 However, as Lewit put it, “in every region” there was “a
series of characteristic transformations [in villas] during the 5th or 6th c. [sic].” These
modifications emphasized the newly economic nature of the villa, “defy[ing] classical
aesthetic traditions and lifestyle [and] converting decorative areas to agricultural or
industrial uses.”91

5.4

The Impact on Trade

Trade in the Roman Empire had faced a number of hurdles. It was hard, risky,
and not appreciated. Society valued the landed aristocracy over a merchant class;
trade, and crafts in general, had a low social status, and any money generated was
likely to be converted into land and thus respectability (thus impeding any long-term
build-up of trading companies).92 Additionally, and probably as a consequence of
the reasons listed above, the institutions for handling trade were underdeveloped.
The Romans lacked a concept of legal agency (though there was some progress on
this front over time), double-entry book-keeping, or sophisticated credit and banking
(though investment banking was recognized).93 In fact, although trade, both local
and long-distance, obviously existed in the Roman Empire, Sawyer warns against
overestimating its overall impact.94
The Roman Empire was fundamentally a maritime economy. Already under the
89 Pirenne,

Medieval Cities, 132; Barnish, “Transformation of Classical Cities,” 396–400.
The Inheritance of Rome, 204–05.
91 Lewit, “Vanishing Villas,” 260. See also pages 261, 270.
92 Garnsey and Saller, The Roman Empire, 44–45; see also Greene, Archaeology of the
Roman Economy, 14.
93 Garnsey and Saller, The Roman Empire, 52, 54–55.
94 Sawyer, “Kings and Merchants,” 141–42.
90 Wickham,
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late Empire, however, the maritime trade routes had declined somewhat. Greene
believes that the “transport systems of the empire worked best in the first two
centuries AD.” He cites the sharp decline in the number of shipwrecks from the third
to the fifth century, though of course that may simply mean that the construction
quality of Roman ships was improving. Nonetheless the supply of grain to Rome
in the fourth century demonstrated that Roman shipping was still sophisticated.95
Throughout the Empire, inland trade was tied closely to rivers, and where there were
no rivers, the Roman roads were indispensable: Greene estimates they would have
cut travel times by a factor of two or three. Road maintenance was of constant and
critical importance, which highlights the impact to communications and trade when
later kings failed to maintain them: Pirenne estimated that the Roman roads were
completely gone by the ninth century.96
∗

∗

∗

The written evidence for trade in the early medieval era is very sparse, but this is
largely because most of our sources were churchmen and, although some references
do appear in saints’ lives, trade was not always seen as relevant—there were even
occasional polemics from churchmen against trade. Historians therefore are forced
to turn to numismatic and other archaeological evidence, as in other aspects of
economic history. This evidence should be treated carefully, however, as valuables
also circulated through means other than trade, including plunder, gifting, etc.97
The Mediterranean remained important to the barbarian kingdoms, just as it had
been under Rome. Indeed, market tolls along inland routes and charters of the Abbey
of Corbie exempting that abbey from some tolls on Mediterranean goods show continued trade into the interior from the Mediterranean trade network,98 and as late as 500
95 Greene,

Archaeology of the Roman Economy, 43; see also Pirenne, Medieval Cities,

3–4.
96 Greene,

Archaeology of the Roman Economy; maritime traffic: 43, inland transport:
30–36. See also Pirenne, Economic and Social History, 86.
97 Sawyer, “Kings and Merchants,” 139–40. Polemics: Pirenne, Economic and Social
History, 12–14.
98 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 9–10, 18–19.
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there was trade between Britain and the Mediterranean.99 Rome remained the center
of what Wickham calls a broad trade network stretching from Sicily to Provence (although the fact that this was “broad” says something of the reduced conditions).100
The only long-distance Mediterranean trade routes were Marseilles–Genoa–Rome,
Rome–the Aegean–Constantinople, and Constantinople–Syria/Palestine.101 These
routes allowed at least some places—the cities of southern Spain, for example—to
maintain commercial and cultural ties to the eastern Mediterranean. In Spain, these
ties continued into the seventh century, and Collins believes they were even stronger
than they had been in the sixth, potentially arguing for a closer connection between
the kingdoms and the Eastern Empire. It is unclear how merchants traveled to inland Spanish cities, but it was probably via rivers, as elsewhere. It is also unclear
what was being traded, though Collins suggests grain or silver from Spain, and possibly marble from the East.102 In general, the western Mediterranean (Gaul, Italy,
Spain) continued to see some maritime trade even after the sea was mostly closed by
Islam.103
Whether or not the Mediterranean was effectively closed, it is true that trade
became more localized in the early medieval period.104 Yet even after the collapse of
truly international Mediterranean trade, the littoral edges of Europe retained some
(usually localized, but gradually less so) maritime commerce. This was true both
in the Mediterranean and in the North and Baltic seas. There was even a common
pattern: first the collapse of Roman merchants and their protecting navy, then the
rise of piracy, and finally the transition of pirates into merchants and a revival of
99 Wickham,

The Inheritance of Rome, 219.
The Inheritance of Rome, 219–20.
101 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 225. See Map 20.2 in McCormick, Origins of the
European Economy, 593, for an excellent depiction of these (and other) routes.
102 Collins, “Mérida and Toledo,” 202–04.
103 See Horden and Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, and
Lewit, “Pigs, Presses and Pastoralism,” all of which advocate for trade at a not insignificant
level.
104 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 218; McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 592.
100 Wickham,

Chapter 5. Economic Structures: Was Pirenne Right?

115

trade, first locally, then on a wider scale.105
The economies, and thus trade networks, of the Mediterranean kingdoms were
varied, with some areas of complexity and some simplicity. There were still “complex
patterns of production and exchange,” including factories of pottery and metals,
particularly in the western Mediterranean region.106 The whole of continental Europe
shows evidence of local manufacture and provincial land-based trade networks that
would have carried some goods (presumably including the factory-made pottery and
metals) throughout Spain, Francia, and Italy.107 Unlike in the north, if traders used
any southern rivers, this is unattested.108
The “Frankish heartland” had the largest economy in the West, with surviving
trade networks, production facilities, and merchant activity documented in saints’
lives. Northern Francia, in particular the area that is now the Netherlands, had more
commercial activity and a more complex exchange system than the rest of Europe
before 800, and continued to be prominent under the Carolingians.109 Pirenne and
Wickham both credit this in part to the presence of so many long rivers. Wickham
cites as major inland routes the Rhine, the Seine–Meuse system (increasingly so),
and the Rhône (decreasingly so). Wickham specifically believes northern rivers to
have been important due to the interlinks between them, not because of their access
to the North Sea.110 But the more intriguing thing is who the Franks were trading
with: the Islamic Abbasid Caliphate.111
The north, including Britain, had a much simpler exchange system than the

105 Pirenne,

Economic and Social History, 15–25.
The Inheritance of Rome, 219–22; quotation is from 219. McCormick,
Origins of the European Economy, 573–80.
107 Wickham, “Comparing Rural Societies,” 242–43.
108 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 226.
109 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 220–22; quotation is from 220.
110 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 94; Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 226.
111 Hodges and Whitehouse, Mohammed, Charlemagne, 120–25; McCormick, Origins of
the European Economy, 386–87, 562–64.
106 Wickham,
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south.112 Nevertheless, the northern coast of Europe, especially in the area of Calais
and Utrecht, was trading with England, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, and Poland
under the Merovingians. (Pirenne sees this as part of the motivation for river trade
by the Frisians along the Rhine, Scheldt, and Meuse.)113 Before the mid-eighth
century, however, Anglo-Saxon trade was particularly highly localized—with the
exception of the “relatively rich and powerful”114 —and evidence for manufacturing
and regional trade networks is totally lacking in England before the ninth century;115
this does not, of course, mean that there was none.
Thus, although most needs were supplied locally in the early medieval period,
even more so than they had been during the Empire, it is clear that there were still
complex networks to supply non-local goods when necessary. Salt was one of the
most important traded commodities throughout Europe, but trade in furs, ivory, and
amber continued as well.116 However, in Pirenne’s words, “it would certainly be an
error to assume that the dealings of the oriental merchants of Gaul were restricted
solely to articles of luxury.” In fact, such general goods as wine, oil, spices, and
papyrus were exported northward from the Mediterranean.117 There was a trade in
glass, pottery, and millstones from Francia.118
Further north, eighth-century England imported fish, wine, and woad, and exported wool, cloth, and hides.119 Flemish cloth and Rhenish wine (still known in
Shakespeare’s day) were exported to England. Coins from Dorestad (near Utrecht)
have been found in Sweden and Poland, though what they were buying is unknown.
Irish ships have been excavated in Noirmoutier (on the Atlantic coast, near the mouth
112 Wickham,

The Inheritance of Rome, 222.
Medieval Cities, 33–34.
114 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 218.
115 Wickham, “Comparing Rural Societies,” 243.
116 Sawyer, “Kings and Merchants,” 146–50.
117 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 17–20. As noted above, the papyrus trade stopped in the
seventh century.
118 Sawyer, “Kings and Merchants,” 153.
119 Middleton, “Early Medieval Port Customs,” 351.
113 Pirenne,
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of the Loire), presumably there for the salt; Salzburg, in contrast, shipped its salt
along the Danube. Slaves were also a major trade throughout the region.120
The most visible impact of the barbarians was therefore the shifting of trade
northward, but whether this was a product or the cause of the barbarians’ continental, rather than Mediterranean, orientation is not yet settled. Sawyer and Wickham
note that land-based trade was retained from imperial times, with urban markets and
county fairs evolving into their medieval equivalents—in Francia, this transition had
happened by the sixth century.121 Middleton and Simon Coupland also cite evidence
for large trading centers developing in the sixth and seventh centuries to support the
Frisian trade across the English Channel and North Sea.122 (The Romans created
frontier trading towns to accommodate foreign trade. All foreign trade was restricted
to these towns without special exemption from the emperor or his delegates, a system broadly retained in the barbarian kingdoms.123 ) Finally, Sture Bolin makes the
point that the economy of Western Europe (particularly Francia) centered on the
transshipment of goods between Muslim and Scandinavian territories.124
∗

∗

∗

All of this commerce had to be conducted somewhere. The Romans originally
created frontier trading towns to accommodate foreign trade. All foreign trade (as
well as the foreign merchants) was restricted to these towns without special exemption from the emperor or his delegates.125 Roman urban markets and county fairs
120 Pirenne,
121 Sawyer,

Medieval Cities, 33–34.
“Kings and Merchants,” 144–46. Francia: Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome,

221.
122 Sawyer,

“Kings and Merchants,” 151–54; Middleton, “Early Medieval Port Customs,”
313, 330; Simon Coupland, “Trading Places: Quentovic and Dorestad Reassessed,” Early
Medieval Europe 11 (2002): 209–11, 221–22.
123 Roman system: Middleton, “Early Medieval Port Customs,” 317–18; Sawyer, “Kings
and Merchants,” 142. Continuation under the barbarians: Middleton, “Early Medieval
Port Customs,” 319–29; cf. Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 18–19.
124 Sture Bolin, “Mohammed, Charlemagne and Ruric,” in Havighurst, The Pirenne Thesis, especially 78–82; see also Hodges and Whitehouse, Mohammed, Charlemagne, 158.
125 Middleton, “Early Medieval Port Customs,” 317–18.
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evolved into their medieval equivalents, which in Francia were in place by the sixth
century. Sawyer points out that these “should be distinguished from long-distance
commerce in goods of high value [which were] offered for sale not by producers, but
by middle men or merchants.”126
Of the markets, Pirenne notes that their “number is itself proof of their insignificance.” Although they probably satisfied local household needs, the transactions they fostered were of minimal economic value. McCormick generally discredits
Pirenne’s discussion of commercial activity, but does agree that more or less through
the eighth century, kings “were indifferent to markets” due to their low economic
impact.127 Either way, the benefit they offered may have been less in terms of
product valuation and more in terms of cash exchange: Goffart sees some market
activity as necessary to mediate between in-kind supply and demand for cash (to
pay taxes/rents).128
The association between markets and merchants (in the sense of broader trade),
and in fact the rise of merchants themselves, are unclear. As noted, trade and
piracy frequently went hand in hand, but while this was certainly the case among
the northern Vikings and the Islamic pirates in the Mediterranean, it does not seem
to have happened in Continental Europe after the fall of the Empire.129 Nonetheless
there was at least some merchant activity throughout the early medieval period—
including not just foreign merchants but at least in Francia local ones—among the
Visigoths, Franks, Lombards, and at least the later Anglo-Saxons to judge by the
evidence of the law codes.130 There is even some evidence for merchant associations
or consortia, as well as cooperative organizations.131
126 Sawyer,

“Kings and Merchants,” 144–46; quotation is from 146. Francia: Wickham,
The Inheritance of Rome, 221.
127 Pirenne, Economic and Social History, 10. McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 573–80, quotation from 580.
128 Goffart, “Roman Taxation to Mediaeval Seigneurie (II),” 386–87.
129 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 106–07.
130 Pirenne, Medieval Cities; local merchants: 21–22, citing Gregory of Tours; laws: 127.
131 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 224–25.
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Pirenne did not believe the merchants evolved from the agricultural markets or
even the traveling abbey procurers. Instead he strongly suggests (but does not outright state) that European mercantilism arose through contact with Venice, where
the Roman systems of trade (in this case, with Byzantium) never collapsed.132 Since
Pirenne, this argument has been reversed; Wickham in particular describes the activities of merchants and mercantile consortia.133 Pirenne also believed that there may
have been some continuity from Roman traders, with the Jews as a surviving class
of merchants focused on specific luxury items rather than more general long-distance
trade, another view which has since been largely discredited. Without downplaying
the role of the Jews, Wickham does note the presence of “foreign” merchants—mostly
“Syrians” (i.e. Easterners), but also Frisians in northern Europe.134
What merchants there were were largely confined to specific trading centers (frequently ports) as they had been under the Romans. Marseilles was a major port
during Merovingian times, tied to Mediterranean traffic ranging from Spain to Constantinople, and hosted foreign merchants including Jews and Syrians.135 Although
Marseilles declined in the seventh and eighth centuries as a now unnecessary port,
Rome remained a large trading city, at least by eighth-century standards.136 Further
north, reflecting the transition from Mediterranean-centered economies to continental ones, there is literary and archaeological evidence for large trading centers (mostly
coastal or riverside) in England, northern Europe, and Scandinavia. These centers
developed in the sixth and seventh centuries, and flourished in the eighth. Centers were sometimes under the direct control of kings or other rulers; by the eighth
century many had become recognized townships.137
132 Pirenne,

Medieval Cities, 107–13.
The Inheritance of Rome, 224–25.
134 Pirenne, Economic and Social History, 11, 34. See Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome,
223, for a particularly good critique of Pirenne’s argument, and 225 for foreign merchants.
135 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 17–18.
136 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 220.
137 Sawyer, “Kings and Merchants,” 151–54; Middleton, “Early Medieval Port Customs,”
313.
133 Wickham,
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Maastricht (in the modern Netherlands) was founded as a new town in the seventh
century with a heavy industrial basis.138 Bede suggests that London was in his day
a major international trading port.139 The rise of Frisian merchants at this time
was probably due to their location, which controlled the mouths of the Rhine and
Meuse rivers.140 Dorestad (modern Netherlands) and Quentovic (modern France)
were major Frisian and Frankish ports of the late eighth and early ninth centuries.
They served primarily the English trade, but also the Continent (inland Germany,
Austria, Switzerland, Italy) and the Baltic region.141 Dorestad’s importance (or at
least its trade connections) seems to have exploded under Charlemagne, as coins
from 28 mints all over the Carolingian Empire have been found at the site.142
Paul Fouracre argues that the rise of these centers was a result of the continued
influence of social élites (see Section 4.1), but I am not convinced of this line of
reasoning. His statement that “The links between wealth, status, political power and
public authority are demonstrated by the rise in the seventh century of emporia, or
trading settlements, a development which ran counter to the general decline of urban
life in Europe at this time,” is fine as far as it goes. However, he continues: “Emporia
sprang up to service the various élites by supplying them with the high-value prestige
goods necessary for the display of high social status, and they were associated with
the growth of those political groupings which had succeeded in mobilizing the wealth
with which to trade.”143 This seems to me too close to Pirenne’s over-emphasis on
luxuries.
∗

∗

∗

Despite, or perhaps because of, its widespread nature, the Empire levied what
138 Wickham,
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“Early Medieval Port Customs,” 349.
140 Sawyer, “Kings and Merchants,” 151; Coupland, “Trading Places,” 211.
141 Middleton, “Early Medieval Port Customs,” 330; Coupland, “Trading Places,” 209–11,
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Sawyer called “vexatious taxation” on merchants in the fourth and fifth centuries.144
The barbarian kingdoms did the same. Indeed, one of the reasons for the establishment and enforcement of such trading centers was the resulting ease with which
rulers could control long-distance trade.
According to Middleton, “Controlling the activities of local and foreign merchants
in the interests of collecting tolls, maintaining law and order, and gaining privileged
access to imported goods was a central concern of medieval rulers. They were also
important matters of state in the Roman and Byzantine empires. Port tolls and
controls on foreign merchants go back a long way.”145 The Roman system of trade
tax strongly influenced policies in successor states: taxes on commerce (including
levies both on transactions and on the transport of goods) were extended by the
barbarians in at least Gaul, Spain, and Italy.146 (Pirenne thought that these market
tolls produced very little money, and eventually became just extortion.147 )
Pirenne believed that the Frankish continuation of Roman market tolls or road
taxes was evidence of continued commerce, and McCormick supports the same conclusion.148 In England, “there are questions about whether [tolls] survived from the
period of Roman rule in Britain or were adopted and adapted later from continental European practices.” Tolls on ships in England in the eighth century may be
based on Roman ones, but this is not as clear as it was on the Continent.149 Similarly, there is evidence that the Anglo-Saxons, Franks (particularly under and after
Charlemagne), and Lombards imposed controls on foreign trade and merchants that
trace to Roman and/or Byzantine origins.150 The 10 percent tax on passing borders

144 Sawyer,

“Kings and Merchants,” 142.
“Early Medieval Port Customs,” 315.
146 Sawyer, “Kings and Merchants,” 142; Middleton, “Early Medieval Port Customs,”,
316.
147 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 40–41.
148 Pirenne, Medieval Cities, 15; McCormick, Origins of the European Economy, 641–42.
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or control points traces from antiquity.151 The law codes, for example, reflect the
kings’ (presumably economic) interest in protecting border-crossing traders.152

151 Middleton,
152 Sawyer,

“Early Medieval Port Customs,” 329.
“Kings and Merchants,” 150–51; see the codes of Aistulf, Ine, and Alfred.
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Chapter 6
The Law: A Study in Adoption,
Adaptation, and Innovation
Having gone through some of the more conceptual aspects of institutional change in
the late antique/early medieval period, I will now turn to a specific case study of
the sorts of ways that the early medieval kingdoms both borrowed from and added
to existing Roman institutions: the legal system. As an item-by-item comparison
of each code is impractical, I chose to screen the laws for particular subject matter:
structure of the judicial system, treatment of violence, family and inheritance law,
and the treatment of foreigners. Additionally, I will cover only the laws the barbarians issued for themselves, not the separate codes sometimes used for their Roman
subjects, as these were largely just repackaged versions of the Theodosian Code.1

6.1

The Influence of Roman Law

To begin with, Roman law was—like the laws of the barbarians that would supplant
it roughly a thousand years later—the province of kings. Roman tradition credits the
1 See

Watson, Roman Law, 86.
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semi-legendary seven kings of Rome, traditionally held to have ruled 753–509 BC,
with issuing what Alan Watson calls a “surprisingly large” body of law.2 In roughly
450 BC, Roman law was codified in the so-called “Twelve Tables.” This code itself,
like many of the early medieval codes, was not actually comprehensive; it provided
for what might be considered special cases rather than more straightforward matters
of law, which were presumably to be taken for granted.3 After the Twelve Tables,
custom was no longer enforced as law. Instead the law evolved through statutes
passed by popular assembly or through edicts issued by the elected praetors (magistrates). (Although they could not de jure change the law, their edicts established
how they would rule in a hypothetical case, which worked out to the same thing.)4
Under the Empire, the law-giving role evolved away from the assemblies and praetors to semi-professional jurists—essentially legal analysts whose published opinions
carried great weight—and eventually to the emperors themselves. Sometime around
160, under the rule of either Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius (both of whom
took a noted interest in the law), an otherwise unknown jurist named Gaius wrote
what was to become the de facto textbook of Roman law for nearly 400 years. His
Institutes survive in more copies than any other classical writing, and served as the
template for Theodosius’s and Justinian’s later works.5
Roman law was originally personal—it applied to Romans only—and remained so
well into the Empire; this personal nature was a feature in common with barbarian
legal traditions and the subsequent early medieval laws.6 However, as the Empire
2 Watson,

Roman Law, 3.
Roman Law, 9–13; Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 12–13.
4 Watson, Roman Law, 15–23. The details of the republican popular assemblies are
complex and not particularly relevant here. See also Drew, introduction to Laws of the
Salian Franks, 12–15, for a general discussion of this topic.
5 Watson, Roman Law, 15–26; Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 14–15.
6 For a contrasting viewpoint see P. S. Barnwell, “Emperors, Jurists and Kings: Law
and Custom in the Late Roman and Early Medieval West,” Past and Present 168 (2000):
7–8, who criticizes the idea of personal law; despite Barnwell’s claims that personal law
has “in recent times been subject to increased scrutiny,” however, his is the only work I
have found to espouse this view.
3 Watson,
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grew, Romans took their law with them, until finally in 212 Caracalla extended
Roman citizenship (and law) to essentially everyone in the Empire. Although still
notionally personal, Roman law became from this point effectively territorial, and
later edicts of the emperors were taken to have territorial force.7
As the size of the body of law grew, jurists recognized the need for compilations
to ensure, essentially, that everyone was working from the same material. There
were two unofficial collections made in the late third century, neither of which has
survived. Beginning in 429, with additional instruction in 435, however, the emperor
Theodosius II appointed a commission to make a compiled edition of all valid imperial
statutes; the result was published in 438. Although the emperor Justinian would issue
a similar recompilation in 534, it would not be as influential in the West as the Codex
Theodosianus; see discussion later in this section.8
∗

∗

∗

Trial by jury was first established in the Republic. The format was amended over
time, but remained essentially the same: a body of sworn jurors, witnesses (who
could be compelled to testify), and representation by attorneys, all roughly following
the format of evidence and persuasive speeches familiar to a modern audience. Character evidence was very important, however; it was provided by so-called laudatores,
who seem to have functioned much like the later oathhelpers; oath-taking as a means
of litigation continued to be referenced under Justinian’s Digests.9 Under the Empire, however, the emperors acquired formal jurisdiction with life and death power;
procedure in imperial trials had no formal rules: the emperor’s ruling was law. By
the later Empire, emperors began to delegate some of their judicial and appellate
functions to the praetorian prefects,10 a development which should perhaps be seen
7 Drew,

introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 12–13; Watson, Roman Law, 25.
Matthews, “The Making of the Text,” in Jill Harries and Ian Wood, eds., The
Theodosian Code (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 19–30, and Watson, Roman
Law, 83.
9 O. F. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995), 1–5.
10 Robinson, Criminal Law, 9–11.
8 John
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as the forerunner of the early medieval devolutions of power discussed in Section 3.2.
As mentioned briefly in Section 4.1, Roman law continued to differentiate between
classes—the “distinguished” (honestiores) and the “humble” (humiliores)—even after the extension of citizenship provided everyone access to common civil law. Even
‘barbarians’ were now citizens (or at least could become citizens). This was not absolute; some classes of “stigmatized” outsiders (captives, etc.) were prevented from
being citizens, and there were ways in which one could lose citizenship and some of
its incumbent privileges.11 Roman law always differentiated between slaves, freemen,
and freedmen.12
Murder, the intent to murder, or furnishing the means for murder were all punished; vendettas were never allowed. The punishment was always by the state: officially exile and forfeiture of all property, but Marcian stated that the death penalty
was common in the fifth century.13 The crime of iniuria covered offense against
honor, reputation, dignity or “physical integrity,” fining both verbal and physical
assault. This fine was originally a scaled compensation (akin to the wergeld ), but
was changed to a case-by-case assessment in the third century BC.14 Self-defense was
a permissible excuse, even for homicide, but at least by the time of Justinian the law
required minimal force be used.15
Marriage technically required only the consent of both parties and both heads
of house; there was no formal ceremony or permission, and while dowries were socially expected they were not required.16 However, not all marriage was legal: marriage between classes (especially freedmen and former mistresses) was forbidden;
11 Mathisen,

“Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani,” 1015, 1019–20.
Roman Law, 39–43.
13 Robinson, Criminal Law, 41–43, 45, 46. Killing a slave was initially treated only as
damage to property; under the Empire it was considered murder.
14 Iniuria: Robinson, Criminal Law, 49–51; compensation: Watson, Roman Law, 72.
15 Robinson, Criminal Law, 20, 45.
16 Judith Evans Grubbs, Law and Family in Late Antiquity: The Emperor Constantine’s
Marriage Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 54–55, 141–43.
12 Watson,
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Christians could not marry Jews (but, interestingly, could marry pagans); Romans
were forbidden to marry barbarians.17 Divorce went through several fluctuations;
by the late fourth century unilateral divorce was essentially only allowed on moral
grounds, though mutual divorce remained permissible until 542 under Justinian.18
Judith Evans Grubbs notes that while Christianity advocated for (and under Justinian achieved) almost total prohibition of divorce, it had little other impact on
marriage.19
Men and women could make wills, with essentially no restrictions on content.
In intestate succession, there was no distinction of the eldest child, and males and
females of the same agnatic degree inherited equally.20 Constantine greatly altered
intestacy law: Women became entitled to a one-third inheritance of a child’s estate,
and if left out of the will they could sue.21 Constantine also expanded freedom of gifts
between parents and children; this was later expanded to greatly simplify Roman gift
law in general.22
∗

∗

∗

Roman and subsequent ‘barbarian’ law seem to have undergone parallel evolutionary tracks (uncharitably, we might say the barbarians reinvented the wheel).
The balance between royal or imperial authority and the use of councils (of elders,
aristocrats, etc.) seems to have shifted at least four times. Roman law saw the
preeminence first of kings and then the senate, before legislative authority settled
on the emperor. Under the early kingdoms we likewise see kings first issuing law in
17 Robinson,

Criminal Law, 57. It is not clear what effect this last ban had, as Caracalla
had extended Roman citizenship to the whole Empire in the third century. Mathisen,
“Peregrini, Barbari, and Cives Romani,” 1030–31, suggests that it was a ban on marrying
barbarians in the military, not barbarians per se.
18 Watson, Roman Law, 31–32; Evans Grubbs, Law and Family, 225–37.
19 Evans Grubbs, Law and Family, 65; see also Evans Grubbs, Law and Family, 15–16,
74–77, and Watson, Roman Law, 32.
20 Watson, Roman Law, 77–79, 81. “Agnatic” means pure male-line relation; Justinian
removed this requirement.
21 Evans Grubbs, Law and Family, 116–17.
22 Evans Grubbs, Law and Family, 117–22.
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coordination with councils and subsequently on their own.23 Similarly, just as Roman law evolved from ‘personal’ to ‘territorial’, the barbarian laws did the same.24
Finally, both assumed at least some state responsibility for legal matters, administered by a royally-appointed “judicial system.” Just as the emperors devolved some
of their juridical authority down to local magistrates, the barbarian systems likewise
included increasingly local duces and comites, and sometimes bishops, as judges.25
One potentially significant difference was that the medieval codes envisioned law as
private suits between parties; Harold Berman claims that this adversarial view of law
harks back to an underlying “Germanic” (even Indo-European) world-view wherein
the point of law and justice was winning, not being right per se.26
As Martin Grimmer notes, this was a critical area for their success: “It was
important in the years following the decline of the Western Empire for so-called
barbarian kings to ape Roman legal precedent and to promulgate something that
looked like a written law code, irrespective of its actual judicial value.”27 It was not
all appearances, however: the content of the Roman and medieval codes was likewise
similar. “Today we are more aware of the considerable overlap between the contents
of these so-called ‘barbarian’ codes, and can see the debt they owed to late Roman
law.”28 Some of the specific inheritances and similarities will be discussed in the
next section.
While it was Roman private law that most influenced the later law codes, which
treated all law as private civil suits, the distinction between civil and criminal law
23 Tacitus,

Germania,, chapters 11–3; LC , preamble; Berman, “Background of the Western Legal Tradition,” 573; Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 232nn2–3;
“Rothair’s Edict,” in Drew, The Lombard Laws, title 386; Hunter Blair, Anglo-Saxon
England, 216–17; Bede, Ecclesiastical History, chapter II.5.
24 Drew, introduction to The Burgundian Code, 4.
25 Drew, introduction to The Lombard Laws, 7–11.
26 Berman, “Background of the Western Legal Tradition,” 565–67.
27 Martin Grimmer, “Britons in Early Wessex: The Evidence of the Law Code of Ine,”
in Higham, Britons in Anglo-Saxon England, 111, emphasis original.
28 Fouracre, “Cultural Conformity,” 156.
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was also blurred in the late Empire; whether this paralleled or influenced the later
medieval development is unclear.29 Certainly, the Theodosian Code would “never be
effectively superseded [in the West] until the twelfth century.”30 Even though only
official copies of the Theodosian Code were allowed, it was sufficiently widespread
that roughly eighty percent of it survives in fragments and as inclusions within the
near-contemporary Alaric’s Breviary and the later Justinian Code.31
Although I have been citing Justinian above, the impact he had on barbarian law
is obscure, and probably minimal. The first significant post-imperial law codes—
those of the Visigoths, Burgundians, and Franks, including in the first two cases
specific laws for Romans—were issued after the Theodosian Code of the mid-fifth
century but before the Justinian Corpus Juris Civilis of the mid-sixth. Yet even after
the issue of the Corpus Juris Civilis, Stuart Madden notes that “only the shortest
of its three parts, the Codex, enjoyed continuous use, if not application, after the fall
of the Western Empire.” The remainder of the Corpus was “lost or simply ignored
until [its] reintroduction in the mid-twelfth century,” even in Spain and Italy, where
the Byzantines had the most influence.32

6.2

The Establishment of New Legal Codes

Major law codes were issued by the Visigoths, Burgundians, Franks (Salian and
Ripuarian), Lombards, and Anglo-Saxons. There were laws for other peoples—the
Frisians, Alemanni, Saxons, and Bavarians—but, on the one hand, these were all
29 Romans:

Robinson, Criminal Law, 24; barbarians: Drew, introduction to Laws of the
Salian Franks, 12; Robinson, Criminal Law, ix, 1.
30 Quotation from Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 15; see also
Matthews, “Making of the Text,” 19–30, and Watson, Roman Law, 83.
31 Matthews, “Making of the Text,” 19; Boudewijn Sirks, “The Sources of the Code,” in
Harries and Wood, The Theodosian Code, 64–65.
32 M. Stuart Madden, “Paths of Western Law after Justinian,” London Law Review 1
(2005): 370.
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outside the former boundaries of the Empire, and on the other were all issued by
the hegemonic Franks, rather than by the peoples themselves.33 Each of these kings
responded differently, “to some degree in accordance with the time of their entry
into the Empire, but . . . more in accordance with the part of the Empire in which
they settled.”34 Grimmer calls the laws of the Franks, Lombards, and Alemanni
closer to image than reality, though noting this is not true of the Visigothic and
Burgundian laws, which reflected real, on-going lawmaking. Grimmer also believes
that Ine’s code fits the pattern of actual lawmaking, and therefore probably more or
less represents conditions as they actually were.35
The Visigothic kings were, in P. D. King’s words, “indefatigable” legislators. At
least twelve, and possibly fourteen, issued either laws or full legal codes between
Theodoric I (reigned 418–451) and Egica (687–702). The first Visigothic law code
was issued by Theodoric himself, date uncertain (it is known only by reference).
No manuscripts of this code survive, and it is unknown how much of the content
survives in later codes. “The earliest surviving laws issued by a Germanic king that
can be regarded as constituting a true code are fragments of a code issued by the
Visigothic king Euric (466–485) about 481.” Though it applied only to the Visigoths
themselves, King calls it the most Romanized of the early Germanic law codes.36
In 506, Alaric II issued the Lex Romana Visigothorum, also called the Breviary,
which applied to the Roman subjects of the Visigothic kings. Alaric’s Breviary
used much of the Theodosian Code, Paul’s Sentences, Gaius’s Institutes, and “some
less important Roman law sources,” and was thus “a very respectable statement of
vulgar Roman law.” The Breviary was supplanted in Visigothic Spain by the Lex

33 Drew,

introduction to The Lombard Laws, 13.
introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 21.
35 Grimmer, “Britons in Early Wessex,” 111–12; on the Franks, Lombards, and Alemanni
he is citing Patrick Wormald.
36 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 22–23; King, Law and Society, 7,
gives the year of issue as 476; see also P. D. King, “King Chindasvind and the First
Territorial Law-code of the Visigothic Kingdom,” in James, Visigothic Spain, 131–32.
34 Drew,
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Visigothorum Reccesvindiana.37 S. P. Scott called the Visigothic Code “the most
remarkable monument of legislation which ever emanated from a semi-barbarian
people, and the only substantial memorial of greatness or erudition bequeathed by
the Goths to posterity.”38 Floyd Lear notes that “there is little doubt that the [later]
Visigothic codes illustrate the transition from a Roman to a Germanic legal basis
and the fusion of Roman and Germanic law with greater precision and detail than
any other examples in the leges barbarorum.”39
Burgundian law consisted of two codes: one for barbarians, commonly refered to
as the Liber Constitutionum, and one for Romans, called the Lex Romana Burgundionum. The conflict between Roman and barbarian legal traditions was particularly
strong in Burgundy due to the heavy, long-established Roman presence in the area
(previously part of Gallia Narbonensis), but this also allowed the Burgundians to
exploit the Roman bureaucracy which survived in the area as they created their
laws.40 The Burgundian code was almost simultaneous with the Codex Euricianus
but “clearly follow[ed] Visigothic precedent.”41 The Liber Constitutionum represents
a transitional stage of law, and was what Katherine Fischer Drew called the “earliest
fusion of the Germanic and Roman law.”42 The Liber Constitutionum was written in
stages, probably between 474 and 516 by the king Gundobad and his son Sigismund.
The later additions have a more theoretical or rhetorical style, and seem to be new

37 King,
38 S.

“King Chindasvind,” 131; Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 23.
P. Scott, preface to The Visigothic Code (Boston: Boston Book Company, 1910),

xxiv.
39 Floyd Seyward Lear, “The Public Law of the Visigothic Code,” Speculum 26 (1951):
1. Scott likewise credits four sources, “first, those based on ancient Gothic customs; second, such as were adopted from the Roman jurisprudence; third, the acts of ecclesiastical
councils; fourth, edicts of kings, promulgated at different times, according to the various
exigencies that arose; all of which seem to have had equal validity”: Scott, preface to The
Visigothic Code, xxix.
40 Drew, introduction to The Burgundian Code, 4–5.
41 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 24.
42 Drew, introduction to The Burgundian Code, 7–8. This is in contrast to the essentially
Roman Visigothic law: see Lear’s comment above.
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law, showing a “trend toward the establishment of a body of royal legislation.”43 The
Lex Romana Burgundionum was written after the first part of the Liber Constitutionum, sometime between 501 and 517, and did not last long, being superseded by
Alaric’s Breviary on the Burgundians’ defeat in 534.44 The Liber Constitutionum,
however, was “one of the most influential of the barbarian codes,” and it continued
to be in force as the personal law of the Burgundian people into the ninth century.45
As a result of extensive connections with Rome, the Burgundians, and the Visigoths, the Frankish law—the so-called Lex Salica, issued between 507 and 511—
demonstrates the influence of Visigothic and Burgundian models. Curiously, however, Roman influence is severely lacking in its content, though Drew says it is
“evident that the Frankish rulers had the service of a legally trained Roman bureaucracy.”46 In fact, “the Frankish legislation has been recognized for many generations
to be the most Germanic of all the barbarian legislation except that of the AngloSaxons.”47 This may be because Clovis was almost certainly not yet Christian (or
at least Catholic) when he first issued his code.48 The Franks issued no Roman law,
and in fact the Salic law is unusual in that in the areas it provided guidance, it
superseded Roman law.49 Since little Roman law was actually contradicted (and the
Church was wholly unaddressed), however, Roman law must have operated in some
capacity, but its nature and administration are unclear.
The first Lombard laws were issued in 643, nearly 80 years after their arrival
in Italy, by Rothair. Rothair was an Arian, and anti-Roman in sentiment. He
43 Drew,

introduction to The Burgundian Code, 8–10.
introduction to The Burgundian Code, 5–6; Drew, introduction to Laws of the
Salian Franks, 24.
45 Drew, introduction to The Burgundian Code, 5–7.
46 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 7–8, 24–25.
47 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, viii.
48 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 7. This is also tacitly implied by
Shanzer, “Dating the Baptism of Clovis,” 56, which gives a conversion date of Christmas
508; the code was most probably issued in 507.
49 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 29; Drew, introduction to Laws of
the Salian Franks, 8.
44 Drew,
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nevertheless issued a law code which, while consisting “almost entirely [of] Germanic
custom,” still reflects Roman influence in its very existence.50 Following a series of
minor changes, Liutprand issued a “professionalization” of the law between 713 and
735, giving sometimes sophisticated legal reasoning rather than simple statements
of action.51 The Lombards issued no Roman law but recognized existing law as still
operational, although Drew also says that the Lombard law courts initially “took
no cognizance of Roman law,” so it is not clear how this was handled.52 Although
Rothair’s Edict was essentially a purely Lombard document, subsequent laws were
greatly influenced by Roman law and by the church.53
The laws of the Anglo-Saxons were somewhat uniquely situated and may preserve
a stronger original tradition than can be found elsewhere. The major barbarian legal
codes on the Continent were not issued until 476 at the earliest, after the arrival of
the Saxons.54 Any influence of these codes on the Anglo-Saxons would have to have
happened by communications with the Continent, and although there were some
such contacts (Æthelbert himself was married to the Frankish Bertha55 ), the extent
of any Continental impact on Anglo-Saxon law is unclear at best. Drew additionally
believes that any influence from the surviving Roman culture was weaker than might
have been expected because of the retreat of the Romano-British population following
the invasion.56 She argues that there was thus “no need to retain Roman-law courts
or Roman law in Germanic Britain.” One is left with the conclusion that the Anglo50 Drew,

introduction to The Lombard Laws, 21. Quotation is from Drew, introduction
to Laws of the Salian Franks, 26.
51 Drew, introduction to The Lombard Laws, 17–18, 21; “The Laws of Liutprand,” in
Drew, The Lombard Laws, 253n13.
52 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 26.
53 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 26–27.
54 The Visigothic Codex Euricianus, although see King, Law and Society, 7: there may
have been earlier laws from Theodoric.
55 Bede, Ecclesiastical History, chapter I.25.
56 While Drew may be correct about the extent of influence, it is highly unlikely to
be due to Anglo-Saxon demographic dominance. Thomas et al., “Apartheid-Like Social
Structure,” suggest a realistic Anglo-Saxon population as low as 5 percent of the total—see
2653–54 especially.
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Saxon laws, in Drew’s words, “more closely approach pure Germanic custom than any
other early Germanic legislation.” In this respect they are most closely related to the
Frankish laws, but there is something less Roman about Anglo-Saxon law than any
of the laws on the Continent.57 At the most superficial level, the Anglo-Saxons were
the only barbarian people to use their own language, not Latin, to promulgate their
laws. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the Roman abandonment of the island
predated any of the major legal developments on the Continent in the fifth and sixth
centuries, so that any legal development, Anglo-Saxon or not, would probably have
followed a divergent trajectory.
Although there is the “strong possibility that . . . the Ostrogoths under their
great king Theodoric . . . participated in the early Germanic legislative activity,” with
Averil Cameron stating that “the Ostrogothic kingdom had one law for the Goths and
another for the Roman population,” the Ostrogoths in fact “produced no significant
collection of legal materials that has survived.”58 Any laws that were passed are
unlikely to have had much influence due to the short span of the kingdom. However,
to judge by the institutions adopted by Theodoric, the Ostrogothic approach to
law was likely to have been even more Roman than the Visigothic one. It is worth
mentioning the Vandals only to point out that although they possessed a kingdom for
roughly 90 years we know very little about their legal work. As with the Ostrogoths,
it is likely that they issued some laws, but none have survived.59
∗
57 Drew,

∗

∗

introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 25–26. See also Patrick Wormald,
The Making of English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century (Oxford: Blackwell,
1999), chapter 2, which lays out the case for a heavy Frankish influence on English law.
58 Quotations from Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 25, and Cameron,
The Mediterranean World, 43, respectively; see also Drew, introduction to Laws of the
Salian Franks, viii. Cameron may have been misled by the common misattribution of the
early laws of the Visigothic Theodoric to the Ostrogothic king: see Burns, History of the
Ostrogoths, 82, and Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 22.
59 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, viii, 25. Drew thinks it unlikely that
any Vandal laws would have been influential due to the brief span of their kingdom, but
note that the Liber Constitutionum was one of the most influential early codes and only
lasted for 30 years or so as the law of an independent kingdom.
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As with the Roman laws, I will survey the various ‘barbarian’ legal codes for
the structure of their judicial systems, treatment of violence, family and inheritance
law, and the treatment of foreigners. The cultural implications of similarities and
differences between the codes will be discussed in the next section.
There were regional judices (judges or justices), usually also duces or comites,
with subordinates who filled a sort of officer-of-the-court function.60 “Courts” could
consist of a single justice or more. Although Burgundian law was personal, it still
required cases to be heard by two judges (counts, or comites), one Burgundian and
one Roman.61 Among the Franks, a council or jury of seven rachimburgi sat on cases
and passed judgment; they were required to know and to abide by the law.62 In
England, Alfred references the rulings of law courts in his preamble, and the laws
of Hlothhære and Eadric refer both to accusations before an assembly or meeting
and to certain “judges of Kent.”63 The Anglo-Saxons may also have had something
that looked rather like the Frankish inquests or juries; whether this was a native
innovation or a Frankish, Norman, or Scandinavian import is controversial.64
Unlike in Roman courts, guilt was determined by a balance of sworn oaths, by
ordeal (usually of boiling water), or by judicial duel.65 In the first case, the accused
60 Visigothic

Code, chapter II.1.3, 13–6, 18–23; LC , preamble.3, I.12; PLS , chapters
LVI.1–3; “Rothair’s Edict,”, title 20, 25; “The Laws of Ratchis,” in Drew, The Lombard
Laws, chapters 1–2; see also Drew, introduction to The Lombard Laws, 8; Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 35.
61 LC , preamble.13.
62 PLS , chapters LVI.1–3, LVII. The word itself is peculiar and the origin of the custom
unclear, but see Jacob J. Rabinowitz, “The Influence of Jewish Law upon the Development
of Frankish Law,” Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 16 (1946):
205–06. See also PLS , Capitulary VI, II.5, for something that looks like an inquest of
freemen.
63 “The Laws of Hlothhere and Eadric,” in F. L. Attenborough, ed., The Laws of the Earliest English Kings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), title 8. The identity
of these judges is not clear.
64 Ralph V. Turner, “The Origins of the Medieval English Jury: Frankish, English, or
Scandinavian?” The Journal of British Studies 7 (1968): 1–10, especially 9–10; “Laws of
Hlothhere and Eadric,” title 5.
65 Drew, introduction to The Lombard Laws, 9.
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could clear themselves by swearing an oath of innocence, an ostensibly barbarian
custom, although note that the Roman emphasis on character witnesses was not
wholly different.66 Like the Romans, the Visigoths allowed representation by an
attorney, and it is implied that such representation existed among the Burgundians
as well.67 In extreme cases, trial by ordeal was allowed.68 The Burgundians and
Lombards also made provisions for judicial combat.69
Capital punishment was allowed for certain “moral” crimes (Tacitus cites treason,
desertion, cowardice, shirking, sodomy) and some extreme instances of murder.70 For
“lesser” crimes the penalty was a proportionate payment, some to the victim or family
(wergeld or compensation) and some to the king (a fine); this was to avoid the blood
feud, which eventually became prohibited.71 For slaves, the punishment could include
beating, and they could be killed with a lower penalty.72 Most of the laws recognized
various mitigating and aggravating circumstances. There was generally clemency for
accidental death; death in a quarrel resulted in an intermediate punishment.73 In
England, Alfred provided no punishment for injury resulting from defending one’s
lord or relatives; the Lombards gave explicit immunity for violence on the king’s
orders.74 On the other hand, pleading ignorance of the law resulted not only in the
66 PLS ,

chapter XIV.2–3; “Rothair’s Edict,” title 153 et al.; “Rothair’s Edict,” title 366,
in turn repealed by “Laws of Ratchis,” chapter 5; “Laws of Hlothhere and Eadric,” titles
9–10; “The Laws of Wihtred,” in F. L. Attenborough, ed., The Laws of the Earliest English
Kings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), titles 17–24, which required this
oath be taken on an altar; “The Laws of Ine,” in Attenborough, The Laws of the Earliest
English Kings, titles 14–17 and various others.
67 Visigothic Code, chapter II.3.3; LC , chapter XXI.
68 PLS , boiling water: chapter XIV.2; Visigothic Code, chapter II.1.32; “Laws of Ine,”,
titles 37, 62. Like the Romans, the Visigoths also allowed torture: Visigothic Code, chapter
II.3.4; VI.1.2.
69 LC , chapter XLV; “Laws of Liutprand,” title 71.
70 Tacitus, Germania, chapter 12; Drew, introduction to The Lombard Laws, 11.
71 Tacitus, Germania, chapter 21.
72 Tacitus, Germania, chapter 25, which states that slaves could be killed with no penalty;
Drew, introduction to The Lombard Laws, 11.
73 Visigothic Code, chapter VI.5; LC , chapter II.2, XVIII.2; “The Laws of Alfred,” in
Attenborough, The Laws of the Earliest English Kings, titles 13, 36.
74 “Laws of Alfred,” titles 42.5–6; “Rothair’s Edict,” title 2.
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normal punishment but, at least among the Visigoths, 100 lashes and a scalping!75
Among some peoples, concealing a murder made the penalty worse.76 There was
also a more general notion of breach of the peace; the Burgundians fined entry with
violent intent, and the Lombards forbade breach of peace in a church.77 The AngloSaxons also levied a fine to be paid to the individual whose mundbyrd (roughly
“protection”) had been violated.78
In all kingdoms, the wergeld payment varied depending on the person killed, but
how it varied was different in every case. Among the Visigoths, Burgundians, and
Lombards, it varied by social status; among the Franks, however, it varied by gender
and age.79 It is worth noting that these correspond to more and less Romanized
areas, respectively. The Visigoths had an extensive list of laws (twenty) concerning
homicide in various degrees; a slave was worth one-third of a freeman (or half, there
is some internal disagreement).80 Among the Burgundians and Lombards there were
three tiers of freemen, the highest worth twice the lowest, and various grades of
slaves.81 The Franks had a fixed payment for the death of any freeman, but tripled
the penalty for a “king’s man.”82 Like the other barbarian legal systems, the AngloSaxon laws for death and injury were based on compensation paid to the victim
or his family. Unlike the Continent, at least initially, wergeld was the same for all
freemen but varied for freedmen; a more structured class system only emerged over
75 Visigothic

Code, chapter VI.4.5.
chapter XLI, various titles; “Laws of Ine,” title 35.
77 LC , chapter XXV; “Rothair’s Edict,” title 35.
78 “The Laws of Æthelberht,” in Attenborough, The Laws of the Earliest English Kings,
titles 5, 8, 13, and 15; “Laws of Ine,” titles 6 and 71; “Laws of Alfred,” titles 3 and 7.
79 Tacitus, Germania, chapter 12; Drew, introduction to The Lombard Laws, 8, 11.
80 Visigothic Code, chapter VI.5; slaves: chapter VI.4.1 and VI.5.9. In the following
discussion I am omitting any specific numbers as there is no basis for comparing the value
of money between kingdoms or across time.
81 LC , chapters II.2 and X for slaves of various skills; “Rothair’s Edict,” title 11; “Laws of
Liutprand,” title 13. Liutprand’s reasoning is interesting: only men could receive wergeld,
as it bought off the feud; since women couldn’t feud, they couldn’t receive payment (title
13).
82 PLS , chapters XV.1 and XLI.1.
76 PLS ,
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time.83
Physical assault was similarly punished by a sliding scale of compensation depending on how severe the resulting injuries were (short of death, as noted above).
The titles prescribing these payments frequently made up the bulk of law; in the
Lombard and Anglo-Saxon laws, the scope was almost absurd—there were different
penalties for breaking different fingers, for instance.84 The idea of wergeld is an interesting one, and represents one of the biggest differences with later Roman law.
Berman notes that “the institution of fixed monetary sanctions payable by the kin
of the wrongdoer to the kin of the victim was a prominent feature of the law of all
the peoples prior to the twelfth century, and indeed of every Indo-European people at some stage of its development, including the peoples of India, Israel, Greece,
and Rome. It is also an important part of the law of many contemporary primitive
societies.”85
Tacitus wrote that the barbarians of his time had a strict marriage code, and that
extramarital sex was punished.86 Indeed, marriage seems to have been considered
more binding among the barbarians than it was for Romans, at least on the Continent, and in many cases divorce was forbidden completely.87 Interestingly, marriage
was somewhat less sacrosanct for the Anglo-Saxons and divorce was implicitly al83 “Laws

of Æthelberht,” titles 21, 26. Per Attenborough, The Laws of the Earliest
English Kings, 177n26.1, the various levels of freedman were unique among the AngloSaxons. Æthelbert’s law was also unique in requiring timeliness, with some payment before
the funeral and the whole within 40 days: title 22. 75 years after Æthelbert, noblemen
were worth three times the value of a commoner; by the time of Ine there were three tiers:
“Laws of Hlothhere and Eadric,” title 1; “Laws of Ine,” title 70.
84 LC , chapter V, XXVI, etc.; PLS , chapter XVII; “Rothair’s Edict,” title 43–152; Visigothic Code, chapter VI.4.1; “Laws of Æthelberht,” titles 33–72; “Laws of Alfred,” titles
44–77.
85 Berman, “Background of the Western Legal Tradition,” 557–59. He further states
that the system of wergeld cannot have been purely utilitarian in origin, but reflected
the deeper ideological world-view that a man’s honor was bound up in the things he had
accumulated (or specifically taken from others): wergeld was therefore essentially punitive,
not compensatory.
86 Tacitus, Germania, chapters 18–19.
87 Visigothic Code, III.6.2–3; LC , XXXIV.2–4.
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lowed.88 Under Alfred there was some added enforcement of marriage,89 although
we do not see, as on the Continent, a move towards the total prohibition of divorce.
Contrast this with the Romans, where either party had the option of unilateral divorce for moral reasons, and mutual divorce was not restricted. In all cases, women
could remarry after the death of their husband.90 The status of women could be
quite different in barbarian societies. At one extreme, Visigothic women were considered to be legally self-competent: they could represent themselves in court (but
could not represent others); husbands could not represent their wives without their
permission.91 Among the Lombards, on the other hand, a woman’s freedom was
specifically controlled by mundium, passed from father to husband and thence to his
heirs.92 Among the Anglo-Saxons something similar must have obtained, given that
marriage was treated as a purchase from the woman’s guardian.93 This was similar
to the Roman practice, although after her husband’s death a woman either reverted
to her father’s mundium or became legally self-competent—under the Lombards,
women could not be self-competent.94
Sexual misconduct could result in punishment for the man or woman. Among
the Burgundians, the cost for sleeping with a woman was her bride price, although
subsequent marriage was not necessary. In England, the woman was the one fined.95
Adultery was prohibited, although in England it was apparently not based on any
Christian morality.96 Apparently uniquely among the Anglo-Saxons, and possibly
88 “Laws

of Æthelberht,” titles 77, 82–84; “Laws of Ine,” title 31; “Laws of Æthelberht,”
titles 79–81.
89 “Laws of Alfred,” title 18.
90 Visigothic Code, chapter III.2.1; LC , chapter XXIV,1; PLS , chapter XLIV,1;
“Rothair’s Edict,” title 182.
91 Visigothic Code, chapter II.3.6.
92 “Rothair’s Edict,” title 182 et al.; “Laws of Liutprand,” title 120.
93 “Laws of Æthelberht,” titles 77, 82–84; “Laws of Ine,” title 31.
94 “Rothair’s Edict,” title 204.
95 LC , chapter LXI; “Laws of Æthelberht,” title 73.
96 Visigothic Code, chapter III.4. LC , chapters XXXVI, XLIV. Cf. “Laws of Æthelberht,” title 10, 31: The adulterer had to pay the woman’s husband her wergeld and pay
to furnish another wife—this last requirement was later dropped, but the fine was kept.
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on the Continent as well, Alfred provided penalties for various degrees of sexual assault.97 Recceswinth’s law and later also revisions prohibited what may be called
“carnal offenses”: originally only pederasty, but under Egica (c.610–c.700) the prohibition was expanded to sodomy more generally. Both were punished by castration of
the guilty parties.98 The provisions seem to be unique in barbarian law, nor do they
trace to ancient Roman law; it is unclear why the Visigoths included this prohibition,
unless it demonstrates Byzantine influence (Justinian had outlawed these actions as
well). As with Roman law, incest was widely forbidden, but the definition of incest
was not clear.99
Inheritance law differed among the kingdoms, sometimes dramatically. All of
the Continental kingdoms passed laws on inheritance, some of them extensive, but
there is essentially no mention of inheritance in the Anglo-Saxon laws. Wills were
allowed by the Visigoths, Burgundians, and Lombards; the Franks allowed a predeath “donation” ceremony that achieved the same effect.100 There does not appear
to have been any restriction on the provisions of Visigothic wills, and heirs could
not contest them.101 Burgundian men could not will away the land grants from
the original Roman settlement; women could not will away their marriage gift.102
Lombard women could not will property at all without the consent of their guardian,
and neither fathers nor mothers could disinherit a son.103
Intestate succession also varied, but usually followed a pattern. Like the Romans,

97 “Laws

of Alfred,” title 11. Note that non-virgins were only half as valuable (11.3).
Code, III.5.5–6. Note that Tacitus also said the barbarians punished sodomy
by death: Germania, chapter 12.
99 Visigothic Code, chapter III.5.1; PLS , chapter XIII.11; “Rothair’s Edict,”, title 185.
100 Visigothic Code, chapter II.5.11; LC , chapter XIV.7; “Laws of Liutprand,” titles 6,
102; PLS , chapter XLVI.
101 There are no restrictions per Visigothic Code, chapter IV.2.20, if there are no children,
except this is immediately contradicted by chapter IV.5, so the result is unclear. No contest:
Visigothic Code, chapter II.5.4.
102 LC , chapter I, and I.1 esp.; XXIV.1.
103 “Rothair’s Edict,” titles 204, 169, and 103 respectively.
98 Visigothic
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Visigothic inheritance was equal regardless of gender.104 Among the other barbarians, the pattern was generally sons-daughters-sisters (the Franks put parents before
siblings).105 As noted, women could generally inherit,106 with one famous exception: Salic land was forever prohibited from female inheritance (which, as noted in
Section 3.3, may have been a specific restriction on allodial land intended to support military service).107 Citing ancient law, inheritance then flowed to more distant
relations.108
As noted, barbarian law was largely personal. This can be seen explicitly in the
Burgundian requirement that Romans be judged by Roman law, and implicitly in
the Lombard stipulations that women who marry Romans “become” Roman and
that those who become priests follow a different law.109 Later laws tended to become
territorial, mooting the question. The Burgundians treated barbarian and Roman
alike, legally speaking.110 Under the Franks, Romans required more oathhelpers
than barbarians did, and had only half the wergeld value.111 Romans were still being
called out as late as 596, when Childebert decreed they be fined only half as much
as Franks for sabbath-breaking.112 The Lombards never specified the particular
differences between Roman and barbarian. This legal separation also meant, for
example, Burgundians were forbidden from advocating for Romans in court, and were
supposed to stay out of Roman–Roman property disputes,113 although the remainder
104 Visigothic

Code, chapter IV.2.1–2.
chapters XIV.1–2, XIV.7; PLS , chapter LIX; “Rothair’s Edict,” titles 154, 158–60.
106 LC , chapters XIV.7, XXIV.3; “Rothair’s Edict,” titles 158–60; “Laws of Liutprand,”
titles 1–4.
107 PLS , chapter LIX.5; Anderson, “Roman Military Colonies,” especially 143–44.
108 Visigothic Code, chapter IV.2.3–11; LC , chapter XIV.2; “Rothair’s Edict,” title 153,
which provided for inheritance up to the seventh degree of legitimate kinship—but all were
obligated to know their ancestry if they sought inheritance.
109 LC , chapter I.8; Constitutiones Extravagantes, in Drew, The Burgundian Code, chapter XX; “Laws of Liutprand,” title 127, the first specific mention of Romans in the Lombard
laws; “Laws of Liutprand,” title 153.
110 LC , chapters II, V, X, XXVI, etc.
111 PLS , chapters XIV.2 and XLI, respectively.
112 PLS , Capitulary VI III.7.
113 LC , chapter XXII, LV.
105 LC ,
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of the law code speaks to a reasonably well-integrated society. The Franks did not
have any legislation preventing contact with the Romans. The Anglo-Saxon laws that
address non-Anglo-Saxons (‘wealas’ and ‘læts’) do not seem to have legally segregated
these peoples from the English. Perhaps the most extreme reaction to Romans, or
foreigners in general, was the Lombard punishment for even doing business with a
Roman.114
In fact, the Lombards appear to have held a peculiar distrust of foreigners.
Leaving Lombard territory or inviting in outsiders carried the death penalty under
Rothair; Ratchis extended the penalty to encompass even sending a representative
across the border.115 All merchants were required to have a letter of permission
from the judge or king (there were similar restrictions on merchants in England).116
Contrast this with the more benign assumptions of Frankish malfeasance in the Burgundian Constitutiones Extravagantes: Franks were not to be trusted when selling
slaves, and there appears to have been asylum for Goths fleeing Frankish persecution.117 Even more liberally, the Visigoths explicitly recognized foreign nationality
in allowing merchants to be judged by their own laws.118
Despite the differences, there were also some integrating tendencies in most kingdoms. Roman and Burgundian comites were commanded to keep justice together.
In some cases Roman law was actually set above Burgundian custom.119 Rothair’s
law was intended to be territorial and all foreigners from outside Lombard territory
had to submit to Lombard law.120 The later revisions of the Visigothic Code were

114 “The

Laws of Aistulf,” in Drew, The Lombard Laws, title 4.
Edict,”, titles 3, 4; “Laws of Ratchis,” chapter 9.
116 “Laws of Aistulf,” title 6. It is not clear whether this applied to all merchants or just
foreign ones. See also “Laws of Ine,” title 25, and “Laws of Alfred,” title 34, which strongly
imply the subject in the English is foreign traders.
117 CE , chapters XXI.9 and 4 respectively.
118 Visigothic Code, chapter XI.3.2.
119 Joint justice: LC , chapters I.3, 5, and 8; CE , chapter XXI.11. Preference for Roman
law: LC , chapter XVIII.1.
120 “Rothair’s Edict,” titles 386, 367.
115 “Rothair’s
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also territorial, and unlike the Lombard laws were actually comprehensive enough
to have been so in practice.121 The Visigoths even explicitly allowed Roman-Gothic
marriages (the other law codes did not prevent them).122 In England, there are no
apparent differences between Britons and Saxons after Ine’s laws.123
∗

∗

∗

Legal codes in the post-imperial period began as an attempt at political legitimacy, but evolved over time from kings trying stamping their mark on society into
more legitimate (and useful) law. (See Wormald’s comment that “Much [early] barbarian legislation, in fact, gives the impression that its purpose was simply to get
something into writing that looked like a written law-code, more or less regardless of
its actual value to judges sitting in court.”124 ) As discussed above, where these laws
had the chance to be tested by case law and revised by later kings, they evolved into
a more practicable legal framework. Not all of these codes got that chance, however,
as the fragmented societies and their legal systems began to be consolidated under
fewer and fewer kingdoms. Such was the fate, for example, of the Burgundian and
Lombard laws: in the best case they survived as the personal law of a conquered
people; in the worst (the Burgundian laws, for example) they were simply superseded. Ultimately, Frankish and Visigothic law proved to be the most influential on
the Continent.
That Frankish law would be influential is not surprising, given the political hegemony that the Merovingians and Carolingians were able to achieve. Additionally,
at the very end of the early medieval period, Charlemagne seems to have conducted
121 Visigothic

Code, chapter II.1.2.
Code, chapter III.1.2. As none of the other codes prevented these
marriages—even the anti-Roman Lombards seem to have allowed them—it is not clear
why the Visigoths felt it necessarily to go out of the way to allow them. Given the more
Roman nature of Visigothic law in general, this is perhaps a reaction to the late imperial
prohibition on Romans marrying barbarians.
123 Grimmer, “Britons in Early Wessex,” 114.
124 Patrick Wormald, “Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis: Legislation and Germanic Kingship, from Euric to Cnut,” in Sawyer and Wood, Early Medieval Kingship, 115, emphasis
original.
122 Visigothic
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something of a campaign of lawmaking in parallel with his military conquests. In the
twenty years or so around 800, he issued laws for the Frisians and Saxons (the first
for either people), consolidated and revised the Salic Law as the Lex Salica Karolina,
and issued a series of capitularies for the other peoples under his rule, creating what
Drew called “a layer of imperial law over the Salic, Visigothic, Burgundian, and east
German underneath.”125 There are no substantial changes between the Salic law and
Charlemagne’s revision.126 A separate Frankish code, the Lex Ripuaria, was largely
based on the Liber Constitutionum and the Lex Salica. Salic law was also used as the
basis for the Frankish preparation of laws for the Alemanni (in the seventh century)
as well as the Bavarians, Saxons, Thuringians, and Frisians (in the eighth and ninth
centuries).127 As a territorial law Lex Salica never extended outside northern Gaul,
but it survived as the personal law of Franks long enough to be remembered at the
time of the French Revolution.128
Unlike the Burgundian law, Lombard law survived the Frankish conquest of
774/5.129 The Franks went on to supplement these laws until the tenth century;
the law remained in effect after the subsequent conquest of northern Italy by the
Holy Roman Empire, and was further supplemented by laws issued by emperors
from Otto I to Henry II (spanning the years 963–1024). The Lombard laws were
finally replaced in the eleventh century by the medieval resurrection of Justinian’s
Corpus Juris Civilis.130 Elsewhere, although the Lex Visigothorum Reccesvindiana
lost some influence due to the Moorish invasion, it did survive. It was incorpo125 Drew,

introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 10–11.
are some differences in the penalties assessed—it is unclear whether these represent transmission errors or changes in intent—and a not terribly significant change in
inheritance favoring the father’s sisters over the mother’s sisters: Lex Salica Karolina, in
Drew, Laws of the Salian Franks, XXXIV.3.
127 Wormald, “Lex Scripta and Verbum Regis,” 108; Theodore John Rivers, Laws of the
Salian and Ripuarian Franks (New York: AMS Press, 1986), 9; Drew, introduction to Laws
of the Salian Franks, 9.
128 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 30–31.
129 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 26–27. Drew, introduction to The
Lombard Laws, 20, prefers the earlier date.
130 Drew, introduction to The Lombard Laws, 21–22.
126 There
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rated into the thirteenth century Siete Partidas of Alfonso X and thus into Spanish
national law (by which route it also became part of the law in colonial America).
Outside Spain, Alaric’s Breviary survived in Frankish-controlled areas and became
one of the most important sources of Roman law prior to the resurrection of the
Corpus Iuris Civilis in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. And in England, law
took a different track: “Because of its emphasis on development by precedent and
in ignoring Roman law, English law came eventually to be unique in Western Europe with different legal rules, divisions of law, legal structures, systematization, and
hierarchies of law-makers.”131

6.3

Laws as an Insight into Culture

As Drew noted, “[e]ach of the early Germanic law codes is distinct from the other; and
there is a vast difference between the most Romanized of them, the Visigothic, and
the most Germanic, the Anglo-Saxon.”132 Presumably some of these differences trace
back to the different evolutionary paths of the law codes, as described above, and as
Drew hints at in calling them ‘Romanized’ and ‘Germanic’. Even the personal views
of the kings that issued them could have shaped the laws in different ways (the antiRoman Aistulf is a good example). In their treatment of foreigners (Romans) they
perhaps differed the most, the integrated societies of the Visigoths and Burgundians
contrasting with the more hostile attitudes of the Franks or Lombards.
Presumably also, however, this cannot be the full explanation. Some of the
differences in the laws probably traced back to real cultural differences between the
various tribes that founded the kingdoms that introduced them—somewhere, bound
up in the laws is an idea of culture that was part of what it meant to be a ‘Frank’
rather than a ‘Lombard’. Unfortunately, distinguishing these types of differences
131 Alan

Watson, “The Evolution of Law: Continued,” Law and History Review 5 (1987):

541.
132 Drew,

introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 27.
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is most likely an impossible task: that differences existed is evident, but why they
existed is hardly ever clear. To take the example of wergeld, for example, it is not
terribly surprising to see a status-based structure among the Visigoths, Burgundians,
and Lombards. But why were the wergeld laws of the Franks and early AngloSaxons not status-based? Were these societies truly more egalitarian? Similarly,
given persistent discrimination in modern society, it is not hard to imagine a society
that values women less than men—but it is hard to envision the differences in social
structure that would explain why the Franks and Lombards would value a woman
at two to four times more than a man, whereas the Burgundians, Anglo-Saxons, and
Visigoths held both sexes to be of equal worth.
∗

∗

∗

Common exposure to Rome is likely to have smoothed over some of the historical
differences between the various peoples (see also Section 4.1). The results of this
process can be seen even in Drew’s description of the laws as more or less ‘barbarian’.
We may hope to look to differences between these laws—the laws of the AngloSaxons or Franks being ‘more barbarian’, for example—for insights into the culture
that these peoples (and by extension others) brought with them into the Empire. To
pick a particular case, both the Anglo-Saxon and Frankish laws include references
to something like a trial by jury. While there were some Roman antecedents, they
were generally republican and over five centuries old; the nature of imperial Roman
law at the time these laws were drafted indicates that the concept was probably a
new introduction (and recall that the Anglo-Saxons probably had little if any direct
influence from Roman law).
Differences between them notwithstanding, the early medieval laws also shared
a great deal of common culture that did not trace to Roman origins. Their method
for handling violence was a payment in lieu of feud, although the value of a person
might vary (for several reasons). They typically placed a higher value on marriage
and family than did the Romans, and most of the laws had a detailed concept of

Chapter 6. The Law: A Study in Adoption, Adaptation, and Innovation

147

inheritance that was decidedly different from the Roman model. All the laws showed
an increasing impact of Christianity as they evolved (on which see the next chapter).
Of course, the early medieval laws do owe much to their Roman heritage: At a
high level, all of these codes were issued by a king, sometimes with the help of a
council. All assumed some state judicial function and described, to varying degrees,
courts and court procedures. At a more technical level, the details of many laws,
particularly the Visigothic ones, trace directly to Rome—many laws in the Visigothic
Code are denoted as “antiqua” (ancient), meaning Roman.133
This commonality with Roman law, particularly apparent after the kingdoms began to recombine the earlier personal ‘barbarian’ and Roman codes, illustrates the
extent of barbarian adoption of Roman institutions.134 However, equally extensive
changes, including the existence of separate ‘barbarian’ codes in the first place, indicates that the early medieval kingdoms were also innovating and/or adapting Roman
institutions to meet their needs.

133 Scott,
134 See

preface to The Visigothic Code, xxvii.
Watson, Roman Law, 86.
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Chapter 7
The Role of Religion
It might seem odd to end this thesis with a discussion of religion, particularly as
this material might ostensibly belong in Chapter 4. However, the deep interconnections between the subjects of the preceding chapters—political institutions, social
organization, economics, and the law—are shown nowhere more clearly than in the
history of Christianity and the Church in the early medieval period. Religion, and
specifically the role of the Church, is therefore a topic worth treating separately.

7.1

The Form and Practice of Religion

In the Roman Empire, public religion evolved from state paganism to increasing
support for, and finally enforcement of, Christianity. The actual nature of the transition, and the Empire’s relationship to Christianity, was of course more complex.
Christianity had been a private, largely underground, religion for the first three centuries of its existence. Only a few years after Diocletian’s infamous persecutions,
Constantine mandated full tolerance for all religions after his victory the Battle of
the Milvian Bridge in 312. In fact, following Constantine, Christianity became the
norm in the Empire: all the emperors (except Julian, called the Apostate, ruled
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355–63) were Christian.1
The various barbarian peoples tended to follow slightly more convoluted trajectories. Though most of them ended up Catholic, most also went through a period of
Arianism. (Arianism, named after its founder Arius, was a heretical form of Christianity that saw Christ as subordinate to God, and was quite popular in the fourth
and fifth centuries among both barbarians and Romans.2 ) In particular, one of
the effects this had, at least initially, was to keep separate the religious structures—
organizational as well as theological—of the barbarians and the Romans.3 The major
exception is Anglo-Saxon England; the Anglo-Saxons remained pagan alongside the
(presumably still Christian) Romano-Britons for well over a century. They did not
convert en masse until Augustine’s mission of 597.4
The Franks, probably still pagan when they entered the Empire, were late in this
development. As noted in Chapter 4, Clovis’s conversion is controversial, and he
probably first converted from paganism to Arianism. The important fact remains
that, despite some early Arianism, the Franks became Catholic; this allowed cooperation with Gallo-Roman bishops who opposed the other, Arian, barbarian groups.5
The Goths were certainly Arian; they had been converted before the tribal division by Ulfilas in the fourth century.6 The Ostrogoths governed Italy as Arians
(and indeed the late capital of Ravenna has many Arian houses of worship).7 The
1 Geary,

Before France and Germany, 12; Joseph H. Lynch, The Medieval Church: A
Brief History (London: Longman, 1992), 10–17.
2 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 16.
3 Mathisen, “Barbarian Bishops,” 690–95.
4 Bede, Ecclesiastical History, chapters I.23–33. In fact the conversion of the AngloSaxons is an interesting affair, given multiple missions and the controversy between Roman
and Celtic forms of worship. It had little bearing, however, on Continental development
(until the Anglo-Saxon missions to Germania in the eighth century) and was a result of
the unique circumstances of the island.
5 Drew, introduction to Laws of the Salian Franks, 7; see also Shanzer, “Dating the
Baptism of Clovis,” and Daly, “Clovis,” especially 623, 639–41.
6 Wolfram, History of the Goths, 75–84.
7 Wolfram, History of the Goths, 325–6.
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Visigoths were still Arian when they settled in the Iberian peninsula, and in fact had
some difficulty with the local Catholic clergy on account of this.8
Not all barbarians were so resolutely Arian, however. Despite previous assumptions of a strong Arian tradition (in Gregory of Tours, among others), Burgundians
are attested as practicing Catholicism as well. The last significant king, Sigismund,
converted after a pilgrimage to Rome; members of his family had been Catholic before that. Interestingly, even the Arian king Gundobad maintained amicable relations
with the Catholic clergy.9
The writings of early medieval historians like Gregory of Tours and Bede are full
of references to a wide range of Christian heresies, against which these authors spend
a great deal of time and invective.10 Nevertheless, despite these accounts, and despite
the prohibitions against heresy in the vast majority of the early medieval legal codes
(see Section 7.2), there is no evidence that heretics or heresies played a major role in
this period of western European history. Although there were significant theological
disputes in the Eastern Empire, the West seemed largely ignorant of these.11
∗

∗

∗

Chris Wickham notes that “There is no precise date at which we can say with
assurance that the ancient church ended and the medieval church began. The transition from one to the other was not an event but a long process.”12 He similarly
argues that both the practice of Christianity and the hierarchy of the Church as an
institution survived from the late Empire through to the medieval period “without
a break.”13
8 Collins,
9 Gregory

Early Medieval Europe, 153; see also Wolfram, History of the Goths, 232.
of Tours, History of the Franks, II.32; Shanzer and Wood, Avitus of Vienne,

18–20.
10 Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks, and Bede, Ecclesiastical History, passim.
11 Wood, “Gregory of Tours and Clovis,” 269; Shanzer and Wood, Avitus of Vienne,
89–91.
12 Lynch, The Medieval Church, 19.
13 Wickham, The Inheritance of Rome, 171, 175.
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This continuity carried with it the cultural heritage of the Roman Empire. Paul
Fouracre argues that “Catholic continuity was for these centuries the chief conveyor
of Roman ideas and institutions to all parts of Europe.”14 Joseph Lynch likewise
cites “normative Christianity, embodied in sturdy structures such as the office of
the bishop . . . the patriarchates and the conciliar tradition,” as a touchstone for
early medieval society.15 Certainly the Church (particularly the bishopric) became
the new refuge of the aristocracy.16
The role of the Church in this period is debated. Henri Pirenne, and later Peter
Brown, saw a more secular Roman society becoming more religious: In some sense
late antiquity could initially be characterized by its (partial) separation of church
and state power. Particularly the later medieval kingdoms would be more overtly
religious in nature.17 In fact the situation was more nuanced, with Brown noting
that the end of “civic paganism” began at the end of the third century, and Pirenne
calling the Church “the most striking example of the continuity of Romanism.”18
In terms of its role in barbarian society, however, the Spanish historians Luis
Garcı́a Moreno and José Orlandis Rovira argue that religion was highly influential,
particularly among the Visigoths.19 Herwig Wolfram finds a middle ground: many
barbarians followed the Arian sect of Christianity, and while it may not have been a
14 Fouracre,

“Cultural Conformity,” 157.
The Medieval Church, 18, emphasis mine.
16 Cameron, The Mediterranean World, 63.
17 Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, 136, 265–66; Brown, The Making of Late
Antiquity, 11. ‘Separation of church and state’ is an admittedly anachronistic framework.
18 Brown, The Making of Late Antiquity, 28–29; Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne,
124.
19 Garcı́a Moreno, “Las invasiones y la época visigoda,” has numerous examples: see 249
for his suggestion that Arianism gave the Goths an identity in the first place (given their
otherwise not entirely cohesive nature, it is an interesting suggestion, if hardly provable);
270–71 for the Arian Gothic conflict with Catholic bishops in the late fifth/early sixth
centuries; and 321–23 for the impact of religion on Visigothic control of the kingdom in the
seventh century. Orlandis, La iglesia, goes farther, seeing religion as a deliberate means
first of keeping Goths and Romans apart and then of integrating them into one society:
20, 97–98.
15 Lynch,
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defining feature of their culture, it was certainly one which set them apart from the
Romans. In general, I am inclined towards something of Pirenne’s cynicism, seeing
the late antique Church in a primarily organizational capacity rather than a spiritual
one.
As much as the Church was the cultural inheritor of Rome, however, the continuity it offered was not absolute, at least with the Eastern Empire. Already in
the early sixth century doctrinal disputes were driving a wedge between Rome and
Constantinople. Following the catastrophic Gothic Wars, the Church in Italy began
aligning itself increasingly with the western powers and Africa against the Eastern
Empire, finally severing ties between the two.20

7.2

Emerging Theocracies?

One of the effects of the rise of Christianity in both the Empire and early medieval
kingdoms was the imposition of Christianity per se. Christianity was made the only
legal religion under Theodosius I in 391/2, and the later emperors all ruled on various
interpretations of Christian doctrine.21 (With respect to Arian Christianity the law
is unclear. Arian worship was explicitly allowed in 386 by a ruling of Valentinian II;22
as noted, paganism was outlawed by his successor, but Valentinian’s law was included
in the code of Theodosius II, so it may have still had force, or Theodosius I may
not have intended to outlaw Arianism with paganism. Justinian, however, used the
Arianism of the Ostrogoths as a pretext to enlist the Catholic Franks against them.)
The effectiveness of this official status is less than certain: a century and a half
later, Justinian was still legislating against heretics and Jews—against whom he also
instigated what can only be called pogroms—and there are various hints in the acts
20 Cameron,

The Mediterranean World, 122; Wood, “Gregory of Tours and Clovis,” 269.
The Mediterranean World, 64–69; Lynch, The Medieval Church, 10–17; see
also Mathisen, “Barbarian Bishops,” 664.
22 Matthews, “Making of the Text,” 37.
21 Cameron,
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of later councils that paganism continued for centuries afterward.23
Most of the law codes were explicitly Christian in origin, though not always
in nature. There are references to God, usually as a lawgiver or benefactor, in
virtually all the codes. The Visigoths were the most compulsive about it, but other
references appear in the laws of the Burgundians, Franks, Lombards, and AngloSaxons. Alfred’s preamble leaves no doubt as to the nature of his law, beginning
with a long introduction meditating on law throughout Christian history and the
growth of church law.24
Because the codes of Euric and Leovigild do not survive in their own right, we do
not know how overt their Christianity was, but the later Visigothic Code, as issued
by Recceswinth, Erwig, and Egica, was a blatantly Christian document. Christian
practice was required, and, for example, all business was legally prohibited on the
sabbath, on feast days, etc.25 In fact, the later Visigothic laws demonstrate a unique
persecution of heretics and Jews. Heretical practice was punished by the forfeiture
of all one’s property, and permanent exile;26 Jewish practice was punished by execution.27 Moreover, Jews were cut off from society. A Christian doing business with a
Jew suffered a financial penalty; actually defending or supporting a Jew resulted in
excommunication and the loss of most or all of one’s property.28 All of these persecutions were initiated by Recceswinth, but were reiterated and reinforced by Erwig

23 Cameron,

The Mediterranean World, 143 and 69, respectively. See also Robinson,
Criminal Law, 13, citing Codex Theodosianus 16.10.4, 16.9.1, 9.7.5, and 16.5.1.
24 LC , chapter I.1. PLS , Capitulary II LXLII. “The Laws of Grimwald,” in Drew, The
Lombard Laws, preamble; from Grimwald all the Lombards did the same. The preambles
of all the Anglo-Saxon laws after Æthelbert are similar; see especially Alfred’s. See also
F. L. Attenborough, ed., The Laws of the Earliest English Kings (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1922), 34; Wormald, Making of English Law, 481–82.
25 Visigothic Code, II.1.10.
26 Visigothic Code, XII.2.2.
27 Visigothic Code, XII.2.3–12.
28 Visigothic Code, XII.2.18, XII.2.15, respectively. These prohibitions seem to imply
that Jews could live in Visigothic territory so long as they did not actually (or at least
openly) practice their religion.
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in his re-issuance of the Visigothic Code.29 S. P. Scott saw in them “the foundation
of the Spanish Inquisition and its diabolical procedure.”30
Contrast this with the other barbarian kingdoms, whose law codes, with one exception, make no mention of Jews (the Burgundians singled out Jews only in the
case of assault on a Christian31 ). In fact, the other law codes may have derived
in part from interaction with the Jews: at least one scholar, Jacob Rabinowitz,
saw some striking similarities with Jewish law in the later laws of the Franks and
Lombards, particularly in the areas of contracts, purchases, and specifically mortgages.32 Rabinowitz even saw the origins of the otherwise singularly Frankish council
of rachimburgs in a similar Jewish construct.33
In England, Bede credits the first imposition of Christianity per se to Eorcenberht,
c.640.34 Under Ine, merely being a Christian gave one a legal advantage: nonChristian oaths only counted half as much.35 However, Ine also required baptism.36
In addition to imposing the religion itself, early medieval laws also legislated
on Christian practice and the Church. At the most basic level many of the laws
provided some protection for churches, either physically or as a place of sanctuary.
The Franks penalized burning a basilica; no other people seems to have felt this
prohibition necessary, but the Lombards and Anglo-Saxons protected the church’s

29 Visigothic

Code, XII.3.
preface to The Visigothic Code, xv.
31 LC , CII.
32 For the Franks see Rabinowitz, “Influence of Jewish Law,” and for the Lombards Jacob J. Rabinowitz, “Jewish and Lombard Law,” Jewish Social Studies 12 (1950): 299–328.
33 Rabinowitz, “Influence of Jewish Law,” 205–06. His argument is based on similarities
in the name, function, and number of the rachimburgs.
34 Bede, Ecclesiastical History, chapter III.8; this code has not survived.
35 “Laws of Ine,” title 15. The word Attenborough actually uses in his translation is
“communicant,” which I interpret as “Christian.”
36 “Laws of Ine,” title 2. Baptism was required within 30 days, or the parents owed a fine;
if the child died unbaptized, the parents lost all their property. This either represents a
concern for the well-being of souls totally unique in early medieval law, or a shrewd excuse
to grab property in a high-death-rate society.
30 Scott,
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property and fined the breach of peace.37 The Franks likewise enforced the sabbath,
as did the Anglo-Saxons (who also required Lent).38 All three also prohibited the
violation of sanctuary.39
On the other hand, the Burgundians made no mention of Christian practice, and
the only concession made in the Lombard laws is the requirement to take oaths on
the Gospels.40 In fact, the anti-Roman Lombard king Aistulf issued a series of laws
which seem to reinforce that the Church should not be treated specially in terms
of compensation, loss of property, oaths, etc., and may have forbidden priests from
entering a Lombard’s house without the permission of a judge,41 but even these laws
suggest a more widespread integration of the Church in Lombard society.
In England the kings took a greater interest in the management of the Church
than did those on the Continent. There were multiple attempts to control the behavior of the clergy.42 Under Ine we see the first required tithing among the barbarians:
all were required to pay what F. L. Attenborough translates as “church dues,” of an
unspecified type or amount.43
∗

∗

∗

Not only were Christianity and Christian practice required, the Church itself
began to acquire enormous power. The Church became legally distinct from the rest
of society, with ecclesiastical courts, and clergy recognized as a separate, privileged
class. The Church even acquired some power of arbitration.44 This development was
37 PLS ,

chapter LXVb; “Rothair’s Edict,” title 35; “Laws of Æthelberht,” title 1; “Laws
of Alfred,” title 6: theft from a church carried only the standard fine, but did forfeit the
thief’s hand.
38 PLS , Capitulary VI III.7; “Laws of Wihtred,” titles 9–13; “Laws of Ine,” title 3; “Laws
of Alfred,” titles 5.5 and 40.
39 PLS , Capitulary II LXL; this was overturned by Childebert: PLS , Capitulary VI II.1;
“Rothair’s Edict,” title 272; “Laws of Liutprand,” 143; “Laws of Ine,” title 5; “Laws of
Alfred,” titles 2 and 5.
40 “Rothair’s Edict,” title 359.
41 “Laws of Aistulf,” titles 16–19, 23; the last may be spurious.
42 “Laws of Wihtred,” titles 6–7; “Laws of Ine,” title 1; “Laws of Alfred,” title 21.
43 “Laws of Ine,” titles 4, 61.
44 Robinson, Criminal Law, 12, citing from Codex Theodosianus 16.2.12 and 41; 1.27.1-2.
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not unlike that of the aristocracy, and in fact the Church and the élites were drawn
into the same cultural orbits.45 The early medieval laws similarly showed protection
or privilege for the institution of the Church. Among the Visigoths, for example,
clerics were given preferential treatment over the laity and it was made illegal to
impersonate a cleric.46
The Church also accumulated wealth and power through its role as a landlord. It
was the largest land-owning institution after the Roman Empire—and the largest in
the wake of the Empire’s demise. Additionally, churches and monasteries probably
also enjoyed greater rights over their land than did lay owners. Certainly they sought
to protect their wealth and status, negotiating exemptions from the taxes and feudal
duties owed on their land (see also Section 4.3).47
“At the same time,” notes Fouracre, “the Church was able to adapt itself to
the changing conditions in post-Roman society, one of which was its own social and
political importance which everywhere grew, if only by default of other structures.
Imbued with wealth and power, church leaders were magnates on a par in wealth
and social status with secular leaders. There followed, not surprisingly, an aristocratisation of the church leadership, and because the same families supplied both
ecclesiastical and secular leaders, there was a sanctification of some elements of the
aristocracy, as there was too of royalty. With one or two exceptions, the saints of
early medieval Europe were as much a social as they were a religious élite.”48 The
same “cultural orbits” binding powerful lay and clerical figures that Wickham cited
in late antiquity equally pertained (probably, continued) to the early medieval period.
The cumulative effect was that “The post-imperial aristocracy made increasing
45 Wickham,

“The Other Transition,” 14.
Code, III.4.18, III.5.3.
47 Wickham, “The Other Transition,” 14, 21; see also Reynolds, Fiefs and Vassals, 60–64.
Susan Reynolds does caution that this apparent bias in favor of Church ownership and
Church privilege may be skewed by the fact that most surviving early records are from
Church lands: 62–63.
48 Fouracre, “Cultural Conformity,” 157.
46 Visigothic
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use of the Church in maintaining its power.”49 This dependence continued a late
Roman trend and saw in particular the use of clergy as secular authorities. Bishops
had seen their secular power increase even under the late Empire, but the early
medieval period saw the development of legal jurisdiction over the laity. Under the
Visigoths, bishops were even given supervisory authority over secular justices (how
this was received by the Visigothic duces who served as justices is not clear).50 To
some extent, this sort of dependence or cooperation was probably essential, given that
the Church remained one of, if not the, biggest power player throughout the early
medieval period. (This is not to say the Church could not find itself on the losing
side of a power struggle: Charles Martel seized Church lands throughout Francia in
the early eighth century; his reasons for doing so are not entirely clear, though they
have been linked to the re-appropriation of the land to his military supporters.51 )
As Fouracre put it, “We can now see how dependent political authority was upon
legal and religious support. In both fields notions of public authority deriving from
the Roman world were kept alive, and the Church in particular provided institutional
continuity with that world.”52 The influence of the Church was relatively new, and
it was pervasive, touching not only on its ostensible domain of religion or theology
but also secular governance and law, and spilling over into its considerable economic
power. Although the term ‘theocracy’ may be too strong a label, it is perhaps not
amiss to see in the early medieval kingdoms at least hints of what Richard Neuhaus
dubbed a ‘clerocracy’.53

49 Halsall,
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51 Lynn White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1962), 10–11; Halsall, Warfare and Society, 71–75.
52 Fouracre, “Cultural Conformity,” 158.
53 Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1986), 166.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions

8.1

Assessment of the Argument

The barbarians, who had not necessarily arrived in the Empire in a manner conducive
to integration, were nonetheless able to fit into the Roman society and class structure.
There were elements of Romanization in barbarian culture, and vice versa. As the
barbarians were established in kingdoms and grew in strength, they made use of
existing administrative and political structures. Around them the economy continued
to evolve along the same lines it had been following already for a century. This
section will summarize the arguments of the preceding chapters; the next will draw
conclusions about the nature of the post-imperial transition.
The way the barbarian peoples were accommodated by the Empire shows a progression from cross-border raiders to settled foederati to increasingly autonomous
kingdoms. As the systems of power became increasingly decentralized, the barbarian peoples were able to leverage themselves via these structures into late Roman
society more broadly. Over the course of late antiquity, the barbarians also began
to adapt the administrative institutions they had taken over to their own purposes.
The various kingdoms seem to have differing success in successfully employing this
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administrative inheritance, but they all relied on it. These kingdoms were hierarchical systems based around kingship backed by a senate or council; while the particular
forms varied, and none truly reflected the Roman model after the sixth century, the
result exhibits a blending of Roman and barbarian traditions. Keeping in mind that
the barbarians were originally settled to provide military service, the transition from
late antiquity to the early medieval period also saw the militarization of society, as
well as a change in how military service was organized and paid for. Rather than
the professional standing armies of the Empire, military service was secured through
assignment of either land or cash support, an institutional arrangement that begins
to look like feudalism. There was likewise both continuity and change in imperial
fiscal institutions. Roman tax structures were adapted to become the basis of the
medieval seigneurial system and, as noted, may have been adapted to handle the new
military structure. At the same time, the economy transitioned from being primarily
tax-based to primarily rent-based.
Just as official administrative institutions became more decentralized, so too culture became more local throughout late antiquity. On the one hand, barbarian and
Roman social structures blurred and adapted into each other; on the other, the
previous imperial culture began to fragment, leading to increasing regionalization.
This “downward” trend created autonomy, ending in some cases with largely selfgoverning settlements of free peasants. Cities also survived, if in reduced form, and
were likewise more independent, but also less influential, retaining in most cases only
a local social or administrative role. This localization also resulted in the growth of
feudalism, or at least feudal-like structures. As various political and economic pressures drove society away from its traditional arrangement, late antique patronage
became something like personal lordship. This combined with a newly dominant
system of land use, whereby ownership of land was increasingly ceded to the more
powerful, while the less powerful used the land in return for rents or services.
The story of the post-imperial European economy is superficially a negative one.
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Like political administration and social structures, the post-imperial economy underwent a period of localization that did not really begin to turn around until the
Carolingian era. Unlike government and society, however, the economy is more
strictly defined by its interconnectedness, so that such decentralization really may
seem to represent a loss. Certainly, decreased or absent central control and thus less
coordination meant more localized economic activity, including a return to diversification of agriculture and industrial production. However, this in fact represented
the continued evolution of a longer trend. Pirenne was thus both right, in that the
economy survived the impacts of the barbarians, and wrong, in that the imperial
economy had already been on a downward trend for some time. Trade networks and
exchange systems did survive. They may have been reduced, sometimes substantially, in scope, but trading centers were being established and expanded throughout
this time. By the Carolingian period international merchants were once again an
established class. The major waterways remained important trade routes, with use
of the Mediterranean only being lost—perhaps curtailed is a better word—by the
rise of Islamic piracy; the major rivers and northern seas remained open.
The laws of the early medieval kingdoms represent an interesting look into the
competing and sometimes contradictory influences on the early medieval kingdoms.
In that they were issued by more or less central states, under the imprimatur of a
king and/or legislative council, and ruled on by a judicial system bearing marked
similarities to the later imperial magistracy, the laws represent a continuation of Roman administrative institutions. Their content, however, gives a glimpse into newly
introduced or emerging social and economic structures. Each law was different, and
reflected the norms (or at least the royal intentions) of its kingdom. Despite their
differences, the early medieval laws also shared a great deal of common culture.
Some of this was obviously inherited from the Romans, and the extent of this heritage identifiable centuries later illustrates the depth of medieval adoption of Roman
institutions. Some of the commonalities in early medieval law, however—including
the existence of separate ‘barbarian’ codes in the first place—also reflect a real in-
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troduction of non-Roman, ‘barbarian’ culture (the concept of blood vengeance and
wergeld is one notable example). In fact, due to the melding of these two traditions,
by the time of Charlemagne the earlier imitations had given way through innovating
and/or adaptation into new forms of law. To some extent, this was a natural outcome of the sophistication and organization required to manage increasingly large
states, and in many ways, the various early kingdoms had to reinvent the legal wheel
(the re-territorialization of law, for instance).
One distinctive feature of this period, first identified by Edward Gibbon, was
the increasing influence of the Catholic Church—but whether that was for barbarian
cultural reasons, an increasing religiousness, or a relative rise in influence due to
the loss of the central state is unclear. What is clear is that the Church became
integral to the medieval kingdoms, gaining in power and influence throughout late
antiquity and the early middle ages. The barbarians, all of whom had been pagan
or Arian on entry into the Empire, converted to Catholicism—in some cases, like
the Franks, it seems clear that this was to exploit or at least share in the Church’s
power. The Church as an institution shared a cultural history with the aristocracy,
and the ties between them led both to the aristocratization of the Church and to
the sanctification of secular power. The Church, always a major landholder, became
involved in the emerging feudal (or feudal-like) social and administrative structures.
Its officials increasingly filled secular roles, particularly in justice.

8.2

Conclusions and Themes

This thesis has proposed that the barbarian kingdoms of post-imperial western Europe were built on and out of the late imperial structural framework. Furthermore,
it has argued that the institutions we think of as medieval—more localized power
systems and economies and the beginnings of what may be called feudalism—in fact
stemmed directly from trends begun under the Empire.
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The evolution of social and political systems—the role of the barbarians within
the Empire, and how their political and class structures changed—plainly reflects
a lengthy and complex adaptation, both before and after the end of the Empire.
The barbarians were at least partially integrated into Roman society, which in turn
influenced their own cultural self-perception. The barbarians made use of existing
administrative and political structures. These changes in themselves are no longer
particularly controversial. The full implications of the process are debated; however,
it is not always even clear whether the evolution of the Roman system was driven by
the barbarians as barbarians, or by the mere fact of the Empire’s interaction with
external parties.
Economically, we can likewise see high-level continuity. Sometimes this continuity
was direct inheritance, sometimes it can only be seen through a continuous process of
adaptation. Overall, however, the economic transition can largely be characterized
as a process of incremental evolution rather than revolutionary change. It is in the
economy, in fact, that we can see the greatest evidence for Roman continuity, and it
is perhaps not surprising that those historians like Walter Goffart who have looked
at economic issues have also been the ones most prominently arguing for continuity.
The issuance of barbarian laws is perhaps the clearest example of the intrusion of
a coherent barbarian culture into a Roman past. Though the laws display their
differences, they also reflect a clear commonality of barbarian, non-Roman culture.
Even here, however, it is clear that the laws owe a large debt to Rome, in both form
and substance.
∗

∗

∗

Though I have in this thesis characterized the transition from late antiquity to
the early middle ages as one of essential continuity, that continuity was obviously
not absolute. Historians like Wolfram and Walter Pohl have argued that we can
trace clear barbarian cultural heritage from literally prehistoric times, and that this
culture is what shaped the evolution of Europe after the Roman Empire. This is far
from clear. Nonetheless, as noted above, there are clear traces of common ‘barbarian’
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culture; one theme of the transition is therefore the ‘barbarization’ of the Empire:
the Vienna and Toronto Schools are both right, to an extent.
In fact, as Katherine Fischer Drew observed, regarding the survival of the different barbarian peoples, “it is a curious fact that those barbarian kingdoms that went
furthest in the direction of compromise and assimilation did not ultimately create a
lasting political life, whereas those kingdoms that retained a stronger Germanic flavor and made fewer concessions or none at all to the Roman population were longer
lasting.”1 The Ostrogoths and Burgundians, who settled closest to the heart of the
empire and made the most significant accommodations, lasted the briefest, both
kingdoms being defunct by the middle of the sixth century. The Vandals, Lombards,
and Visigoths all made varying degrees of concessions, and lasted somewhat longer.
The Franks and Anglo-Saxons, both pagan at entry, settling farther from Rome, and
making little if any accommodation, lasted substantially longer as political entities
and significantly shaped the countries that became France and England. (We should
not necessarily draw too strong a conclusion from Drew’s observation: The Ostrogoths and Vandals were crushed by the Eastern Empire even as they attempted to
retain much of the western imperial structure, and of course the Visigoths had built
a fairly robust kingdom before they, too, were defeated by the Moors in the early
eighth century.)
‘Barbarization’ notwithstanding, another theme that we may see is that the elements we now see as medieval were almost entirely present within the Empire itself.
Within the context of the barbarian invasions, the weakening of the central imperial
state, and the economic trends of the fourth and fifth centuries, Romans and barbarians alike worked to adapt imperial institutions but also, when necessary, replace
them. This trend holds true in the political, social, economic, legal, and religious
domains—though, as above, in some areas more than others.
The final two related themes that appear are the trends first towards localiza1 Drew,

introduction to The Lombard Laws, 13–14.
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tion or regionalization of society at all levels, and second towards the sorts of social
relationships that we can call feudalism. Although the traditional concept of feudalism is perhaps too specific to be truly applicable, especially in light of recent
scholarship, understood more broadly feudalism remains the most useful framework
for understanding this transformation. Specifically, feudalism remains the best way
to understand the coordinated (or at least interlocking) processes of the local consolidation of power by the aristocracy (both lay and clerical); the localization of
governmental functions, including in the extreme a type of personal lordship; and
the replacement of taxes and cash payments with rents and payments in kind or in
service. Particularly when we consider the tying of land grants (or rent revenues
from land grants) with the provision of military service, it is hard to deny the association with the traditional understanding of feudalism—and we need look no further
than the original settling of barbarians as foederati in the fifth century to see the
beginnings of this process.
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